The campaign was a first step in the corporatist experiment of organizing society through associations of producers rather than classes, promising a less divisive and more organic form of political representation. It transformed a simple dictatorial regime into a fascist one, combining state corporatism and authoritarianism.[28] By 1933 the 1926 authoritarian military coup had evolved into a full-fledged fascist regime—the New State—with a corporatist constitution that would last until 1974.[29] It replaced any form of liberal mechanisms of representation with ideological nationalism, a one-party state, systematic political repression, and a social and economic corporatism formed by alleged organic social unities, a combination that placed it among the family of European fascist regimes.[30] Amusingly similar to Bolshevik arguments, the ruling elite of the New State considered Portuguese society not yet ready for pure corporatism from below, the state having to assume for the time being the responsibility to build a new social structure based on the alleged harmony of its different organs. Manuel de Lucena, a scholar who has explored the relations between corporatism and fascism in greater depth, maintains that not even in Mussolini’s regime were corporatist organizations so influential.[31] A short glance at the multiplicity of new institutes, boards, commissions, and councils, the so-called organisms of economic coordination, which were created to guarantee the discipline of different economical sectors, confirms the verdict. Every major product or raw material, be it rice, wine, cod, cotton, or wool and industries as disparate as milling, cannery, ceramics, or pharmaceutical, deserved a new rationalizing para-state corporatist institution controlling imports, prices, wages, or quality.[32] The first such corporatist institution to be created was the National Federation of Wheat Producers (FNPT), and it was the direct result of a campaign—in this case, the Wheat Campaign.
Colonel Henrique Linhares de Lima, having been responsible for organizing the management of supplies of the Portuguese Army in the trenches of World War I, was now to transfer his military expertise to the Wheat Campaign as Minister of Agriculture of the dictatorial regime from 1929 until 1932. Again, it is important to notice these constant transactions between peace and war, with permanent mobilization a hallmark of the new regimes. Linhares de Lima was granted the power to mobilize every engineer and scientist from the Lisbon Agronomy Institute—the main agricultural-sciences establishment in the country—to promote wheat production. He was quick to nominate the institute’s young and promising professor of genetics, António Sousa da Câmara, as the Wheat Campaign’s field marshall.[33] Câmara, when remembering those glorious days, didn’t shy away from the typical epic rhetoric of the fascist era: “The wheat campaign had come. The dawn had arrived! Happy those like us, who started our professional lives under the dawn’s early light and were able from the very first moment to follow a Great Leader and the flame of a new Mystique.”[34] The Great Leader was, of course, António de Oliveira Salazar (1889–1970), the dictator who headed the Portuguese government from 1932 until 1968, and who had been the finance minister of the dictatorial government since 1928.
The Wheat Campaign was organized in six divisions—Propaganda, Technical Assistance, Financial Assistance, Transportation, Fertilizers, Seeds—with a triangular command made up of a politician named by the Minister of Agriculture, a large landowner, and an agricultural scientist.[35] Mário de Azevedo Gomes, the scientist formerly responsible for the technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture, did not hide his disdain for the new structure of the Central Board for the Wheat Campaign, which he described as an “alien body that represented a State inside the State.”[36] However, for Câmara there was no doubt concerning the need for this new parallel structure that should be filled with young people full of enthusiasm to serve the new leader. In the pages of his campaign diary, he recalled how Linhares de Lima was obsessed with “saving for the Nation the torrents of gold sent abroad to buy our bread. Salazar needs us to win the campaign.… If Salazar does not rest, neither do we have the right to rest.”[37] While Salazar tightened control over public expenditure to free Portugal from foreign dependency, the Wheat Campaign, together with measures increasing protectionism and credit concessions, promoted national production and imports substitution.[38]
Technical brigades consisting of 124 agricultural scientists and engineers were sent into the Portuguese fields to spread ten commandments of wheat farming. By following the first three, a farmer would defend the fatherland by using proper fertilization, mechanized implements, and selected seeds. The fourth and fifth commandments urged a farmer to use sowing machines and to rationally organize his livestock so as to have enough manure at his disposal. Succeeding commandments reminded a farmer of the important role of the technical brigades. The ninth called for a farmer to “reflect on the patriotic accomplishment in Italy,” and the tenth repeated the motto “Our land’s wheat is the border that best defends us.”[39]
In the years 1927–1933, the wheat fields of the Alentejo region in southern Portugal, which alone accounted for about 60 percent of the country’s wheat production, added an area increment of 28 percent, occupying 391,000 hectares.[40] The total annual production of the country grew from 280,000 tons for the years 1925–1929 to about 507,000 tons for the years 1930–1934.[41] The record productions of the years 1934 and 1935, with unprecedented surpluses in domestic grain output, proclaimed the victory of the Wheat Campaign. This was due primarily to the extension of wheat fields into the poor soils of the heaths and the replacement of vineyards by cereal. In 1938, Câmara, the young geneticist who served as the executive head of the campaign, when praising the “golden wheat fields that covered the Portuguese soil over a previously unheard extension,” already recognized, using familiar militarist language, the limitations of the “first raid.”[42] After all, he preferred production increases more through intensification rather than extension.[43] Be that as it may, he had no doubts about the profound effects of the campaign on the landscape: “The attack by men and machines ripped the heaths…. The crimson spot rockrose, the bell heather, the broom, the rosemary, all that scented world, the heath’s soul, slowly disappeared under the turfs lifted by the plough.”[44]
The Campaign meant, once and for all, an end to the uncultivated lands of Alentejo, a major topic for every Portuguese politician who had promised to increase the productive output of the country since the nineteenth century.[45] The heathlands that occupied two thirds of the region in 1864 were definitely gone by 1930, with sharecroppers assuming the status of heroes in this epic reclamation of the southern plains as asserted by popular songs and political rhetoric.[46] Possessing no more than a pair of mules and a plow, and paying back to the large estate owner between one seventh and one third of the crop, they were attracted by the high grain prices of a protected national market as well as by the subsidy paid by the Campaign for each hectare of newly cultivated land. While the large landholder contracted directly wage laborers to work the deeper clay soils of the property (the barros), the sharecroppers were directed to the terras galegas (the poorer schist thin soils at the peripheries of the estates).[47] Traditionally, the terras galegas, which constituted about 85 percent of the total area of the province, had been left uncultivated as heathlands or had been under a regime of long fallow.
28
This argument was made by Machado Pais et al. on pp. 388–389 of “O fascismo nos campos.”
29
On Salazar’s corporatist state, see Manuel de Lucena,
30
This short list is taken from Manuel Villaverde Cabral, “Portuguese fascism in comparative perspective,” working paper presented at XIIth World Congress of International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, 1982. This text removes any reasonable doubt about the inclusion of the Portuguese regime among European fascisms.
32
Ibid. Corporatism didn’t affect all sectors equally, having developed to protect national agriculture from international markets (wheat, rice, olive oil, wool), to coordinate production and commerce of colonial products (cotton, coffee, sugar, vegetable oils), to control imports of food, energy, and raw materials (cod, coal, metals), to support main exports (wine) affected by the Great Depression, and to impose cartelization from above in dispersed sectors put under the control of big families (pharmaceuticals, ceramics, matches). Sectors already under a regime of monopoly (cement, fertilizers, oil refining) didn’t have to integrate the new corporatist system; they had been “naturally” corporatized. See Fernando Rosas, “O Corporativismo Enquanto Regime,” in
33
António Sousa da Câmara,
35
36
Mário de Azevedo Gomes,
38
On Salazar’s financial and economic measures in the first years of the dictatorship, see Fernando Rosas,
39
40
In 1929, Alentejo’s districts of Beja, Évora, and Portalegre accounted for 58% of Portugal’s wheat production.
41
Mário de Azevedo Gomes, Henrique de Barros, and Eugénio de Castro Caldas, “Traços principais da evolução da agricultura portuguesa entre as duas guerras mundiais,”
43
António Câmara and Lúcio Mercês de Mello, “Ensaios de Intensificação cultural do trigo,”
45
The campaign followed a trend that had begun with the raising of the wheat tariff by Elvino de Brito in 1889. See António d’Oliveira Salazar,
46
José Cutileiro,
47
The best discussion of the different nature of soils in Alentejo and their relation to the wheat campaign is, Mariano Feio,