348 Some of the military arrows, vectors, etc. for Kharkov and Stalingrad derive from the maps in Günter Wegmann, ed., “Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt…”: Der deutsche Wehrmachtsbericht (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1982).
349 Colonel Metz to Paulus: “Let me congratulate you on your Knight’s Cross…” —Slightly abridged from Goerlitz, p. 167. This message bears the date of 5 June 1942 and therefore probably reached Paulus much sooner than I have allowed it to.
351 Field-Marshal von Manstein: “The safety of a tank formation operating in the enemy’s rear…”—Von Manstein, p. 185.
351 Coca to her husband, on Africa: “Keep your fingers out of that pie.”—Ibid., p. 32.
353 The Führer: “There is not going to be a winter campaign!”—Ibid., p. 35.
353 The architecture of Werewolf, Wolf’s Lair, Wolf’s Gorge, and for that matter many of the structural details of Hitler’s trains, cars, military headquarters, etcetera, referred to in this story and in “Clean Hands”—Peter Hoffmann, Hitler’s Personal Security (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979). Hitler was at Wolf’s Lair, with many interruptions, from 24 June 1941 through 20 November 1944. Meanwhile came two spells at Werewolf: 16 July to 1 November 1942 (this is the period of greatest relevance here), and 17 February through 13 March 1943. Paulus’s final visit to Wolf’s Lair, when Paulus goes “whiter than a German tank,” is my fabrication.
354 Hitler: “The Ukrainians, yes, a thin Germanic layer…”—Kershaw, p. 244 (recollection of A. Rosenberg); somewhat altered; the original was about the Poles rather than the Ukrainians.
356 Hitler: “Once we’ve erased Leningrad and Moscow from the map…”—Warlimont, p. 242, quoting Goebbels, March 1942.
356 Major-General Schmidt: “The greatest happiness any of our contemporaries can experience…”—Warlimont; quoting Goebbels’s diary, entry for 21 March 1942.
361 Paulus to Lutz: “The great thing now is to hit the Russian so hard a crack…” —Goerlitz, p. 169.
363 Colonel Heim on Paulus: “A slender, rather over-tall figure…”—Goerlitz, p. 48.
363 “They”: “This defensive mission is contrary to the German soldier’s nature”—After Newton, p. 63 (Otto Schellert, “Winter Fighting of the 253rd Infantry Division in the Rzhev Area 1941-1942”).
364 “A German general who survived the war”: “Practically every Russian attack…” —Major-General F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Story of the Employment of Armour in the Second World War, trans. H. Betzler (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956, repr. of 1955 English ed.), p. 185.
366 Field-Marshal von Manstein: “This policy of covering everything…”—Walimont, quoting Goebbels’s diary entry for 21 March 1942, p. 40.
366 Unnamed officer at Wolf’s Lair: “Any caliber smaller than a hundred and fifty millimeters is ineffective…”—Loosely after Newton, p. 117 (Gustav Höhne, “In Snow and Mud: 31 Days of Attack Under Seydlitz During Early Spring of 1942”).
366 Hitler: “I made it clear to my Brownshirts… rip off his armband”—Loosely after Mein Kampf, p. 504 (“An Attempted Disruption”).
367 “Manstein’s high regard for the march discipline of the S.S. Death’s Head Division” —Op. cit., p. 187.
369 Fremde Heere Ost, Gruppe I, Army Group report on the Red Army’s new Don Front: “Defensive enemy behavior”—Thomas, p. 269. (The source for this erroneous information was actually not the Leitstelle für Nachrichtenaufklärung, however.)
370 Enemy signal of 18.11.42: “Send a messenger to pick up the fur gloves”—Erickson, p. 464.
371 “Übersicht über sowjetrussischen Kräfteeinsatz” and description of the map’s colors —The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, trans. David Irving (New York: Times Mirror, World Publishing, 1972, trans. of 1971 German ed.), frontispiece.
372 Great Soviet Encyclopedia: “Encirclement is most often achieved…”—Vol. 18, p. 78 (entry on encirclement).
374 Paulus, on a possible breakout: “More than ten thousand wounded and most of our heavy weapons would have to be written off”—Loosely after the sentiment expressed by General Schmidt in Beevor, p. 268. On this same page Beevor writes that Paulus was “haunted” by comparisons with Napoleon’s retreat, so I supplied the standard figures on that disaster.
376 Field-Marshal von Manstein on Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch: “Not belonging to quite the same class as Baron von Fritsch…”—Manstein, p. 75. About Paulus, Manstein was actually more charitable than this, concluding (p. 303) that “he can hardly have had a sufficiently clear picture of the overall situation.”
376 Radio transmission came from our Führer: “Sixth Army is temporarily surrounded by Russian forces…”—Moderately altered from the version in Beevor, pp. 269-70.
378 Paulus to Coca: “At the moment I’ve got a really difficult problem on my hands…” —Goerlitz, p. 72 (letter of 7 December 1942).
378 Episode of the grand piano in the street, the ammunition-box altar for Christmas, and a few other miscellaneous details—Loosely based on Franz Schneider and Charles Gullans, trans., Last Letters from Stalingrad (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1962).
378 Gehlen’s assessment of von Manstein: “One of the finest soldiers of this century.” —Gehlen, pp. 153-54. This was actually a postwar evaluation of the man.
379 Field-Marshal von Manstein: “The best chance for an independent breakout has already been missed.”—von Manstein, p. 306.
380 Paulus’s letter to von Manstein, as dictated to Colonel Adam: Severely abridged, somewhat “retranslated” and slightly altered from the full version which von Manstein gives as Appendix I (pp. 551-54).
381 Lieutenant-General Jaenecke: “We’ll go through the Russians like a hot knife through butter!”—Slightly altered from Mitcham, p. 235.
383 Paulus: “Your airlift has failed us…”—Loosely after Craig, p. 234.
384 Major-General Schmidt to Major Eismann: “Sixth Army will still be in position at Easter…”—Slightly “retranslated” from von Manstein, p. 334.
384 Paulus to Eismann: “At any rate, under current conditions a breakout would be impossible…”—Very loosely after an indirect quotation in von Manstein.
384 The remainder of this conversation with Eismann is fabricated. For evidence that von Manstein was in fact willing to take responsibility for having Paulus disobey Hitler, see his memoir, pp. 341-42.