Major General Talvela again appears on the scene. He made a visit to Berlin in the middle of December 1940. The presence of the Finnish general in Berlin in this period caused Ziemke to suggest the possibility that the Finns may have participated in the development of the Barbarossa directive. There is no direct evidence that this was the case although his visit was probably not just a coincidence. The stated reason for Talvela’s visit was to maintain the personal contact between Mannerheim and Göring that had been established by Veltjens.
Talvela had talks with both Göring and Halder and the Finn briefed his hosts on the political and military situation in Finland. We have no information about what else may have been discussed except that Talvela tried to get German support for a political union between Sweden and Finland. Such a union had been agreed to by the Swedes provided Finland gave guarantees that it would not engage in a war of revenge against the Soviet Union. Finland accepted this condition. However, a union of Sweden and Finland ran contrary to German interests. They wanted to keep the north divided in order to maximize German influence. A Swedish-Finnish union would also alleviate Finland’s isolation and undermine German efforts to secure Finnish participation in the attack on the Soviet Union. It was a serious policy mistake by the Soviet Union to also oppose such a union. The German opposition to a union was conveyed to Talvela by Göring.
This was the second attempt to form a Scandinavian military alliance. It had been proposed earlier in 1940 after the Winter War and Norway and Sweden were positive to the idea. The Soviet Union also expressed opposition on this occasion although such a defensive alliance was not specifically prohibited by the Peace of Moscow nor was there a requirement for Finland to seek prior approval by the Soviet Union. A Scandinavian military block may have kept all of Scandinavia out of World War II and spared the Soviet Union from having to worry about the north.
Matters of more immediate interest to Germany were also touched on during Talvela’s visit. Halder requested information about the time the Finns would need to make an “inconspicuous” mobilization for an attack in the Lake Ladoga area.42 It is unlikely that Halder would have raised this question if Finnish participation had not already been discussed by representatives of the two countries.
The Barbarossa directive (No. 21), signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940, states that Finland would cover the marshalling of German troops transferred to the Rovaniemi area from Norway. In describing the operations in the far north it is again assumed that Finnish contingents would operate with the Germans against the Murmansk Railroad. The described participation of Finland is not hypothetical and since the directive served as the basis for all planning associated with the attack on the Soviet Union we must assume that the Germans had some form of assurance from the Finns and that the question of Finnish participation was a settled issue.43
In January 1941, the OKH invited the chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lt. General Erik Heinrichs, to Germany for the stated purpose of lecturing to military audiences on Finnish operations and experiences in the Winter War. General der Infanterie Waldemar Erfurth writes that there was no mention during this visit of German–Finnish military cooperation or the German plans for an attack on the Soviet Union.44
It defies logic to believe that there were no discussions—at least hypothetical—of cooperation in case of war in view of what is already discussed in this chapter and subsequent developments. Even Mannerheim’s writings, which always deny that Finnish officers made any agreements with the Germans or participated in their planning, wrote this about General Heinrichs’ visit to Germany:
During a formal visit to the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, the latter suggested that Finland and Germany again, as in 1918, might come to the point of fighting together, and that the natural task of the Finnish Army would be to move against Leningrad. The idea was rejected emphatically by Lieutenant General Heinrichs, who said he was convinced that neither the government nor the commander in chief would consent to such an operation—particularly since the Russians had asserted that Finland threatened the security of Leningrad. It deserves to be emphasized that neither the so-called Barbarossa Plan nor any others were shown to Lieutenant General Heinrichs.45
The refusal to threaten Leningrad is believable in light of Mannerheim’s long-standing view that nothing should be done to validate Soviet concerns and their stated reason for launching the Winter War.46 However, it is less believable that the Finns showed no interest in military cooperation in view of their strong desire to recover lost territories and to remove the threat from the east.
Helmuth Greiner, who kept the OKW diary, was exceptionally well informed of important conversations and decisions at the highest military levels in Germany. According to him, General Halder told Hitler as early as February 3, 1941, that “The Finns intended to deploy about four army corps in the south, and to assign five divisions from these to the attack on Leningrad, three divisions to Lake Onega, and two divisions against Hanko; however, they needed strong support.”47 This information was obtained by Halder in a “detailed conversation” he had on January 30, 1941 with Lieutenant General Heinrichs in Germany about cooperation between the two countries in case of a war against the Soviet Union.
Colonel Erich Buschenhagen, chief of staff of Army of Norway, was present in Berlin during General Heinrichs’ visit. He was sent to Finland the following month (February). There are divergent statements and claims on what transpired during this visit.
Buschenhagen’s description of his mission suggests a coordination visit by the chief of staff of the organization tasked to take part in Operation Barbarossa on the northern front. It is very unlikely that the Germans would have sent this officer to Finland for that purpose if the subject of military cooperation had not been discussed in Berlin the previous month.
Buschenhagen’s explanation of his visit to Finland is contained in a deposition at the Nuremberg Trials. It was to make a personal contact with the Finnish General Staff to discuss “operations from middle and northern Finland.”48 He held meetings on this subject with Lieutenant General Heinrichs, his deputy, and Colonel Kustaa Tapola, the chief of operations of the Finnish General Staff, and relates that they reached agreement on various issues. He goes on to say that he and Colonel Tapola traveled to central and northern Finland to study “the terrain, the possibilities for deploying and billeting, and for operations in that sector.”49 According to Buschenhagen, these discussions led to the development of a plan by the Army of Norway for operations from Finnish territory. This plan was presented to, and approved by, the OKW.
Mannerheim gives a different version, claiming that the visit dealt primarily with the transit traffic. However, he goes on:
Besides that, the Colonel wanted to familiarize himself with our operational plans for Lapland and discuss traffic and communications in the north. He also let it be known that Germany would not remain inactive in case of a Soviet attack on Finland. As far as operational plans were concerned, I absolutely refused to disclose them; neither could there be any question of discussing possible German–Finnish operational coordination. On the other hand, there were no objections to discuss the communications system of Lapland within the context of the transit agreement.50