The capture of Kandalaksha was still viewed as the first step in isolating Murmansk from the south. Operations after the capture of Kandalaksha would depend on the circumstances at the time. It was assumed that transit through Sweden for the buildup in central Finland would not be possible and other provisions were made. One infantry division was to be sent by sea to Finland and the XXXVI Corps Headquarters and its attachments would come by sea from Norway. An additional division would be sent by rail from southern Norway if Sweden granted transit after the start of the war against the Soviet Union. Again, it was planned to offer the command of all forces in Finland to Marshal Mannerheim.
The Army of Norway submitted its plan of operations to the OKW on April 17 and followed this up a few days later by issuing orders to the Mountain Corps Norway and the XXXVI Corps. The strength of the enemy that these units were expected to encounter was estimated at five infantry divisions and two understrength armored units.
Hitler had a meeting with General der Gebirgstruppe Dietl, the commander of Mountain Corps Norway, in Berlin on April 21. Dietl was an ardent supporter of Hitler, and Hitler was fond of this plain Bavarian who had proved his loyalty by his tenacity at Narvik the previous year. He explained to Dietl the importance of eliminating the threat from Murmansk at the very outset of operations by seizing that city. Dietl explained the difficulties involved in an attack on Murmansk—long and difficult lines of supply, atrocious terrain, severe climate, lack of roads, and the lack of various support troops in his command to overcome these obstacles.
Dietl agreed with Hitler that the Soviets might attack Pechenga since it was much easier for them to do so because they had lateral lines of communication and large supply depots close to their forward positions. He pointed out that it would be much easier for the Germans to cut the Murmansk Railroad further south and that this would place the Soviets at the same disadvantage as the Germans.24
Hitler was impressed by Dietl’s arguments and asked him to leave his papers so he could think about what Dietl had proposed. While we don’t know what caused Hitler not to adopt Dietl’s recommendations, the final decision by OKW was, as we shall see, a poor compromise.
Mountain Corps Norway had several missions under the Army of Norway operations order. First and foremost was the defense of Norway north of Narvik. The second mission was to execute Operation Renntier as discussed earlier. The forces should be ready to carry out this mission on 72 hours’ notice. This mission would either be executed separately (in case of a Soviet attack on Finland) or as part of the third mission which was to undertake an offensive along the Arctic coast to Polyarnyy to close Kola Bay north of Murmansk. This operation was code named Platinfuchs (Platinum Fox). If conditions allowed, Dietl’s forces were to cross Kola Bay and occupy Murmansk.
Dietl had the following forces available for his primary mission, the defense of Norway north of Narvik:
1. The 199th Infantry Division.
2. The 9th SS Regiment.
3. Three machinegun battalions.
4. A police battalion.
5. Some naval units.
6. Coastal artillery.
Dietl had the following forces available for the execution of Renntier and Platinfuchs:
1. 2nd Mountain Division.
2. 3rd Mountain Division.
3. A reduced-strength antiaircraft battalion.
4. A communications battalion.
5. Two batteries of 105mm guns.
6. A rocket launcher (Nebelwerfer) battery.
7. A construction battalion.
8. An attached Finnish unit of three infantry companies and a battery of artillery. It was referred to as the Petsamo Detachment or the Ivalo Battalion.
The main German attack was to be carried out by the XXXVI Corps against Kandalaksha, code named Polarfuchs (Polar Fox). The concept of operations called for the assembly of XXXVI Corps east of Rovaniemi. The corps’ main attack would envelop and eliminate the Soviet strongpoints in the Salla area and then drive towards Kandalaksha along the road from Rovaniemi. After taking Kandalaksha and securing its southern flank the corps would push northward along the railroad to take Murmansk in conjunction with Dietl’s Mountain Corps.
The following forces were assigned to the XXXVI Corps by the Army of Norway operations order:
1. The 169th Infantry Division.
2. SS Kampfgruppe Nord.
3. 6th Finnish Division, detached from III Finnish Corps.
4. Two tank battalions.
5. Two motorized artillery battalions.
6. A heavy weapons battalion.
7. A communications battalion.
8. Two batteries of antiaircraft artillery.
9. A rocket launcher battery.
10. Two construction battalions.
11. A bridge construction battalion.
All details involving Finnish participation had not been resolved when the Army of Norway issued its order and the part of the order pertaining to Finnish units was therefore tentative.
As described in Chapter 1, on May 25 the OKW began a three-day conference with a Finnish military delegation headed by General Heinrichs. This conference was continued on June 3 in Helsinki. Command relationships in Finland were decided at these meetings. Falkenhorst would command in northern and central Finland (Silberfuchs) and Marshal Mannerheim would command in southern Finland. This was a change from earlier German intentions to offer Mannerheim the overall command in Finland.
The Army of Norway issued a supplement to its April order after the problems involving Finnish participation were resolved on June 11. This included an order to the Finnish III Corps,25 which became attached to the Army of Norway on June 15. The combat elements of III Corps consisted of two infantry divisions and border guards. However, one division—the 6th—was attached to XXXVI Corps. The III Corps (3rd Division plus border guards after the detachment of the 6th Division) was directed to provide security for the right flank of the XXXVI Corps through offensive operations. Its main force was to attack from Suomussalmi towards Kem by way of Ukhta. A secondary attack would be launched against Loukhi (Louhi) via Kestenga (Kistinki). The 6th Finnish Division—attached to XXXVI Corps—would begin its advance from the Kuusamo area towards Loukhi but instead of going directly to that town, it would swing in a northeast direction east of Salla to Alakurtti on the Tuntsa River. The southern border of the Army of Norway’s responsibility was along a line running from Oulu to Belomorsk.
The roles of the German Navy and the Luftwaffe in Operation Silberfuchs were limited. Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander in chief of the German Navy, was eager to capture Polyarnyy and Murmansk early. He viewed this as the most effective way to neutralize Soviet naval supremacy and reduce the chances of British naval operations in the north. The navy expected that supply operations along the coast of north Norway might have to be curtailed until Polyarnyy was captured and Kola Bay sealed.
The Luftwaffe participation was very inadequate. The 5th Air Fleet in Norway held back about 200 aircraft for the defense of Norway, its primary mission. A measly 60 aircraft were made available to support Silberfuchs. Only 10 of these were fighters. The rest were bombers (40), and reconnaissance aircraft (10). These very small air assets had the nearly impossible missions of providing close air support, destroying the port facilities at Polyarnyy and Murmansk, interdicting the Murmansk Railroad, destroying Soviet airfields, and of operating against the Soviet Navy in the Arctic Ocean.