The Army of Norway also issued orders to the Finnish III Corps and the German XXXVI Corps on June 22. The III Corps was ordered to begin cross-border operations at 0200 hours on July 1 and XXXVI Corps was ordered to begin its operations at 1600 hours the same day. The staggered timing in each sector was necessitated by the scarcity of air resources. The air operations in support of Mountain Corps Norway could take place from airfields in Norway—Kirkenes and Banak—but the operations had to switch to Rovaniemi for support of the two corps in the Salla area.
Some of the serious problems for the Germans with respect to lines of communication were touched on when we discussed the marshalling of their forces. The main supply and support bases for German operations out of Finland were in Norway and the poor lines of communication in the northern part of that country presented the Germans with almost insurmountable problems. There were basically four routes for the Germans to support their forces in Finland:
1. By sea around the northernmost part of Norway to the ports of Kirkenes and Pechenga. This route was exposed to British and Soviet naval attacks and the entrance to Pechenga harbor was within range of Russian shore batteries on the Rybachiy Peninsula.
2. Route 50 from Narvik to Kirkenes. This road did not have an all-weather surface in 1941 and the snow removal equipment proved inadequate to cope with the heavy snowfall.
3. The land route from Norway through Sweden. Reliance on this route was dangerous because its use hinged on Swedish permission. The Swedes became increasingly reluctant to grant permission for its use as the war progressed. Finnish railroads were built to Soviet gauge while Swedish railroads used western gauge. For that reason rail shipments from Sweden had to be trans-loaded at the border.
4. The sea route through the Baltic, either from Norway or Germany. While this route was relatively safe, it was long and presented problems of its own. The Finnish port capacity in the Gulf of Bothnia was limited and the ports were ice bound for up to five months each year.
The internal lines of communications in Finland were also inadequate. Almost none of the roads were improved by any stretch of the imagination. Most of the bridges were not built to carry heavy military equipment. The Arctic Ocean Highway was exceedingly important to the Army of Norway as it was the only road link between Rovaniemi and Pechenga and on to Kirkenes. However, it was inadequate for the increased demands and of marginal usefulness since trucks consumed nearly the weight of their cargos in fuel on the 600-mile round trip from Rovaniemi to Pechenga.
Severe climate and extraordinarily difficult terrain characterized the Mountain Corps Norway zone of operations. At Pechenga Bay the influence of the Gulf Stream is still strong enough to permit some summer vegetation near the bay and along the river valley. East of Pechenga the coast is bare. The terrain is a mass of low, rocky hills, and depressions with giant boulders left over from the last ice age. Many valleys have no outlets and the melting ice forms hundreds of lakes. This belt of tundra is rather narrow at Pechenga but as one moves east the effects of the Gulf Stream weaken and the belt increases in width to nearly 100 kilometers or more near Kola Bay and Murmansk. Dietl described the terrain around Murmansk as follows when he talked to Hitler on April 21:
The landscape up there in the tundra outside Murmansk is just as it was after the Creation. There’s not a tree, not a shrub, not a human settlement. No roads and no paths. Nothing but rock and scree. There are countless torrents, lakes and fast-flowing rivers with rapids and waterfalls.28
Dietl goes on to describe the tundra belt around Murmansk as one big wilderness and the pathless desert of rocks as impenetrable for military formations.
Inland from the tundra the terrain gradually becomes characterized by coniferous forest. There are mountains with elevations of up to 2,000 feet but the valleys are swampy with numerous streams and lakes. This is the type of terrain found in the Salla area.
The winter lasts from October to May on the Arctic coast. While the temperatures are not as severe as found further south, away from the influences of the Gulf Stream, the winters are characterized by almost continuous storms and blizzards. The temperatures inland frequently reach -45° Fahrenheit in the Rovaniemi-Salla area of southern Lapland and -40° Fahrenheit in Karelia and South Finland.
The summer usually brings a month or more with an average temperature over 50° Fahrenheit. Swarms of mosquitoes thrive in the swampy forests of the interior. Patches of snow and ice survive the summer despite the fact that temperatures may occasionally reach as high as 80° Fahrenheit. The coastal winds bring in banks of fog that persist from a few hours to weeks.
A close look at the planning process for German operations out of Finland is quite revealing. Perhaps most important is the fact that the allocation of resources, particularly air assets, reveals that German capabilities were already showing evidence of being overstretched. Germany was not only about to become involved in a life and death struggle with the Soviet Union but had large forces tied down in the Balkans, in North Africa, and in the defense of western Europe. The scarcity of forces may also have contributed to the hesitant planning and frequent changes leading up to and subsequent to the launching of the attack.
Hitler’s fixation with the defense of Norway and assigning that the top priority on the northern front severely reduced the forces available for operations in Finland. The ground forces sent to Finland represented only slightly more than half of what was held back for the defense of Norway. The danger he saw to his hold on Norway was in the form of a British attack. It is difficult to square this with Hitler’s stated view that Great Britain was defeated and only the hope of Soviet and US help kept its hopes alive. However, there is some validity to Hitler’s argument that the garrison troops in Norway were not suited for operations in the Arctic.
The fragmentation of the German effort did not augur well for overall success. While operations began with the main effort correctly identified as the operations of the XXXVI Corps, the allocation of resources failed to underscore this decision. Attacks by the Army of Norway were launched in three sectors with about two divisions in each sector. Generals Hans Feige (commander of XXXVI Corps) and Dietl both argued that the main effort should be made against Kandalaksha and that the forces in this area should be strengthened for that purpose. Dietl even suggested suspending operations in the Mountain Corps Norway sector to achieve a concentration in central Finland. As we shall see, instead of doing so the Army of Norway took action to effectively shift the main effort to the sector of the Mountain Corps. It is curious that the OKW and the Army of Norway continuously violated some of the teachings of Clausewitz, such as concentrating striking power at the decisive point through the reduction of forces elsewhere.
While strategic logic dictated that the main effort should be made in the drive to Kandalaksha, it was important to maintain pressure in other sectors so as to prevent the Russians from shifting forces laterally behind their front from one to the other. They were able to do so because of the Murmansk Railroad. OKH did not become involved in the arguments about a strategy in Finland since the Army of Norway came directly under OKW after the Lofoten raid and because the OKH considered the operations in Finland, except for those of the main Finnish Army, a waste of precious resources.
The Germans allowed themselves to enter into a very imperfect coalition by failing to insist upon the harmonization of objectives and plans. To them the war was total but not to the Finns. These differing aims created difficulty for the cobelligerents from the very start. The greatest potential of the Finnish effort from the standpoint of the Germans was twofold: 1) the quick isolation and capture of Leningrad so that forces tied up in that gigantic operation could be used in other areas and 2) in providing assistance in severing the Soviet Union’s overseas supply route. It was up to the political leadership in Germany to achieve a formal agreement from Finland on these points and it was up to the OKW to take steps to establish an effective command structure. Hitler did not intervene and OKW failed to take these rather obvious actions. Without them it was virtually impossible for the Germans to achieve an effective strategic relationship with Finland and its more limited—and politically unstable and shifting—war aims.