The Finns appear to have harbored some fears that the Germans might reach an agreement with the Soviets that would avoid war and possibly leave them exposed. In the event of a peaceful settlement between Germany and the Soviet Union they wanted guarantees from Germany of its independence, its borders (preferably the 1939 borders), and economic assistance. Two days before they began general mobilization, the Finns reiterated their demands for guarantees in case war was averted. Field Marshal Keitel authorized the German military attaché in Helsinki to tell the Finns that all conditions they had expressed were accepted and would be fulfilled.72
The Finns began a partial mobilization on June 9 and a general mobilization was ordered on June 17. The rapid and efficient mobilization called to duty reservists born between 1897 and 1918 in addition to the 1919 and 1920 year groups. The defense forces involved, including auxiliaries, numbered 630,000.73 This was a massive undertaking by a nation with a population of less than four million.
General Erfurth and Colonel Buschenhagen arrived in Helsinki on June 13. Erfurth assumed his duty as liaison officer at Mannerheim’s headquarters. Buschenhagen traveled to Rovaniemi on June 15 and established the headquarters for the Army of Norway in Finland. The Army of Norway thereafter had two headquarters more than 1,600 kilometers apart, one in Norway and one in Finland. Operational control of the Finnish III Corps, commanded by Major General Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo, also passed to Army of Norway on June 15. In order not to arouse Soviet suspicions about an attack, General Falkenhorst remained in Norway until June 21.
It is impossible to reconcile the increasing interaction between the Finnish and German military from August 1940 onwards with the picture of innocence and reluctance to participate in a war against the Soviet Union painted by Finnish political and military leaders after the war. While the Finnish leaders denied that they participated in war planning with the Germans or had made any commitments to the Germans, the average Finn, watching the hectic German activities in central Finland, must have been fully aware that the country was moving rapidly towards war
While the decision to become a cobelligerent with Germany may have been made by a group of influential political and military leaders, it is safe to conclude that the decisions taken were in tune with the majority of the politicians and the Finnish population.74 President Ryti undoubtedly expressed the view of many Finns when he told a parliamentary delegation on June 21 that “this war is Finland’s only salvation. The Soviet Union will never give up its attempt to conquer Finland.”75
TWO
PLANS, PREPARATIONS, AND DEPLOYMENTS
It is relatively easy to determine Germany’s war aims vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. They are spelled out in the Barbarossa Directive.
The mass of the Russian Army stationed in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented. In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached from which the Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The ultimate objective of the operation is to establish a defense line against Asiatic Russia from a line running approximately from the Volga River to Archangel. Then, in case of necessity, the last industrial area left to Russia in the Urals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.1
The German objective was to destroy the military and economic potential of the Soviet Union by conquering and occupying permanently vast regions of that country, including some areas that were to be given to Germany’s allies. It was a life and death struggle between two totalitarian systems. It is relatively easy for a dictatorship to set and maintain war aims since public opinion does not factor much into the equation.
It is much more difficult to discern the true Finnish war aims or what the Finns expected from their participation in the war. There are several reasons for this. First, the Finnish civilian and military leaders were careful—as they had been in their dealings with Germany leading up to the war—not to leave a paper trail. Since their statements at the war guilt trials have little credence, we are forced to look at their statements and actions before and during the war. Secondly, Finland was a democracy and public opinion played a large role in setting and sustaining war aims. Like the public in most democracies, the war aims changed with the ebb and flow of the fighting. Success tended to lead to an expansion of war aims while deteriorating military situations often lead to pressure to reduce the scope of those aims and even to terminate the war. This issue is addressed throughout this book. Finally, it is difficult to learn what the motives were since various writers tend to emphasize, de-emphasize, or dismiss some statements and events depending on their political persuasions.
The stated Finnish war aims were limited to the recovery of territories lost during the Winter War; hence they refer to the conflict from 1941 to 1944 as the “Continuation War.” However, it is patently obvious from statements and events both before and during the war that they hoped to come out of the war with much more than the territories lost in 1940.
The most ambitious statements of Finnish aspirations appear to be those given by President Ryti to Ambassador Schnurre in October 1941.2 He let it be known that Finland desired all of the Kola Peninsula and all of Soviet Karelia with a border on the White Sea to the Gulf of Onega (Ääninen). Also included in his wishes were Ladoga Karelia and that the future border should then proceed along the Svir River, the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, and finally along the Neva River to where it entered the Gulf of Finland.3 Within a couple of weeks of this statement, Ryti told Ambassador Blücher that Finland did not want a common border with the Soviet Union after the war and he requested that Germany annex all territory south of the Archangel region.4 The views that Ryti expressed in October 1941 may be what prompted Hitler to tell Foreign Minister Witting the following month when he came to Berlin to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact that Germany favored an expansion of Finland to the east, to include the Kola Peninsula as long as Germany shared in the mineral resources. Witting told Blücher after his visit to Berlin that it was necessary for Finland’s security to hold on to the captured territories.5
This brings up the thorny question of East Karelia (or Far Karelia) and the concept of Greater Finland (Suur-Suomi). The Karelian issue is long-standing and complicated, too much so to allow proper coverage in this book. Suffice it to say that the Karelians were related to the Finns both linguistically and culturally but their area had never been under the control of Finland or Sweden so Finland had no valid historical claims to that part of the Soviet Union.
The fate of Karelia had been a very contentious issue during the War of Independence in 1918. The issue was complicated by a division of opinion among the Karelians themselves. Some wanted to remain under Soviet rule. Others favored outright independence, while still others—mostly conservatives—favored a union with Finland. The issue was further convoluted at the end of the War of Independence—which was in many respects a civil war—by the presence of British and German troops.