The OKH order assigned the defense of Norway as the highest priority of the Army of Norway. Only forces over and above the requirement for the priority mission would be used in Finland where the mission of German forces was limited to the defense of the Pechanga area until Finland entered the war. At that time the order laid out two possible courses of action. The first was that proposed in the Army of Norway staff study, while the second would come into being if Sweden refused transit of troops. If this materialized, the Germans would launch an attack through Pechenga with the mission of capturing Murmansk.
As far as the mission of the Finnish Army, some disagreements had developed and certain things remained unresolved. Finnish participation in the planning had been indirect and remained so because Hitler’s order on February 3, 1941 specified that all potential allies should be brought into the planning process only when German intentions could no longer be disguised. The Army order gave the Finnish Army the mission of covering German deployments in central Finland and the capturing of Hanko. The Germans wanted the bulk of the Finnish Army to undertake offensive operations towards the southeast when German Army Group North crossed the Dvina River. The Germans accepted offensives on both sides of Lake Ladoga as long as the main effort was made on the east side of that lake. The Finnish Army was expected to make a sweep around the eastern shore of the lake and isolate Leningrad by affecting a junction with Army Group North in the Tikhvin area.
The Finns, however, preferred to undertake an operation west of Lake Ladoga with the limited goal of recovering the important territory on the Isthmus of Karelia which they had lost in the Winter War. The missions of the Finnish Army were thrashed out in the meeting between General Halder and General Heinrichs on January 30, 1941. The Finns would launch their offensive not later than when Army Group North crossed the Dvina River. The offensive was to take place on both sides of Lake Ladoga with five divisions on the west side and three divisions in the east. The Finns would use two divisions against Hanko. Heinrichs also answered the question that Halder had asked General Talvela in December about Finnish ability to mobilize without drawing attention. Heinrichs stated that to mobilize without causing some attention was not possible.
Resource problems now began to affect the plans in the north. OKH informed the Army of Norway that only a part of the support personnel and transport resources requested in the Silberfuchs staff study would be available. In addition, Kampfgruppe Nord was withdrawn from Falken horst’s order of battle for Finland.21 The Army of Norway was asked to investigate if it could carry out the OKH order with these limitations. The Army of Norway replied that while the occupation of Pechenga could be carried out, an attack against Murmansk from the Pechenga area alone was not possible because the large force required could not be supported and operational possibilities were also poor. The destruction of Russian forces defending Murmansk was possible providing full use of Swedish territory was granted for both supply and troop movements.
The Army of Norway proposed to execute the plan in the Silberfuchs staff study but to delete that part of the plan that called for a southward turn to support the Finnish Army in the Lake Ladoga area because of inadequate logistic and transportation assets. The Army of Norway stated that an operation to the south would be possible only after an adequate supply base had been established in the Kandalaksha area. The OKH accepted the Army of Norway proposal on March 2, 1941.
On March 4, 1941 the British carried out one of the first commando operations of World War II in the Lofoten Islands in Norway. The operation was code-named Claymore and the mission was to destroy a number of fish oil factories that produced glycerin for use in munitions. The factories in the Lofoten Islands accounted for about half of the total production of glycerin in Norway. The naval component of the force consisted of two cruisers and five destroyers. After bombarding the town of Svolvær and sinking several ships in the harbor a force of about 800 was landed. This force consisted of 3rd and 4th Commandos and a force from the Norwegian Army in the UK under the command of Captain Martin Linge.22 The main factories were destroyed after minor fighting.
The raid had little military significance but it had a considerable psychological effect on Hitler and led him to take action impacting planned operations in Finland. Hitler was extremely proud of having pulled off what he labeled the “sauciest” military operation of the war by his conquest of Norway against virtually all military principles and the views of the German General Staff. He undoubtedly considered Norway a trophy attesting to his military genius and wanted to protect that trophy at nearly any cost. Hitler continued to maintain, “Norway is the zone of destiny in this war” and demanded unconditional obedience to all edicts pertaining to its defense.23
Hitler called a conference on March 12 to evaluate the situation in Norway. He expressed the view that the British would start their offensive against the long Norwegian coastline as the German campaign began against the Soviet Union. He expected British action to consist of a number of small raids that would be difficult to counter because of poor internal lines of communication in Norway. These raids could develop into major operations. In view of this danger and the need for the Army of Norway to maintain total security for Norway Hitler made several decisions that impacted on the planned operations in Finland:
1. Strengthen the defenses in Norway with 160 coastal artillery batteries and two garrison divisions.
2. Reduce the number of forces from Norway that had been planned for use in Finland.
3. Re-evaluate the plans for German operations in Finland since Swedish attitude with respect to transit was in doubt.
Hitler’s orders led to a revision of the command structure and the OKH order for Barbarossa. Falkenhorst had reported to OKW as armed forces commander in Norway and to OKH as commander of the Army of Norway and the planned operations in Finland. Falkenhorst was now placed under OKW in both areas. The additional batteries for coastal defense were to be in place by the middle of May along with increased troop strength in north Norway. The occupation and defense of the Pechenga area was reaffirmed but the planned operation against Murmansk was changed. Murmansk was not to be attacked directly at this stage but only isolated from the rest of the Soviet Union.
The British raid in Lofoten caused the Army of Norway to practically stop its planning for Barbarossa while waiting for its missions to be clarified. Some deployments of forces did take place during March. The movement of the 2nd Mountain Division to the vicinity of Kirkenes was begun. The OKH’s earlier withdrawal of SS Kampfgruppe Nord from participation in operations in Finland was now rescinded, and the lead elements of this organization were prepared for transport via Sweden to the Kirkenes area. The Swedes were told that the unit was being moved as part of a replacement operation. From Kirkenes Kampfgruppe Nord would proceed south along the Arctic Ocean Highway to its assembly area near Rovaniemi. The reason this unit was again assigned to operations in Finland was that it was the only motorized unit available to the Army of Norway and this facilitated the long trek from Kirkenes to Rovaniemi.
An OKW directive of April 7, 1941, which implemented the revised OKH order broke the logjam that had existed the previous month and allowed planning and preparations to proceed. The directive provided for the reinforced 2nd Mountain Division to be ready to occupy Pechenga provided its commitment did not reduce the forces available to defend the Narvik-Kirkenes area to below the 18 battalions that had been decided on earlier. It was not certain that enough forces could be gathered for a drive to Polyarnyy to block Kola Bay above Murmansk, but preparations for this possibility were to be made.