The concentration of the Army of Norway forces for Silberfuchs was itself a major undertaking. In the far north, only the 2nd Mountain Division was already in the Kirkenes area. Most units that became part of Mountain Corps Norway for defense of north Norway and for Platinfuchs had to be transported from southern Norway. Sea transport was the only practical way since Route 50 south of Narvik had to cross several fjords before reaching Bodø and for the 140 kilometers that separated Bodø from Narvik there was no road at all. Route 50 north of Narvik was impossible to keep open in winter with available snow removal equipment. From April to June much of this road became impassable because of the thaw.
The 3rd Mountain Division was already in the Narvik area but had to be brought from there to Kirkenes. The last elements of this division did not reach their assembly area south of Kirkenes until June 17. The 199th Infantry Division, the staff of the 702nd Infantry Division, and various miscellaneous units amounting to several thousand troops had to be transported from southern Norway. The transfer of these units was completed by the end of May. The 8,000-strong motorized SS Kampfgruppe Nord came from southern Norway through Sweden to Narvik and had to be moved from there to Kirkenes. It reached its destination on June 6 and started the long trek via the Arctic Ocean Highway to Rovaniemi on June 7. It reached Rovaniemi on June 10.
The assault elements of Mountain Corps Norway (the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions plus combat support troops) numbered 27,500 men. Mountain Corps Norway was to draw its supplies from a one-year stockpile Hitler had ordered established in Norway in the fall of 1940. These supplies were, for the most part, brought to Kirkenes by ships.
The movement of the main force of XXXVI Corps to Finland was carried out in two sea transport operations: Blaufuchs (Blue Fox) 1, and Blaufuchs 2. Blaufuchs 1 brought the 169th Infantry Division and assorted support units (20,000 men) from Stettin to Oulu. Blaufuchs 2 brought the XXXVI Corps Headquarters and corps support troops (10,600 men) by ships from Oslo to Oulu. The first ships sailed on June 5, 1941, and the transfer was completed on June 14.
These large-scale troop movements could not be concealed and their purpose was explained as a relief operation for north Norway. The XXXVI Corps was ordered not to turn eastward from the route Oulu–Rovaniemi until June 18.
The strength of the XXXVI Corps was 40,600 men. This did not include the attached Finnish units. Stockpiles that the corps could draw on had been established with rations for three months, ammunition for more than two months, and petroleum products for two months. The supply operations for both Norway and Finland were managed by Heimatstab Nord (Home Staff North). This organization was renamed Heimatstab Übersee (Home Staff Overseas) in June 1941.
Negotiations for the transit of one division to Finland across Sweden from southern Norway began in Stockholm on June 23, 1941. The Swedes consented to the transit on June 25 and the 163rd Infantry Division began moving out of Oslo on June 26. The 163rd was replaced in Norway by the 710th Infantry Division from Germany. The intention had been to use the 163rd Division against Hanko but OKW ordered it attached to the Finnish Army in the south where it became Mannerheim’s reserve for operations in the Lake Ladoga area.
Seven divisions (about 150,000 troops) were left for the defense of Norway and they were organized and stationed as follows:
1. LXX Corps of three divisions had its headquarters in Oslo.
2. XXXIII Corps of two divisions had its headquarters in Trondheim.
3. Provisional Corps Nagy of two divisions with its headquarters in Alta. This organization was originally part of Mountain Corps Norway but was detached on June 28 and thereafter came under the command of the Army of Norway in Oslo. It had 160 batteries of army coastal artillery, 56 batteries of naval coastal artillery, 6 police battalions, an SS-Regiment, and 3 motorized machine gun battalions.
In an elaborate cover operation to shield the upcoming attack on the Soviet Union units in Norway were assigned to an operation called Harpune Nord (Harpoon North). Units in Denmark and France were also part of the deception plan (Harpune Süd—Harpoon South). The intention was to depict an invasion of England in the making, timed for about August 1, 1941.
The timing of the attacks out of Finland was left undecided in the operational orders. With respect to the timing of the Finnish attacks in the southeast this was probably due to the fact that the Germans did not want to reveal the starting date of their own operations against the Soviet Union. Another reason was that the Germans wanted to time the Finnish attack for maximum impact in relation to the advance of Army Group North. The Finns requested of the Germans on June 16 that the main Finnish attack be delayed until a few days after Silberfuchs started. Erfurth explained that the reason for the Finnish request was that “The Finns wanted to create the impression among their own people and people’s representatives of being drawn in by the course of events.”26
Finland declared neutrality when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. This official position was maintained until the evening of June 25 despite the fact that German aircraft began operations from Finnish airfields on June 23 when the Luftwaffe flew missions against Murmansk and Salla. The Russians retaliated with attacks on Pechenga, Kemijärvi, and Rovaniemi. The Soviets began massive air attacks against cities in southern Finland on June 25 and that night the Finnish government declared that since the country had been attacked, a state of war existed between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Much focus has been directed at the fact that the Soviet Union initiated attacks on Finnish cities before Finnish military operations against the Soviet Union had begun. The Soviets were well aware that strong German military forces were present in Finland and that the Finnish armed forces were mobilized and deploying with the logical intention of joining the Germans in offensive operations. The Finns later admitted that the presence of German forces in the country gave the Soviets compelling reasons for attacking. Tanner recounts a conversation with Mannerheim, Prime Minister Linkomies, the minister of defense, and the chief of staff on August 9, 1943:
The conclusion of the exchange of opinions can be said to have been that… Germany having attacked Russia on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had begun bombing places in Finland because there were German troops in the country.27
The German Army made its decision as to the location of the Finnish attack on June 24 and this differed somewhat from what had been agreed to earlier. Erfurth was instructed to tell the Finns to prepare for an operation on the east side of Lake Ladoga with at least six divisions, with the weight of the attack on the left. The Finns submitted plans which agreed with the German wishes on June 29. General Halder, based on the fact that Army Group North was approaching the last major obstacle south of Leningrad—the Dvina River—decided on July 4 that the Finns should start offensive operations on July 10.
The Mountain Corps Norway executed Operation Renntier on June 22 by crossing the Norwegian–Finnish border with the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions. The Finnish border guards had orders to cooperate and there were no incidents. Mountain Corps Norway stopped short of the Finnish–Soviet border with the 2nd Division on the left and the 3rd Division on the right. Orders were issued to Mountain Corps Norway by the Army of Norway not to cross the Soviet border until June 29. The German move into Pechenga was undoubtedly observed by Soviet forces on the Rybachiy Peninsula at the entrance to Pechenga Bay.