…The most important task of Group XXI, even during these eastern operations, remains the protection of Norway[emphasis in Trevor-Roper’s translation]. Any forces available after carrying out this task will be employed in the North (Mountain Corps), at first to protect the Petsamo area and its iron [nickel] ore mines and the Arctic highway [Arctic Ocean Highway], then to advance with Finnish forces against the Murmansk railway and thus prevent the passage of supplies to Murmansk by land.
The question whether an operation of this kind can be carried out with stronger German forces (two or three divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it will depend on the willingness of Sweden to make its railways available for troop transport.
It will be the duty of the main body of the Finnish Army, in conjunction with the advance of the German North flank, to hold down the strongest possible Russian forces by an attack to the West, or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, and to occupy Hango.17
The whole German effort in the north was directed at isolating Murmansk—whether in a drive from Pechenga, from Rovaniemi, or from both. The operations in the south and southeast became a Finnish affair.
Paul Carell writes in Hitler Moves East 1941–1943 that “The very first drafts for ‘Operation Barbarossa’ list a surprising objective—Murmansk.18 This little-known place was named alongside the great strategic objectives like Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Rostov.”19 It is true that the Germans contemplated a drive to capture Murmansk but the capture of that city is not listed as an objective in the final version of Directive No. 21. The task of the forces in the north was to cut the Murmansk Railroad and thus isolate Murmansk.
Murmansk became extremely important to the Allied war effort as the major port for bringing supplies and equipment for the Soviet armed forces. But this development was not foreseen by Hitler and the German High Command and was therefore not the reason for according that port on the Arctic Ocean with a population of about 100,000 such importance. The Germans anticipated a quick knockout blow in World War II and the importance of Murmansk as a supply port was considered very minimal in their short-war scenario.
The Russians had begun the construction of an 1,350-kilometer railway line from St Petersburg (Leningrad after the communists seized power) to Murmansk in 1914. This gigantic construction project, completed in 1917, was undertaken by the Russians for the purpose of making use of the only port in that country which had an unrestricted connection to the oceans of the world. Murmansk, located at approximately the same latitude as Point Barrow, Alaska, was ice-free throughout the year with open access to the Atlantic. The other major port on the White Sea, Archangel, was ice-bound for several months each year. The Russians initially used a convict work force but after World War I began, they used some 70,000 captured German and Austrian prisoners. Carell describes the deplorable conditions under which these prisoners worked:
The hardships of the prisoners-of-war defied description. During the short scorching summer they were mown down by typhoid, and during the eight months of the Arctic winter they were killed by cold and hunger. Within twenty-four months 25,000 men had died. Every mile of the 850-mile long line cost twenty-nine dead.”20
To Hitler, the danger from the Murmansk Railroad was the ability it gave the Russians to move large military forces from central Russia to their border with Finland along the Arctic Ocean. A major reason for Hitler’s invasion of Norway in 1940 was to secure the iron ore from the mining districts in northern Sweden. The nickel mines in Kolosjoki near Pechenga, only 100 kilometers from Murmansk, were also important to the German war industry and a significant reason for Germany’s interest in Finland. Of grave concern to Hitler was the possibility that Russia might use the Murmansk Railroad to quickly move significant forces to threaten these valuable sources of iron and nickel. Another worry was that the British would land forces in that area.
Hitler had reason to be concerned. German aerial reconnaissance of the Murmansk area revealed extensive army and air force installations. These, along with massive rail and harbor facilities made Murmansk an ideal Soviet marshalling area for an offensive against northern Finland and Norway. Hitler not only viewed this as a threat against the nickel that the Germans needed in their steel industry but as a strategic threat to the success of Barbarossa. Kirkenes in Norway, only 50 kilometers from Pechenga, was an important German base. If the Soviets reached that far, the line of communications to northern Finland would be cut and the whole Finnish front would be outflanked from the north.
The next step in the planning process was the development of a staff study by Group XXI (Army of Norway) for operations in Finland based on Directive 21. The study was expanded by Marshal von Brauchitsch on January 16 to include examining the feasibility of a German–Finnish southeast drive in the area of Lake Ladoga, Lake Onega, and the White Sea. The Army of Norway was asked to make recommendations for supply operations and command relationships. This study, begun in late December, was completed on January 27, 1941, and given the code name Silberfuchs (Silver Fox).
The Finnish Army would carry the main burden of the attack. The bulk of their forces would be concentrated in the southeast for an attack east of Lake Ladoga towards the Svir River. The Finnish Army was to defend the frontier north of Lake Ladoga with relatively weak forces, and additionally was responsible for the security of the coast and the Åland Islands. The staff study assumed that the overall command in Finland would be given to the Finns because they were providing the preponderance of forces.
The planning and preparation for Renntier was not wasted, but expanded by making it part of the operations assigned to Mountain Corps Norway. The main German attack was a drive from Rovaniemi through Salla to Kandalaksha on the White Sea. This drive would cut the Murmansk Railroad and sever lines of communication between Soviet forces in Murmansk and on the Kola Peninsula from the rest of the Soviet Union.
The forces allocated to the main drive consisted of one German and one Finnish corps. The German corps—XXXVI Corps—consisted of two infantry divisions and SS Kampfgruppe Nord reinforced by a tank battalion, a machinegun battalion, an antitank battalion, an artillery battalion, and engineers. Kampfgruppe Nord would provide security for the assembly of the two infantry divisions. Part of the German forces would turn north when they reached Kandalaksha. In conjunction with one reinforced mountain division advancing from Pechenga towards Murmansk, the forces that turned north would destroy the Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk.
The Finnish corps—III Corps—consisted of two divisions (3rd and 6th) plus border guards. Its main mission was to launch a secondary attack on the German right flank against Ukhta (Uhtua) and then on towards Kem (Kemi) on the White Sea. This drive, if successful, would also cut the Murmansk Railroad. The bulk of the German forces advancing on Kandalaksha would turn south after reaching that town and link up with the Finns in the Kem area for a joint drive southward behind the left wing of the main Finnish Army.
The operations proposed in the Silberfuchs staff study assumed that Sweden would allow German troops and supplies to cross its territory from Norway to Finland. It was planned that five divisions (later increased to seven) would be left in Norway for its defense and that the Army of Norway would supply all German units. This would involve large supply, construction, and transportation assets and many of these would have to come from Germany.
The German Army issued an operation order at the end of January for operations in Finland using the Army of Norway staff study as its basis. Hitler approved the order on February 3, 1941.