Formal education in science also lacked any institutionalization. There were, however, some establishments having scientific staffs of high competence, of which the most important was the Mouseion (Museum) established at Alexandria, richly endowed by the Ptolemies; but, at least initially, it was an institute for advanced research. If the scholars endowed there were also teachers, this meant only that they dispensed instruction to a small circle of chosen disciples. The same informal character of personal training was to be seen in all the special disciplines—medicine, for example, which saw such a fine development between the time of Hippocrates (5th century bce) and that of Galen (2nd century ce). If there were in the Hellenistic era certain “schools” of medicine—old (Cnidus, Cos) and new (Pergamum, Alexandria)—these were less the equivalent of today’s medical faculties than simply centres to which the presence of numerous qualified masters attracted a large number of aspirants. Whatever theory these “students” were able to learn, they learned largely through self-training and practice—by associating themselves with a practicing physician whom they accompanied to the bedsides of patients, taking part in his consultations, profiting by his experience and advice.
Philosophy and rhetoric were subjects of education most highly institutionalized. Although philosophy was taught privately by individual masters-lecturers—who could be either itinerants or residents of one place—these teachers were well organized and, in groups, possessed a kind of institutional character. On the model of Plato’s Academy, the new Athenian schools of philosophy—Aristotle’s Lyceum, Epicurus’ Garden, the Porch (stoa), which gave its name to the Stoics—were brotherhoods in which the posts in both teaching and administration were passed from generation to generation as a kind of heritage. It was in philosophy that the personalistic character of the Hellenistic era most clearly asserted itself in contrast to the more communal idea of the preceding period; when philosophy turned to the problem of politics, for instance, it dealt less with the citizens of a republic and more with the sovereign king, his duties and character. The central problem was henceforth that of wisdom—of the purpose that man should set for himself in order to attain happiness, the supreme ideal. The teaching of philosophy was not entirely contemplative: it involved the disciple in an experience analogous to a religious conversion, a decision implying a revision of his life and the adoption of a generally ascetic way of life. Such a vocation, however, could obviously appeal only to a moral, intellectual, and financially secure elite; philosophers were always quite a small number within the Hellenistic (and Roman) intelligentsia.
The reigning discipline was always rhetoric. The prestige of the oratorical art outlived those social conditions that had inspired it; political eloquence operated only in the context of an embassy coming to plead the cause of a particular city or pressure group at the court of the sovereign. Legal eloquence maintained its function, and the profession of advocate retained its attractiveness, but it was above all the eloquence of showy set speeches—the art of the lecturer—that experienced a curious blossoming. Also, as a result of the customary habit of reading aloud, there was no sharp line between speech and the book; thus, eloquence imposed its rule upon all literary genres—poetry, history, philosophy. Even the astronomer and the physician became lecturers.
Hence, great importance was attached to the teaching of rhetoric, which developed from century to century with an ever more rigorous technicalism, precision, and systematization. The study of rhetoric had five parts: (1) invention (the art of finding ideas, according to standard schemes), (2) disposition (the arrangement of words and sentences), (3) elocution, (4) mnemonics (memory training), (5) and action. Action was the art of self-presentation, the regulation of voice and delivery and above all the art of reinforcing the word with the expressive power of gesture. Each of these parts, equally systematized to the tiniest detail, was taught with a technical vocabulary of extreme precision. Such an education—which in addition to theory comprised a study of the great examples to be imitated and exercises in practical application—required many years of study; in fact, even in maturity, the cultivated Hellene continued to deepen his knowledge of the art, to drill himself, to “declaim.”
A rivalry existed between philosophy and rhetoric, each trying to draw into its orbit the best and the most students. Even in the time of Plato and Isocrates, this rivalry did not proceed without mutual concessions and reciprocal influences, but it remained one of the most constant characteristics of the Classical tradition and continued until the end of antiquity and beyond. The long summer of Hellenic civilization was extended under the Roman domination; the great centres of learning also experienced a long prosperity. Athens in particular was the unchallenged capital of philosophy; its ephebeia welcomed foreigners to come to crown their culture in the “school of Greece.” Its masters of eloquence also had a solid reputation, even though they had competition from such schools of Asia Minor as those of Rhodes (in the 1st century ce) and Smyrna (in the 2nd century bce). Under the later Roman Empire, Alexandria—already famous for medicine—competed with Athens for preeminence in philosophy. Other great centres developed: Beirut, Antioch, and the new capital Constantinople. The quality of the teachers and the number of students attending permits one to apply to these centres, without too much anachronism, the modern designation of “universities,” or institutions of advanced learning. Ancient Romans Early Roman education
The quality of Latin education before the 6th century bce can only be conjectured. Rome and Roman civilization were then dominated by a rural aristocracy of landed proprietors directly engaged in exploiting their lands, even after the establishment of the republic. Their spirit was far removed from Greece and Homeric chivalry; ancient Roman education was instead an education suitable for a rural, traditional people—instilling in youth an unquestioned respect for the customs of the ancestors: the mos maiorum.
Education had a practical aspect, involving instruction in such farm management concerns as how to oversee the work of slaves and how to advise tenant farmers or one’s steward. It had a legal aspect; in contrast to Athenian law, which relied more on common law than on codified law, Roman justice was much more formalistic and technical and demanded much more study on the part of the citizen. Education also had a moral aspect, aiming at inculcating rural virtues, a respect for good management of one’s patrimony, and a sense of austerity and frugality. Roman education, however, did not remain narrowly utilitarian; it broadened in urban Rome, where there developed the same ideal of communal devotion to the public weal that had existed in Greece—with the difference that in Rome such devotion would never be called into question. The interests of the state constituted the supreme law. The ideal set before youth was not that of the chivalrous hero in the Homeric manner but that of the great men of history who, in difficult situations, had by their courage and their wisdom saved the fatherland when it was in danger. A nation of small farmers, Rome was also a nation of soldiers. Physical education was oriented not toward self-realization or competitive sport but toward military preparedness: training in arms, toughening of the body, swimming across cold and rapid streams, and horsemanship, involving such performances as mounted acrobatics and cavalry parades under arms.