The German visitor was interested in Finnish operational plans for the northern part of the country and Mannerheim undoubtedly knew that German interest in this part of the country was due to plans to strike at the Soviet Union from northern Finland with the port of Murmansk and the Murmansk Railroad as the obvious objectives. I believe the Finnish General Staff, possibly with Mannerheim’s blessings, did discuss contingency plans. It is otherwise difficult to understand why an army level chief of staff, in the company of the operations officer of the Finnish General Staff, would travel to northern Finland. The transit traffic was operating without problems and had there been any, it would have been more appropriate for lower-level transport personnel from both sides—not two key military planners—to have addressed these problems.
General Hermann Hölter, who was General Erfurth’s chief of staff in Finland,51 writes the following:
For a group of forces provided for a thrust via Salla in the direction of Kandalaksha, which were not to be transported over the Baltic until shortly before the attack, it was necessary to create supply bases in the harbors of the Gulf of Bothnia and in the Rovaniemi district [for forces planned for the use in the Salla region]. These deployment preparations were served by the negotiations of the Chief of the General Staff of the AOK [Army High Command] Norway, Colonel Buschenhagen, with Finnish command officials in the winter of 1940–41 and his reconnoitering the boundary between northern Finland and Russia.52
Later, in discussing operational planning, Hölter quotes Buschenhagen as saying on June 13, 1941, as they traveled together to Finland that “The Finns stood by our side with advice and assistance in planning the operations.”53 A note in the Halder Diary after a conference on Operation Barbarossa on March 17, 1941, deals with security in the rear areas and it states “no difficulties in Northern Russia, which will be taken over by Finland.” Again, on March 30 Halder notes the following: “No illusion about our allies! Finns will fight bravely, but they are numerically weak and have not yet recovered from their recent defeat. Rumanians are no good at all.”54 General Walter Warlimont, deputy chief of operations at OKW, reported on April 28, 1941 that Finland’s part in Operation Barbarossa needed to be clarified with “authoritative” Finnish military officials without breaching operational security.55
There can be no doubt that much more collaboration was taking place between the Finnish and German military in this period than what is stated by Mannerheim. General Erfurth writes that “Neither negotiations nor discussions concerning a possible future cooperation between the Germans and the Finns took place during this visit of Buschenhagen at Helsinki or anywhere else” and he suggests that Buschenhagen confused the February visit to Finland with a visit he made in June 1941.56 He admits, however that Buschenhagen had a tour of eastern Lapland. This area had little to do with the transit of personnel but figured prominently in later German operations.
It should be kept in mind that Erfurth only arrived in Finland in June 1941. He spent over three years at the Finnish Headquarters and his friendship with Mannerheim is well known. His statement may therefore have been influenced by the views of the Finns rather than based on any independent knowledge he had about the events leading up to the war. Observations on German Army activities in Finland in the spring of 1941 by Ambassador Blücher, which are quoted earlier, clearly contradict statements by Mannerheim, Erfurth, and Heinrichs.
For security reasons the Germans did not want their relations with Finland to warm too rapidly. Too much activity in this area could alert the Soviet Union that something was afoot. The Finns were eager to acquire a protective umbrella in the form of Germany and Finnish foreign minister Rolf Witting went so far as to suggest to the German ambassador in Helsinki in early April that Finland join the triple alliance. The Germans ignored the suggestion. This worked to the advantage of the Finns since they later found themselves as a cobelligerent with Germany and this was preferable to that of an ally.
Karl Schnurre, a special envoy from Hitler to the Finnish president, arrived in Helsinki on May 20.57 He told Ryti that a tense situation had developed between Germany and the Soviet Union that could lead to war. In view of this hypothetical possibility, he asked that a Finnish military delegation be sent to Germany to be briefed on the situation. According to Mannerheim, President Ryti told the envoy that Finland was resolved not to attack the Soviet Union and he expressed an unwillingness to be drawn into a war between the great powers.58 Despite this statement, it was decided to send a military delegation to Germany—with the apparent approval of the cabinet and Mannerheim.
The Finnish military delegation, headed by General Heinrichs, left for Salzburg on May 24, 1941. General Heinrichs’ instructions, according to Mannerheim, did not authorize him to make any decisions or enter into any sort of agreements.59 However, the fact that the delegation included the chiefs of operations, mobilization, supply, and the navy’s chief of staff give credence to a conclusion that they came not merely to listen to a briefing of the worsening situation in Europe but to actually participate in planning.
It is difficult to determine how much reliance can be placed on the statements of the various parties in such murky circumstances. All present their actions in the very best light but the happenings on the ground—reconnaissance by planners, the establishment of a network of supply installations, strengthening of roads and bridges to support heavy military traffic, and the deployment schedules of units—speak volumes about the veracity of the different actors.
The Germans had made detailed plans for the three-day conference. The primary Finnish account is given by Mannerheim, and is supplemented by German diaries and the information contained in the testimony and documents from the Trials of War Criminals. The Finns were met by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Major General Alfred Jodl.
Jodl opened the conference and he described the planned attack on the Soviet Union as a preventive action. He portrayed a dangerous build-up of Soviet forces along the border that would allow the Soviet Union to select the time and place for military action. While Germany would try to resolve the issues through diplomacy, Soviet actions had forced the undertaking of certain countermeasures. If diplomatic means were not successful, military measures would become necessary.
The Finns were briefed on the German operational plan that involved the conquest of the Baltic states. Jodl explained that the Soviet defenses were expected to collapse as Army Group North advanced towards Leningrad. The primary task for the Finns would be to tie down Russian forces around Lake Ladoga. The briefing also included plans for the German attack from north Norway across Finnish territory to capture Murmansk and the planned German/Finnish attack across the waist of Finland to capture Salla together with its continuance to Kandalaksha on the White Sea to cut the Murmansk Railroad.
Germany’s requests of Finland included:60
1. Transport of a German corps headquarters and a reinforced division from harbors in the Gulf of Bothnia by rail to the Rovaniemi area.
2. Small Finnish detachments to assist the attack against Murmansk.
3. Early disguised mobilization of the Finnish Army.
4. Finnish participation in the attack out of central Finland to cut the Murmansk Railroad.
5. Finnish attack on both sides of Lake Ladoga toward the Svir (Syväri) River and the Ladoga Canal.