14. Tanner, op. cit., pp.39–41.
15. DGFP, volume 8, p.248, Document No 223.
16. Ibid, volume 8, p.251, Document No 226.
17. Ibid, volume 8, p.267, Document No 240.
18. Ibid, volume 8, p.252, Document No 227.
19. Ibid, volume 8, p.252, Document No 228.
20. Ibid, volume 8, p.255, Document No 232.
21. Documents Concerning Finnish–Soviet Relations, p.49.
22. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.311 lists the size of territory the Soviets were willing to give up in East Karelia as 3,455 square miles (8,948 square kilometers).
23. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.58.
24. Hugh Shearman, Finland. The Adventures of a Small Power (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1950), p.89.
25. DGFP, volume 8, p.469, Document No 404.
26. Ibid, volume 8, p.268, Document No 241.
27. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.69.
28. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.359.
29. DGFP, volume 8, p.651, Document No 526.
30. Ibid, volume 8, p.706, Document No 574.
31. Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), pp.538–548.
32. Tanner, op. cit., p.271.
33. DGFP, volume 8, p.774, Document No 612.
34. Ibid, volume 8, p.778, Document No 617.
35. Ibid, volume 8, p.869, Document No 661.
36. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.76.
37. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.370 and Richard W. Condon, The Winter War. Russia against Finland (New York, Ballantine Books, 1972), p.153.
38. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.388.
39. DGFP, volume 8, p.650, Document No 526.
40. Harold C. Deutsch. Presidential address presented on December 27, 1946, at the 25th Anniversary meeting of Phi Alpha Theta, held in New York jointly with the meeting of the American Historical Association.
41. General Otto Ruge, the commander in chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, sent a courier to Marshal Mannerheim at the end of the conflict in Norway. This courier, Captain Tage Ellinger, was asked about the military situation in Norway. After Captain Ellinger completed his briefing, Marshal Mannerheim remarked caustically that it was lucky for Finland that English troops had not come to help during the Winter War. Tage Ellinger, Den Forunderlige Krig (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1960), p.116.
42. Trygve Sandvik, Operasjonene til lands i Nord-Norge 1940 (Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1965), volume 2, p.334 and Birger Gotaas, Fra 9. april til 7. juni. Episoder og opplevelser fra krigen i Norge (Oslo: J. Dybwand, 1945), p.229.
43. Halder War Diary, entry for July 21, 1940.
44. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939–45. Translated by R. H. Barry (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1964), pp.112–114. Warlimont notes that Hitler had already hinted at the necessity of dealing with the Soviet Union earlier in 1940, even before the campaign in the west was concluded.
45. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), p.188.
46. Warlimont, op. cit., p.112.
47. The preparations continued based on Hitler’s verbal order on July 29 and 31. This order was confirmed in September 1940.
48. Halder War Diary, entries for July 21 and 30, 1940.
Chapter 1
1. C. Leonard Lundin, Finland in the Second World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p.80.
2. Ernst von Born, Levnadsminnen (Helsingfors: Sönderström, 1954), pp.327–375.
3. Carl Olof Frietsch, Finlands Ödesår 1939–1943 (Helsingfors, Sönderström, 1945), p.244.
4. Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army (Pamphlet No. 20–271), 1959), p.115.
5. Wipert von Blücher, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951), p.194.
6. Ibid. pp.194–195, 197.
7. DGFP, volume 8, Nos. 310 and 398.
8. Halder’s diary for July 22 mentions Finland as one route by which to attack the Soviet Union.
9. Messages from Zotov to Molotov on July 12 and August 1, 1940, as cited in Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.82.
10. Veltjens, a highly decorated pilot, was an old friend of Göring from WWI. He was engaged in what can be called the business of arms dealing.
11. NSR, Foreign Office Memorandum w/4646/40g, dated October 8, 1940.
12. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.399–400.
13. Prime Minister Risto Ryti held two positions at this time. He was Prime Minister but also acting President because President Kyösti Kallio was ill.
14. The delivery of arms to Finland and the presence of German troops on its soil were violations of the spheres of influence established in the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. However, it can be argued that the Soviet Union had already violated the secret protocol when it occupied Lithuania in 1940 since the agreement called for the Soviet sphere of influence to stop at the northern border of that country.
15. Blücher, op. cit., p.198.
16. Ibid, p.198.
17. Ibid, p.221.
18. Hjalmar J. Procopé, editor, Fällande dom som friar (Stockholm: Fahlcrantz & Gumælius, 1946), pp.67–68.
19. Blücher, op. cit., pp.198–199.
20. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.427.
21. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.115.
22. NSR, Telegram from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg on September 16, 1940.
23. Ibid, Telegram from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the German Minister in Finland on September 16, 1940.
24. Ibid, Telegram from the German chargé Tippelskirch to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on September 27, 1940.
25. Ibid, Telegram (No 1787) from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the German Embassy in Moscow on October 2, 1940.
26. See, for example, Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45 (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1949); and NSR.
27. Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter (New York, Macmillan, 1951), p.212. This is a much-shortened version of the book referenced in note 26, primarily because it leaves out that part dealing with the period before Hitler’s rise to power.
28. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960), p.805.
29. Winston S. Churchill. The Second World War. Their Finest Hour (New York, 1948–1953), p.584.
30. These words are not in the German minutes of the meeting but come from Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.586 based on a later conversation with Stalin.
31. NSR, Telegram from Ambassador Schulenburg to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop containing a memorandum (No. 2362, dated November 20) of a meeting with Foreign Minister Molotov. The other conditions included a mutual security pact with Bulgaria, bases in the Black Sea within range of the Straits to include joint military action against Turkey if that country caused troubles, a recognized Soviet sphere of influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and a renunciation by Japan of commercial rights (oil and coal) in northern Sakhalin.
32. NSR, p.304.
33. The German decision not to participate was actually caused by a misunderstanding since the German Foreign Office did not discover until the end of the month that an option existed and by then it was too late.
34. Blücher, op. cit., pp.211–212.
35. Ibid, p.215 and Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.118.
36. Ibid, p.119.
37. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.85.
38. Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1950), p.572.
39. Major General Talvela was a hero of the Winter War and held important commands in the war that began in June 1941. He commanded the VI Corps from June 1941 to January 1942. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1942 and assigned as the Finnish representative to OKW and OKH. He served in that position from January 1942 until February 1944 when he took over as the commander of the Maaselkä Front until June 1944. In that month he became commander of the Svir Front for one month (June 16 to July 18). From July to September he was again assigned as the Finnish representative at German military headquarters. General Talvela was a trusted advisor and confidant to Marshal Mannerheim.