German friendship and protection, eagerly pursued by the Finns since the Winter War, had blossomed into full-scale participation in plans for a war of aggression at the side of Germany against the Soviet Union. The Finnish leadership must have been fully aware that events would take them in this direction. The talks that had taken place and the composition of the military delegation sent to Germany support this conclusion.
According to Mannerheim, Heinrichs told the Germans that Finland desired to remain neutral but was also determined to resist any Soviet aggression. He allegedly stated that while he was not authorized to make any commitments in operational matters, he believed that in the hypothetical case outlined by Jodl it would be possible for some smaller Finnish units to cooperate with the Germans in the far north.
From Salzburg the delegation traveled to Berlin, where it was received by General Halder, chief of staff of OKH. As chief of staff of the army, he was particularly interested in Finnish participation in the operation against Leningrad and suggested a strong attack on either side of Lake Ladoga. The German Army wanted the Finns to delay their operations for 14 days after the German attack but General Heinrichs opposed such a delay. Again, according to Mannerheim, Heinrichs stated Finland’s desire to remain neutral and that Finland would not attack Leningrad under any circumstances, even if attacked by the Soviet Union. Halder asked that the German views be given to the Finnish government and the military high command.61
Talks between the German and Finnish military resumed again on June 3, 1941, this time in Helsinki. Colonel Buschenhagen represented the OKW and Colonel Eberhard Kinzel represented the OKH. The German officers discovered that the Finns were willing to accept the proposals made by the Germans at Salzburg and Berlin at the end of May.
Buschenhagen’s second visit to Finland is mentioned by Mannerheim in his memoirs, but in a misleading way. He writes:
From his [Buschenhagen’s] remarks to the General Staff it appeared that his mission this time was concerned with a discussion of practical details in connection with eventual cooperation in the north if Finland were attacked by the Soviet Union, and also with obtaining guarantees for Finland participating in the war as Germany’s ally. After I had reported to the President of the Republic and he had confirmed that he adhered to his earlier standpoint, I had Colonel Buschenhagen informed that a guarantee for Finnish participation in the war could not be given. Finland was determined to remain neutral provided she was not exposed to aggression.62
It comes as no surprise that there are major differences between the excerpt of Buschenhagen’s testimony below and Mannerheim’s statement.
At these conferences [in Helsinki], which again took place between General Heinrichs, General Halder, and Colonel Tapola, the details of this collaboration [agreed to the previous week in Germany] were worked out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization…. All agreements between the OKW and the Finnish General Staff had as their sole purpose from the very beginning the participation of the Finnish Army and the German troops on Finnish territory in aggressive war against the Soviet Union…. There was—from the very beginning—no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union….63
A number of Finnish military officers labeled Buschenhagen’s deposition false or distorted at the war guilt trials in Helsinki in 1945.64 Both Heinrichs and Tapola were among them. The Finnish officers denied that any agreements had been made with the Germans at any of their meetings or conferences.65 In the summary of his testimony Heinrichs declared:
Neither in conversation with him [Buschenhagen] nor in connection with the visit to Salzburg and Berlin, nor on any other occasion…were there made any written or oral commitments or agreements, binding for Finland’s government or military leadership.66
How much credibility should be given to the testimony of Buschenhagen is a controversial subject. His testimony at the Nuremberg Trials was not given in person but via a deposition taken while he was a Russian prisoner of war. Buschenhagen was released from captivity in 1955 and he did not die until 1994. There was therefore ample time for him to recant the testimony he gave while a Soviet prisoner and thus put the record straight if he had wanted. He never officially changed his testimony.
Greiner’s writings support Buschenhagen’s testimony. He claims that Finnish refusals to offer formal commitments were essentially meaningless as far as the Germans were concerned:
On this occasion [May 25, 1941], however, no firm agreements were reached, only operative possibilities were discussed in a non-binding manner, but the Finns were officially notified of the German intention, in case of a war against the Soviet Union, of having German troops push forward from northern Norway through the Petsamo region against Murmansk and from central Finland against the Murmansk Railway…. At the beginning of June the Chief of Staff of the Armeeoberkommando Norway, Colonel Buschenhagen, was sent to Helsinki to continue discussions with the Finnish General Staff. The Finns now expressed agreement to the transport of the German 169th Infantry Division as early as the first half of June [begun on June 4] from the homeland by sea to Oulu and Kemi and from there move forward by rail into an area of deployment provided east of Rovaniemi.67
Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg in the National Defense Section of the OKW expresses views similar to those of Greiner when he writes:
Finland was to cover the deployment of a Northern Group detached from our Army of Norway…and operate in cooperation with it…. The final discussion with the Finns took place at the beginning of 1941 after preliminary discussions in Salzburg…. When the Finns agreed to the question as to whether they would take part in such a campaign [pre-emptive German attack on the Soviet Union if that became necessary], Jodl explained the tasks planned for them within the context of the overall plan. The Finns basically agreed subject to the concurrence of their government….68
Finally, we should take into consideration a pro memoria which General Heinrichs gave the German military representatives on June 3, 1941:
The Commander-in-Chief [Mannerheim] wishes to take this opportunity to say that the interest called forth by these discussions is in no way purely operational or military-technical in nature.
The idea [destruction of the Soviet Union] which forms the basis of the propositions communicated to him by the highest echelons of the German leadership must arouse joy in the Finnish soldier’s heart and is regarded here as a historic sign of a great future.69
Heinrichs added orally that “for the first and probably the last time in Finland’s thousand-year history the great moment has come in which the Finnish people can free itself for all time from the pressure of its hereditary enemy.”70
Ziemke’s examination of German military records supports Buschenhagen, Greiner, and Lossberg’s accounts and allows us to summarize what was agreed to in Helsinki. The assembly of the main force of the Finnish Army would—with the Svir River as its objective—be such that it could attack east or west of Lake Ladoga on five days’ notice. A reinforced battalion would be attached to the German forces driving towards Murmansk and a corps of two divisions would participate in the attack towards the Murmansk Railroad at Kandalaksha. The Finns accepted responsibility for occupying the Åland Islands and pinning down the Soviet forces in Hanko. However, they requested that a German division be made available to attack and capture Hanko. German documents also affirm that the Finnish government and the Finnish parliament represented by the Foreign Affairs Committee approved the military arrangements between Germany and Finland on June 14.71