Ziemke and Erfurth speculate that this change came about because of an OKW desire to command in an active theater of operations. There was probably another and more practical reason. Hitler became exceedingly worried about the security of northern Norway and the iron and nickel mines in Sweden and Finland after the British raid on the Lofoten Islands in March 1941 (see below), and began a major force build-up. Mountain Corps Norway was an integral part of the defense of north Norway and Hitler and the OKW may well have been reluctant to place a good part of this area under Finnish command. Falkenhorst was still the German armed forces commander in Norway and it made some sense to also have him as commander in central and northern Finland.
Mannerheim wrote after the war that he received indirect feelers—from General Erfurth to General Heinrichs—about assuming overall command in Finland. There is some confusion in the sources as to when these feelers were made. Mannerheim gives the time of the offer as June 1941 while Erfurth places it in June 1944.16 Mannerheim writes about the 1941 offer that he was not attracted by the idea and gives as his reason a reluctance to become too dependent on the German High Command. Mannerheim does not mention the 1944 offer in his memoirs but Erfurth writes that Mannerheim replied to it on June 29, 1944, with the statement that he was too old to take over the additional responsibilities that the position of commander in chief of all forces in Finland would entail. The 1944 offer, if made, was probably an attempt to tie Finland firmly to Germany at a time when it was beginning to go its own way.
In addition to failing to settle on an overall commander, operations in Finland came under two separate German headquarters. The German commander in chief in northern and central Finland, whose main focus was on isolating Murmansk, reported to the OKW after Hitler’s changes to the command structure following the Lofoten raid in March 1941. OKH—responsible for operations on the Eastern Front—was left to deal with operations in southern Finland. The axiomatic belief in both Germany and Finland that the looming war would be short was probably the greatest contributing factor to this deficient command arrangement. This short-war scenario undoubtedly made many feel that no elaborate command structure or long-range plans were necessary.
There was no joint German–Finnish campaign plan much beyond the initial attacks. The loose and informal nature of the coalition, the lack of long-range planning, and an ineffective command structure posed increasing problems as the war dragged on. These massive violations of long-standing military principles could have been rectified by Hitler and the OKW, but they failed to act.
The planning for an operation against the Soviet Union began as soon as Hitler briefed his military advisors at the end of July 1940. The initial planning effort for the invasion was led by Major General Erich Marcks who was in charge of planning at OKH; he developed the first draft which was presented to OKH on August 5. Major General Friedrich von Paulus replaced Marcks in September when he became assistant chief of staff for operations at OKH. In addition, there was an independent operational study going on at OKW by Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg. While the final OKW position did not differ significantly from the OKH plan presented to Hitler on December 5, the earlier efforts focused on trying to change the overall strategy and therefore the roles assigned to the forces on the northern front.
Finland offered at least two operational possibilities for the German planners.
1. An offensive to isolate Murmansk.
2. An offensive on both sides of Lake Ladoga against the right flank of the Soviet forces in the Leningrad area.
General Marcks undoubtedly recognized the importance of the Murmansk Railroad in providing a link between the Soviet Union and the outside world. Finland, however, did not figure prominently in General Marcks’ scheme of things. He envisioned the main assault on the Soviet Union to take place in the south and center. Northern Russia did not figure into the initial assault. He recommended postponing Finnish participation until later since a major German drive through the Baltic States to Leningrad was not part of his overall plan.
A plan that the National Defense Section of OKW submitted to General Jodl on September 19, proposed a significant change to the plan initially worked out by General Marcks. This proposal, probably worked out by Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg, coincided with General von Paulus taking over General Marcks’ job at OKH. The National Defense Section recommended a significant increase in the strength of the German Army’s left wing driving northward through the Baltic States towards Leningrad. This strategic change increased the importance of Finnish participation. The altered plan called for almost all German and Finnish forces to concentrate in southeast Finland. These forces would either attack across the Karelian Isthmus in the direction of Leningrad or on the east side of Lake Ladoga in the direction of Tikhvin.
The OKW’s proposed revisions to the plan made excellent sense. However, strategic and practical problems led to its abandonment. The Finns would probably resist such a deployment since it would leave central Finland virtually defenseless unless they moved sizable forces to that area. Concentrating the bulk of German forces in southeastern Finland would also cause serious transportation and supply problems. The communications network in southeast Finland would be severely strained to support both the Finnish Army plus a number of German divisions. Finally, it would be nearly impossible to have a large buildup of German forces along with the necessary supplies in this area without alerting the Soviets to a pending attack.
Brauchitsch and Halder presented the army plan for the campaign against the Soviet Union to Hitler on December 5, 1940. Hitler approved the plan and Jodl instructed the National Defense Section on December 6 to prepare a directive based on the approved plan.
From the incomplete records of the conference on December 5 and the more complete record of a meeting between Halder and Falkenhorst on December 7 we get a rather clear idea of what the planners had in mind. The plan for a main German effort in the southeast was dropped, undoubtedly for the reasons mentioned above. The plan that was settled on was one that dissipated the offensive and left the important operations in the southeast totally to the Finns. The German offensive was fragmented. Two mountain divisions would cross the Finnish border in the Pechenga area and conduct operations in the direction of Murmansk. Two additional divisions from central Norway were to cross Sweden by rail. This force would launch operations in the Salla area and advance towards Kandalaksha (Kantalahti) and cut the Murmansk Railroad to isolate Murmansk.
Hitler signed Directive No. 21, the strategic plan for Operation Barbarossa, on December 18, 1940. It is a very concise document (nine typed double-spaced pages) when one considers the fact that it was the blueprint for the most gigantic military operation in history. The directive, which the OKW issued as the basis for operational planning by the services, reads as follows regarding operations in Finland:
Finland will cover the advance of the Northern Group of German forces moving from Norway (detachments of Group XXI) and will operate in conjunction with them. Finland will also be responsible for eliminating Hango [Hanko].
It is possible that Swedish railways and roads may be available for the movement of the German Northern Group, by the beginning of the operation at the latest.