3. See Horst Möller et al., eds., Die tödliche Utopie: Bilder, Texte, Dokumente, Daten zum Dritten Reich (Munich and Berlin, 1999), pp. 62f.; Chaussy and Püschner, Nachbar Hitler, p. 45.
4. See Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, p. 166. The rumor circulated among the staff that Eva Braun’s and Hitler’s rooms were connected by a “hidden door”: Eva Braun “had a room that was connected to Hitler’s bedroom by a secret door” (Therese Linke, unpublished handwritten memoir, no year [from the 1950s], in ZS 3135, vol. 1, IfZ Munich, p. 9).
5. Albert Speer to Werner Maser, n.p., January 30, 1967 (carbon copy), in Albert Speer Papers, N 1340/37, BA Koblenz. Cf. Speer, Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle 1945, p. 146.
6. Martin Bormann to Dr. Friedrich Wolffhardt, Führer Headquarters, December 27, 1941, U.S. National Archives, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD, quoted in Beierl, Geschichte des Kehlsteins, p. 8.
7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. Starting in 1934, Department 1 of the Reich Security Service (Reichssicherheitsdienst, RSD) and the SS-Begleitkommando under SS-Standartenführer Johann Rattenhuber were responsible for Hitler’s security. See Möller, ed., Die tödliche Utopie, p. 67; Chaussy and Püschner, Nachbar Hitler, p. 130. See also Peter Hoffmann, Die Sicherheit des Diktators: Hitlers Leibwachen, Schutzmassnahmen, Residenzen, Hauptquartiere (Munich and Zürich, 1975).
9. See Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, pp. 16 and 171.
10. Therese Linke, unpublished handwritten memoir, p. 9.
11. See Chaussy and Püschner, Nachbar Hitler, pp. 146ff.
12. Speer, Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle 1945, p. 100.
13. Christa Schroeder to Johanna Nusser, Führer Headquarters, August 30, 1941 (original), in ED 524, IfZ Munich. Fritz Wiedemann similarly states: “There were always the same people, proof of the consistency of the company at table” (undated notes, including “Obersalzberg,” (transcription), in Fritz Wiedemann Papers, Kleine Erwerbung Nr. 671, vol. 4, BA Koblenz.
14. Fritz Wiedemann, as cited in note 13, above. Hitler, according to Wiedemann, never worried about his own personal security. He repeatedly used to “rush off on a drive somewhere or another, or even to a play, without telling his security staff.”
15. Fritz Wiedemann, undated notes, as cited in note 13, above.
16. See Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, p. 186.
17. Fritz Wiedemann, undated notes, as cited in note 13, above.
18. Ibid. Wiedemann first mentioned Eva Braun as well only in his memoir published in 1964: Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte: Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen des Vorgesetzten Hitlers im 1; Weltkrieg und seines späteren Persönlichen Adjutanten (Velbert, 1964), p. 79.
19. See Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, pp. 50f.
20. State Secretary and Head of the Chancellery (Lammers) to the Minister of Finance (Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk), Berchtesgaden, September 11, 1936 (copy), in R 43/4326, Bl. 5 u. 6, BA Berlin.
21. See Thamer, Der Nationalsozialismus, pp. 183f. See also Akten der Reichskanzlei, Regierung Hitler 1933–1945, vol. 5, Die Regierung Hitler 1938, ed. Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und dem Bundesarchiv (Munich, 2008).
22. See Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p. 32. The “Private Chancellery of the Führer and Chancellor,” run by Albert Bormann, Martin Bormann’s brother, was Chief Department 1 of the “Chancellery of the Führer.” It lost its significance, as did the “Chancellery,” when the “Party Chancellery” run by Martin Bormann (a renaming of the “Deupty Führer’s” staff after Rudolf Hess’s disappearance) was established in 1941.
23. See State Secretary and Head of the Chancellery (Lammers) to Retired Captain Wiedemann (adjutant to the Führer), Berlin, August 18, 1938 (copy), in Rep. 502, NG-1465, Bl. 739, State Archives, Nuremberg. Lammers writes that he has ordered payment of the “41 receipts” that Weidemann sent over from the Munich art dealer Maria Almas, totaling 284,550 reichsmarks. See also Hanns Christian Löhr, Das Braune Haus der Kunst: Hitler und der “Sonderauftrag Linz” (Berlin, 2005), p. 35; and Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, Staatsbankrott: Die Geschichte der Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1920 bis 1945, geschrieben vom letzten Reichsfinanzminister (Göttingen, 1974), pp. 241f.
24. See Völkischer Beobachter, January 19, 1937, in R 43 II/1036, Bl. 103, BA Berlin. See also Franz Alfred Six, ed., Dokumente der deutschen Politik: Das Reich Adolf Hitlers, vol. 5 (Berlin, 1940).
25. State Secretary and Head of the Chancellery (Lammers) to the Minister of Finance (Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk), Berchtesgaden, September 11, 1936 (copy), in R 43/4326, Bl. 6, BA Berlin.
26. See Chaussy and Püschner, Nachbar Hitler, p. 132.
27. See Wiedemann, Der Mann der Feldherr werden wollte, pp. 68f. This was also a try for Party work, according to Otto Dietrich (12 Jahre mit Hitler, p. 45).
28. Reichsminister and Head of the Chancellery to the personal adjutant of the Führer and Chancellor (SA-Obergruppenführer Brückner), Berchtesgaden, October 21, 1938 (copy), in R 43 II/888b, F 1, Bl. 42, BA Berlin.
29. Reichsminister and Head of the Chancellery to Economic Minister Walther Funk, Berchtesgaden, October 24, 1938 (copy), in R 43 II/888b, F 1, Bl. 43, BA Berlin.
30. Reichsminister and Head of the Chancellery to the personal adjutant of the Führer and Chancellor (SA-Obergruppenführer Brückner), Berchtesgaden, October 21, 1938.
31. See Jörg Osterloh, “Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung im Reichsgau Sudetenland 1918–1945” (dissertation, Munich, 2006), p. 13.
32. See Reichsminister and Head of the Chancellery to the personal adjutant of the Führer and Chancellor (SA-Obergruppenführer Brückner), Berchtesgaden, October 25, 1938 (copy), in R 43 II/886a, F 3, Bl. 128f., BA Berlin. On Bl. 129, there is a handwritten note mentioning resubmission on October 27 and 31. Lammers, who clearly still had not received an answer from Brückner after two days, let his assistants remind him twice, presumably to try to get an answer by phone.
33. See Kershaw, Hitler 1889–1936, p. 535; Hitler 1936–1945, p. 186; The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1987), p. 121. Kershaw writes that Hitler, from 1935–1936 on, withdrew more and more from domestic government activities and turned over political business to “chancelleries, ministries, and special plenipotentiary organizations.” Cf. Martin Moll, ed., “Führer-Erlasse” 1939–1945 (Stuttgart, 1997), p. 11. Moll maintains that this claim is based not least on a “giant gap in the sources with respect to civilian matters.”
34. See Wilhelm Treue, “Das Dritte Reich und die Westmächte auf dem Balkan,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 1 (1953), no. 1, p. 61. Cf. Dilek Barlas, Etatism & Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic & Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929–1939, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, vol. 14, (Leiden, 1998), pp. 188f.
35. See Moll, “Führer-Erlasse,” pp. 26ff.
36. See Gun, Eva Braun, p. 126.
37. Wiedemann, Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte, p. 69.
38. Speer, Albert Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle 1945, p. 100. How this process of reaching a decision and converting it to action actually played out remains unexplained. See in this regard Moll, “Führer-Erlasse,” p. 26.