Although such duct overflows most likely occurred later in the sinking and to the rear (under the second smokestack, from boiler room number 4 into boiler room number 3), Barrett and Kemish escaped up through a hatch atop the boiler room number 5 casing—which would not have been possible if, prior to the loss of buoyancy in boiler room number 5, water was already pooled atop the hatch, almost halfway up E deck (at the point of exhaust-chamber convergence).
Moreover, under the duct-flooding scenario, the flooding in boiler room number 5 would have started slowly, then built steadily in force—with the flood coming down through the air and exhaust ducts and out through the mouths of the boilers, not from the direction of a bulkhead between the boilers, as reported by Barrett to the American Inquiry, May 25, 1912, p. 1141. Barrett was very clear about a sudden knocking noise, followed by a great wave that appeared to be shooting at him through the front bulkhead from a space between the boilers and not from the boilers themselves. All of this occurred with such rapidity that there was no time for Barrett and Kemish to attempt a rescue of John Shepherd and Herbert Harvey. During the next few minutes, boat 6 began lowering, and Molly Brown’s observations are consistent with a rapid and significant loss of buoyancy in the bow section, with the ship taking on more water and beginning its shift from leaning to starboard to a portside list.
Edward Wilding’s testimony at the British Inquiry, June 7, 1912, pp. 528–529, and June 19, 1912, pp. 736–737, divided the examiner and the commissioner on the use of mathematical figures alone in determining the breaking strength of the Titanic’s steel bulkheads and addressed (for the first and one of the few times) the bending strength of rivets and steel plates along the interior bulkheads (rather than the usual focus on the outer hull). Barrett reported that the slant of the deck was worsening considerably before water broke through to boiler room number 5: British Inquiry, May 7, 1912, pp. 2046–2049.
Daniel Buckley testified at the American Inquiry, May 3, 1912, pp. 1020–1022, about the confinement of third-class passengers. At the stern, Masabumi Hosono survived, like Buckley, by refusing to be confined, as recorded in his letter to his wife, Apr. 1912, reproduced in M. Findlay, “A Matter of Honor,” Voyage 27, Winter 1998, p. 122. Anna Turja and several of her friends made a similar breakaway, detailed by Paul J. Quinn, Dusk to Dawn, Fantail Press (Hollis, NH: 1999), 123.
Harold Lowe had been forgotten and was initially left asleep in the officers’ quarters, as he told the British Inquiry, May 22, 1912, pp. 366–367; British Consulate affidavit, New York, May 1912, L/P file, pp. 413–420. When he awoke and stood up, Lowe understood immediately that the slant of the deck was wrong: American Inquiry, Apr. 23, 1912, p. 387. Lowe’s impression of a twelve- to fifteen-degree tilt was not accurate. Later in the sinking, when Lightoller swam toward the crow’s nest from the submerging bridge, the Titanic measured only ten to eleven degrees down trim: Charles Pellegrino and Walter Lord, measurements made with models in water, 1987–1988.
About the time Lowe awoke and the first distress rocket detonated at 12:45 a.m., Lily Futrelle felt the deck tilt suddenly, as described in her interview with the Boston Sunday Post, Apr. 21, 1912, L/P file, p. 129.
Henry Harper reported in “The True Story of the Disaster,” Harper’s Weekly, Apr. 27, 1912, having watched the iceberg through his open porthole. When the robot Jake maneuvered into the Harper stateroom, D-33, the porthole was still open: Charles Pellegrino, video log, Expedition Titanic XIII, Aug. 2001; Don Lynch and Ken Marschall, Ghosts of the Abyss (Toronto: Madison Press, 2003), 102, 103.
Three starboard D-deck portholes near the Harper stateroom were also open, as confirmed by Ken Marschall, in a letter and maps discussing his census of open portholes in the bow section, June 30, 2010, L/P file, pp. 129B–130.
Thomas Patrick Dillon witnessed the opening of the watertight doors to boiler room number 4: British Inquiry, May 9, 1912, pp. 98–102. Edward Wilding defended this action: Wilding, British Inquiry, June 7, 1912, p. 529; Lightoller, British Inquiry, May 21, 1912, pp. 334–335.
Parks Stephenson, personal communication, Dec. 23, 2010, clarified the pumping power aft of boiler room 4: “The boiler [room number] 3 pump room was cross-connected via a ten-inch hose to help combat the rising flood waters in boiler room [number] 4 [up to and after the collapse of the sealed boiler room number 5]. Unlike boiler room [number] 5, where [a] single pump room was keeping ahead of the visible flooding before the failure of the bulkhead, the water in boiler room number 4 was rising despite two pump rooms working against it.”
Charles Lightoller gave testimony suggesting that he helped to sink the ship faster, believing that a gangway door could be opened on a lower deck to off-load more passengers into lifeboats being sent down only half fulclass="underline" British Inquiry, May 21, 1912, pp. 314, 323.
Henry Harper’s lifeboat (boat 3) reached the water about 1 a.m.: American Inquiry, Apr. 24, 1912, pp. 1159–1163; British Inquiry, pp. 399, 404. George Rowe said he fired the first rocket somewhere between 12:45 and 12:50 a.m. and had been instructed to fire rockets “every five or six minutes”: letter to Walter Lord, 1955 (with annotations by Lord), L/P file, p. 319.
The number of people in boat 3: American Inquiry, results summary, pp. 1159–1163, lists forty passengers and ten crewmen; Colonel Archibald Gracie, in Jack Winocour, ed., The Story of the Titanic as Told by Its Survivors (New York: Dover, 1960), 234, lists forty people aboard. Henry Harper, “The True Story of the Disaster,” Harper’s Weekly, Apr. 27, 1912, described the tilt toward the port side and agreed with Gracie’s total of forty people aboard.
The crew abided by Lightoller’s plan to open a lower gangway door, as Norman Chambers testified to the American Inquiry, May 3, 1912, p. 1043. The opening of the portside D-deck door about this time probably occurred at least several minutes ahead of the boiler room number 5 collapse, the sudden shift to port, and the burst of water through a porthole near boat 6, as reported by Molly Brown to Colonel Gracie in Jack Winocour, ed., The Story of the Titanic as Told by Its Survivors (New York: Dover, 1960), 178.
Brown believed the gush came from a D-deck porthole; however, she was notoriously unsure of the Titanic’s geography, even regarding the location of her own stateroom: James Cameron, Ghosts of the Abyss, IMAX, 2003. A census of D-deck openings renders Brown’s identification of a D-deck port as the source of the gush unlikely. A known, open D-deck porthole just in front of the open gangway door would have been located near the bow of boat 6 as it was being lowered (possibly gushing directly into the boat).