If Russian nationalism was in crisis by summer 1917, nationalism among the non-Russian people was in the ascendant.[112] From the late nineteenth century, the tsarist state had been destabilised by rising nationalisms, although these played no direct part in its demise. At the time of the February Revolution nationalism was developed extremely unevenly across the empire - strong in the Baltic and the Caucasus, weak in Central Asia - and movements to form independent nation-states proved irresistible only in Poland and Finland. Initially, nationalists demanded rights of cultural self-expression, such as schooling or religious services in native languages, the formation of military units along ethnic lines, and a measure of political autonomy within the framework of a federal Russian state. The typical aspiration was encapsulated in the slogan of the liberal and moderate socialist Ukrainian National Council, known as the Rada: 'Long Live Autonomous Ukraine in a Federated Russia'. The Provisional Government assumed that by abrogating discriminatory legislation against national minorities it would 'solve' the national question. Its reluctance to concede more substantial autonomy was motivated by fear that nationalist movements were being used by Germany - a not unreasonable supposition if one looks to their later record in the Baltic - and by an emotional commitment to a unified Russian state, especially strong among the Kadets. As a result of this reluctance, nationalist politicians stepped up demands for autonomy, at the same time as they tacked to the left in order to keep in step with the growing radicalism of peasants and workers, whose support they needed if they were to create viable nation-states.[113] When in September Kerensky finally endorsed the principle of self-determination 'but only on such principles as the Constituent Assembly shall determine', it was too little and too late.[114] Nevertheless if nationalism became one more force undermining the viability of the state, the strength of nationalist sentiment should not be exaggerated. In most non-Russian areas, demands for radical social and economic policies eclipsed purely nationalist demands. Workers, for example, generally inclined to class politics rather than nationalist politics; and though peasants liked parties that spoke to them in their own language and defended local interests, they proved unreliable supporters of 'their' nation-states when called upon to fight in their defence. In general, but not invariably, nationalism proved successful where it was reinforced by class divisions, as in Latvia, Estonia or Georgia.
In autumn 1917 a psychological break occurred in the public mood, with the euphoria of the spring giving way to anxiety, even to a sense of impending doom. This was most evident in many elements that made up Russia's heterogeneous middle classes. The intelligentsia, which had long been losing coherence as an ethically and ideologically defined group, lost confidence in the common people whose interests it had always claimed to champion. By autumn many felt that the existence of civilisation was menaced by the 'dark masses'; so fearful were they that sections of the press referred to them as the 'i.i.', which stood for 'terrified intellectuals'.[115] Students, in the van of the struggle against autocracy between 1899 and 1905, had ceased in the intervening years automatically to identify with the Left. When 272 delegates arrived for the All-Russian Congress of Students on 15 May they proved unable to forge a common programme, declaring themselves 'necessary to no one, and our resolutions binding on no one'.[116] Professional groups, such as lawyers, doctors, teachers or engineers, showed rather more confidence. One of the paradoxes of the revolution was that as the power of the state weakened, its reach - via the regulatory economic organs and democratised local administrations - expanded, and opportunities for professionals, managerial and technical staff increased accordingly.[117] The liberal and technical professions, however, showed little political coherence, with lower-status groups, such as primary-school teachers or medical assistants, orienting towards 'revolutionary democracy', and higher-status groups, such as doctors or secondary-school teachers, orienting towards the Kadets.[118] Beneath professionals were salaried employees (sluzhashchie), a diverse group comprising white-collar workers in public institutions, industry and commerce, and numbering close to 2 million. Their tendency was to align politically with the 'proletariat' by forming trade unions, although hostility towards them on the part of blue-collar workers was by no means uncommon.[119] Salaried employees, along with the lower ranks of professionals, were part of the heterogeneous lower-middle strata, whose ranks also included artisans, traders and rentiers, and who numbered about 14 million by 1915.[120] Many of the latter turned against socialist 'chatterers' in the soviets, demanding a 'strong power' to defend property and security.[121]
Following the July Days, Kerensky, now prime minister, cultivated an image as a 'man of destiny' summoned to 'save Russia'.[122] On 12 July he restored the death penalty at the front, and a week later military censorship. On 19 July he appointed General L. G. Kornilov supreme commander-in-chief of the army. Kerensky hoped to use the reactionary general to bolster his image as a strong man and to restore frayed relations with the Kadets, many of whom talked openly about the need for military dictatorship to save Russia from anarchy. Kornilov and Kerensky entered into negotiations on the need to establish 'firm government', which both understood to mean crushing not only the Bolsheviks but also the soviets. Kerensky, however, demurred at demands to restore the death penalty in the rear and to militarise defence factories and the railways. On 26 August Kerensky received what he took to be an ultimatum from Kornilov demanding that all military and civil authority be placed in the hands of a dictator. Accusing him of conspiring to overthrow the government, he sent a telegram on 27 August relieving Kornilov of his duties. The latter ignored it, ordering his troops to advance on Petrograd. Kerensky had no option but to turn to the Soviet to prevent Kornilov's troops from reaching the capital.
112
The following is based on Mark von Hagen, 'The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire', in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.),
113
V P. Buldakov, 'Imperstvo i rossiiskaia revoliutsionnost', pt. 2,
115
O. N. Znamenskii,
116
Znamenskii,
117
Daniel Orlovsky, 'The Lower Middle Strata in 1917', in Acton et al. (eds.),
118
Howard White, 'The Urban Middle Classes', in Service,
120
N. I. Vostrikov
i970), p. i5.
122
The account of the Kornilov rebellion is based on: J. L. Munck,