General Sir Charles Maynard commanded the Allied Expeditionary Force in Murmansk from March 1918. He did not favor either political independence for the Karelians or the absorption of Karelia by Finland.6 His views were naturally colored by the presence of German troops in Finland under the command of General Rüdiger von der Goltz. They were there to aid the anti-Bolshevik forces under Mannerheim but remained in the country for some time after hostilities ended.
However, General von der Goltz also opposed the absorption of Karelia by Finland. His goals were to recreate a conservative Russian regime friendly to Germany and to make Finland a dependable German ally. Separating East Karelia from Russia would be as unacceptable to a new conservative Russia as it was to the Soviets. Finland could never achieve a durable independence or security by making claims on territories Russia considered vital to its interests.7 Despite von der Goltz’s views the Finns laid claim in 1918 to the province of Viena and the Murmansk coast. Von der Goltz is alleged to have warned the Finns privately that it was not wise to seek control of Russia’s only ice-free port. The German High Command echoed these views by stating that it could not support a boundary dangerous to the vital interests of Russia.8
Mannerheim’s relationship with General von der Goltz is described as cool and the reason may well have been the German’s view on East Karelia. If Mannerheim harbored a burning desire to bring East Karelia into Finland he did not prevail during the War of Independence. His resignation on May 31, 1918, may well be traced back to his differences with the Germans and members of the Finnish government who shared their views. While the Finns did not renounce their claims to East Karelia they did not pursue that objective and it remained within the Soviet Union.
Mannerheim’s memoirs are surprisingly quiet when it comes to Finland’s war aims. However, there are several bellicose orders of the day from both the time of the War of Independence and the Continuation War which indicate that he may at least have shared some of the views of those who argued for the conquest of East Karelia. A couple of examples that proved somewhat embarrassing both during and after the war are illustrative. Part of his order of the day on June 28, 1941, reads:
I call upon you to take part in a holy war against the enemy of our people. Our dead heroes are rising from their fresh, green graves at this moment in order to rejoin us as brothers-in-arms of mighty Germany in a crusade against our enemy to secure the future of Finland. Brothers-in-arms: Follow me for the last time, now that Karelia is rising, and Aurora will light a new day for the Finns.9
Finnish radio carried another order of the day on July 7, as the main offensive was about to begin. It proclaimed his intention of conquering the provinces of Viena and Aunus:
We promise the Karelians that our sword will not rest until Karelia has been liberated. The provinces of Viena and Aunus have waited twenty-three years for the fulfillment of this promise, and since the winter campaign of 1939–40 Karelia has waited for the dawn of the day that is to bring her freedom. Her battalions are now marching in our ranks.
The freedom of Karelia and the Greater Finland is the goal that beckons us in this mighty whirl of historical events. For us this war is a holy war against the enemy of our nation and at the side of mighty Germany we are firmly determined to bring this crusade against our common foe to a victorious end in order that Finland’s future may be assured.10
What we don’t know is whether such statements were only for the purpose of firing up the fighting spirit of the troops or whether they represented the views of a significant segment of the Finnish military and civilian leadership.11 While only speculation, such expansionist views would explain why certain circles in Finland were so willing to become involved in the military adventure that Hitler was about to launch.
Ambassador Blücher writes that strong differences of opinion existed both in the officer corps and political circles in Finland on the issue of conquering East Karelia and moving as far as the Svir River. Even in September 1941 the Finnish government tried to avoid a discussion of war aims since it would demonstrate publicly the divide that existed between conservatives and liberals. Only great success on the battlefield by Germany and Finland could solve this dilemma.12
General Erfurth believed that the majority of Finns at the beginning of the conflict were interested primarily in recovering the territories lost in the Winter War. Those who harbored hopes for a Greater Finland were primarily among the military and younger academics. However, after the great military successes in 1941 and the apparent unstoppable drive of the Germans deep into the Soviet Union, the ranks of the more ambitious increased.13
It is rather amazing that the Finns appear not to have realized—by their refusal to participate in operations against the Soviet Union after they had secured the lost territories and East Karelia—that the achievement of their own goals was totally dependent on Germany achieving its goal of destroying the Soviet Union. Germany’s failure to do so either because of a military defeat or because of a negotiated settlement would jeopardize Finland’s position. If Germany lost the war the very existence of Finland came into question. It therefore made virtually no difference what the Finnish war aims were as they were intrinsically linked to those of Germany.
It is nevertheless extraordinary that the Germans did not press the Finns for more definitive answers regarding their participation in achieving the two main German objectives—operations against Leningrad and the cutting of the Murmansk Railroad. The failure to do so became a major bone of contention, as should have been anticipated. Karl von Clausewitz wrote: “No war is begun, or at least, no war should be begun, if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: what is to be attained by and in war?”14
While the Finns appear to have limited themselves to stating to the Germans that they were only interested in regaining their lost territories, the Germans were probably well aware that a sizable part of military and political circles in Finland had more ambitious ideas. This became obvious when Finland moved into East Karelia. The strong expectation of a short war was probably a major factor in keeping the Germans from insisting on a harmonization of war aims and plans.
It was a grave mistake for the Germans not to insist on a clear understanding about Finnish participation in the achievement of the dual objectives—capture of Leningrad and the cutting of the Murmansk Railroad—before placing some 250,000 troops in a war theater where they would to a large extent be dependent on the actions of their newfound brothers-in-arms. If the Finns had balked at such an understanding, it would have been wise for the Germans not to waste precious resources in this theater of war.
The OKW was given the responsibility under the Barbarossa Directive to make the necessary arrangements to put Romanian and Finnish contingents under German command. There is no evidence that this was seriously tried with respect to Finland. Command and command relationships were discussed during the Finnish delegation’s visit to Germany in May 1941. The Germans wanted General Falkenhorst to command the forces in north and central Finland while Mannerheim would command in the south.
German planners had previously assumed that Mannerheim would be given overall command in Finland.15 This is reflected in the OKW directive on April 7, 1941 (see below). That idea was now dropped, and their chance of bringing Mannerheim, a rather independent individual, under their control was lost as well. In doing so the Germans disregarded another well-known warning of their military philosopher and theorist Clausewitz that the worst situation is where two independent commanders find themselves operating in the same theater of war.