The arbitrary creation of these currencies to support war efforts at different rates has caused wide variations in the exchange rates among European countries to the extent that some had faced severe hyperinflation in their national economies. Some of the countries like; Germany, Hungary, Austria, and Poland of which hyperinflation had taken a very heavy toll on, have made several attempts to re-establish gold convertibility to fix the fundamental disequilibria in their balance of payments. However, the British Sterling, which had been providing the strongest foundation for the harmonization of economic policies prior to the outbreak of WWI, was no longer enjoying its hey day.
Especially after the decline of the British industrial and commercial hegemony, countries that were previously renowned as international creditors have started losing their elevated positions after becoming heavily dependent on capital imports from the United States in exchange for maintaining a stable balance of payments equilibrium. After a while, it became evident that pre-war exchange rates could not be restored.
During the inter-war period, national price levels and interest rates rose to unprecedented proportions as each developing country, including the ones in the “most-industrialized” periphery (i.e. Germany, Japan), experienced both inflation and deflation in their domestic economies. The dissolution of Europe in the aftermath of WWI disrupted the orderly process of the gold standard and led to a period of persistent economic uncertainty. The Bank of England ceased issuing loans, as governments around the world, particularly in Europe, defaulted on their loans and their debt repayments for war reparations. Each country in Europe gradually started abandoning the gold standard. In the aftermath of WWI, strategic economic alliances that were made prior to the war all broke down with the possible advent of an even more destructive war.
As a result of this scenario, most of the belligerent countries have found their remedy in the procurement of arms and weapons by printing out of massive amounts of money to finance their military expenditures and to support war causes, even though almost all of them have declared moratorium on their payments post-WWI. One example of such a case was Germany, as the industrial heartland of Europe suffered one of the most severe hyperinflations in world history with highest military spending.
In the ensuing political conflict after WWI, the structure of the world economy, including those of financial centers were also profoundly devastated. Countries that engaged in war started to yearn increasingly for the pre-war parities (as goods and services had become overvalued and undervalued) and for the restoration of the gold standard.
The decline in the Bank of England's wealth as the world's leading financial center followed by persistent stagflation in Britain failed to inspire confidence in the world markets. As a result of the British Central Bank’s ineffectiveness in carrying out its obligations and because of her failure of commitment to maintain a stable currency value, foreign holders of British pounds converted their pound holdings into U.S. dollars. However, between the 1939-1942 period, Britain had already depleted more than half of its gold reserves after purchasing ammunitions from the U.S. In short, there was not enough money supply to resume the gold-standard system as the war had led to the complete depletion of gold stocks in Britain.
On the other hand, the U.S. economy was also suffering from a similar predicament during the inter-war period. Governments around world that were operating on the gold standard were being limited from expanding their money supplies and thereby from lowering their interest rates. The imposition of this rule had pushed some countries to break the rule and secretly print out more money to tackle deflation in their economies. However, to show its commitment to the gold standard, the U.S. Federal Reserve did not pursue an expansionary monetary policy and kept interest rates at relatively high levels during the war periods. But the gold stocks of the Federal Reserve were also rapidly contracting and were causing a sudden devaluation of the U.S. dollar “In the U.S., the Federal Reserve was required by law to have 40% gold backing of its Federal Reserve demand notes, and thus, could not expand the money supply beyond what was allowed by the gold reserves held in their vaults.”
(Edward C. Simmons, Elasticity of the Federal Reserve Note, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1807996)
The maintaining of high interest rates would translate directly into a deflationary pressure on the dollar, which then had caused a significant reduction in investment in U.S. banks overtime. Because of this scenario, both investors and depositors have started withdrawing their funds from U.S. banks after the emergence of a widespread speculative fear that the value of the U.S. dollar would decline.
In spite of some burgeoning international economic corporation in the period preceding 1930's, there was much considerable turbulence in the world markets. Trade barriers were mainly imposed and the widespread repudiations of domestic and international debts were accompanied by uncertainty in economic policies. Governments' efforts to improve the effects of foreign exchange markets proved problematic and incessant deflation led to increased rates of unemployment as the stock markets around the world have crashed. This period in history was called the “Great Depression.”
During the world-wide depression, many countries that were agitated by the suspicious arrangements made for the exchange of unreliable currencies assumed an uncooperative behavior. It was precisely during this period when the need for the creation of a monetary order that would govern international monetary relations among independent states became evident. This new international monetary order was called the “Bretton Woods System.”
The Bretton Woods System (1944-1971)
“To suppose that there exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium if we only trust methods of laissez-faire is a doctrinaire delusion which disregards the lessons of historical experience without having behind it the support of sound theory.” (J.M. Keynes, 1980)
The quarter-century following WWII, has clearly demonstrated the fundamental disadvantages of the fully-flexible exchange rates. By 1944, many countries have extracted important lessons from the tragic experiences of the Great Depression and made important strides to avoid repeating the same mistakes of the past.
One of these intended critical measures was to put into practice an international monetary order that would regulate and oversee the international transactions of independent states. Although many countries had divergent views on the macro-economic management of their national policies, almost all of them agreed upon the idea of establishing an international monetary system that would regulate the international economy primarily through the two main principles of capitalism; “through private ownership” and “through adjustable market mechanisms.” (Two examples of this particular case were France and the U.S., where the French government sought greater planning and intervention in the markets, whereas the American government favored a relatively limited level of intervention.)
The era following the Great Depression was one in which many countries implemented “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies by shifting away the demand for imported goods to domestically produced goods by imposing tariffs and quotas. This was done with the objective of fighting against domestic unemployment and trade deficits. At the same time, most of the debtor nations were also seeking to reduce their balance-of-payments deficits by implementing monetary policies that would devalue their currencies and increase the competitiveness of their exports around the world. In the end, these frivolously managed currency devaluations and beggar thy neighbor policies have backfired and led to the following to occur: 1-) plummeting of national incomes, 2-) a sharp increase in unemployment rates, 3-) contracting demand for goods and services, 4-) and eventually to the overall decline of global international trade.