The German response to the convoy traffic around north Norway was slow. The reason is likely their belief that the war would be short and that they were therefore of little importance. Lack of adequate air and naval forces in north Norway may also have played a role as did fuel shortages.
The situation had changed by late winter or spring of 1942. It was now obvious to the Germans that the war would not be short and they were becoming seriously concerned about the steady flow of supplies to the Soviets through the Arctic. The volume of this aid was on a far greater scale than had been anticipated.
Hitler issued orders in mid-March to step up operations against the Murmansk convoys. The navy was ordered to increase the numbers of U-boats in north Norway and the Luftwaffe was directed to increase its long-range reconnaissance and bomber forces.
The Royal Navy historian Sir Michael Lewis refers to the Arctic Convoys as a magnificent achievement under almost impossible conditions. This achievement was not without cost. The Allies, mostly the British, lost 18 warships and 1,944 sailors and airmen. Eighty-seven merchant ships and 829 merchant sailors were also lost. Six of the 87 merchant ships lost sailed independently and another five were sunk by German aircraft in Soviet ports. The German Navy lost one battleship, three destroyers, and 32 submarines.8
At the end of 1943 the German efforts against the Arctic Convoys essentially came to an end as a result of the sinking of the Scharnhorst, the crippling of the Tirpitz, and the lack of bombers in Norway after most were moved to other fronts. The U-boats remained a threat but the increased effectiveness of anti-U-boat operations reduced their usefulness. The Germans were waiting for the introduction of a new-type submarine that would overcome this problem.
Hitler placed much emphasis on the early capture of the Soviet industrial area. However, he failed to appreciate the effects of the massive assistance of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and foodstuffs from Britain and the US. This proved instrumental in keeping the Soviet Union in the war.
While the effects of the Lend-Lease program are still hotly debated, it is worthwhile looking at what some writers have to say on this subject. The German historian Paul Carell writes this about the first two years of the aid:
And since Archangel was frozen up from November onward, supplies for the desperately fighting forces outside Moscow and Leningrad had to come via Murmansk. It was an endless stream, a stream which was not to cease again, but grow in volume, a stream which ultimately decided the German-Russian war.
Here are a few figures to prove the point. During the first year of the Soviet aid programme the following supplies were delivered along the northern sea route alone—i.e. through Murmansk and Archangel—in nineteen convoys:
3,052 aircraft: Germany entered the war in the East with 1,830 aircraft.
4,048 tanks: The German forces on 22nd June 1941 had 3,580 armoured vehicles.
520,000 motor vehicles of all types: Germany had entered the war with altogether 600,000 vehicles.
In fact, the American armament supplies during 1942 almost completely made good the material losses of the Soviet Army. The decisive effect of American aid on the destinies of the war could not be revealed more clearly than by this fact.9
What arrived in the Soviet Union via Murmansk was only part of the immense flow of aid from the Western democracies. Aid via the Persian Gulf began arriving in 1942 but the flow was small until 1943 when the railway system between Basra and the Caspian Sea area had been expanded sufficiently to accommodate the traffic. The supplies and equipment arriving by this route eventually amounted to about 25 percent of all aid to the Soviet Union.
The largest flow, accounting for about half the aid, came across the Pacific to Soviet eastern ports. The possibility that this route would be disrupted by the Japanese was taken into account and Stalin warned Japan not to interfere.10 Thus approximately 25 percent of the aid came via Murmansk and Archangel. The total tonnage shipped via the northern route was 3,964,231 out of a total of 16,366.747.11
War materials sent via the Murmansk route according to Woodman included:
5,218 tanks (1,388 made in Canada); 7,411 aircraft (3,129 made in America); 4,932 anti-tank guns; 4,000 rifles and machine guns; 4,338 radio sets; 2,000 field telephones; 1,803 radar sets; 473 million projectiles; 9 torpedo craft; 4 submarines; 14 minesweepers; 10 destroyers; and a battleship.12
As far as overall aid going by all routes Woodman makes the following listing:
Between March 1941 and December 1945, the United States of America contributed to Russia: 14,795 aircraft; 7,537 tanks; 51,503 jeeps; 35,170 motor bicycles; 8,700 tractors; 375,883 trucks and lorries; 8,218 anti-aircraft guns; 131,633 submachine guns; 345,735 tons of explosives; 1,981 locomotives; 11,155 railway wagons and trucks; 540,000 tons of steel rails; in excess of 1 million miles of telephone cable; food shipments to the value of $1,312 million; 2,670,000 tons of petrol; 842,000 tons of chemicals; 3,786,000 tyres; 49,000 tons of leather; and 15 million pairs of boots. The total value of the above is said to be $11,260,343,603.13
The extent to which this aid contributed to the ability of the Soviet Union to halt the German offensive and eventually go on relentless offensives of its own is difficult to quantify and the subject of continued controversy. Soviet writers during the period of the Cold War down-played the value of Western aid. The aid received was also labeled as consisting of obsolete items of little value. It was claimed by the Soviets in 1948 that the aid amounted to only 4 percent of Soviet production between 1941 and 1943.14 In the late 1970s Soviet scholars revised the estimate upwards admitting that the number of tanks received amounted to 10 percent of their own production and that the aircraft equaled 12 percent of the production.15
However, even after the breakup of the Soviet Union the tendency has been to be less than forthright in admitting the value of Western aid. Many Western historians fell in line with Soviet claims that the aid was of little consequence both because of the amount and the claim that it was of inferior quality.
Most of the tanks provided through 1943 were light tanks and certainly not up to the quality of the home-produced T-34. That some failed to measure up against what the Germans had is understandable but to claim that they were valueless is a total distortion, particularly the large number of Sherman tanks.
Soviet claims that the 14,795 aircraft provided by the United States fell into the useless category is even more questionable. Sixty-seven percent of these were fighters and 26 percent bombers. The Soviet air force lost over 1,800 aircraft in the first day of the German attack and 3,200 aircraft in the first four months. As Chris Bellamy writes, “even obsolescent aircraft were better than none” in a period of heavy losses and with a dramatic cutback in production.16
The most valuable aid may have been in the 1941–42 period when the Soviet war industry was moved to the Urals and beyond to keep it from falling into German hands. This was an achievement which contributed immeasurably to the ability of the Soviet Union to stay in the war and begin turning the tables on the Germans. However, production in 1941–42 was at its lowest and insufficient to meet the demands brought about by the enormous losses. Victor Kravchenko, who was involved in the Soviet armaments procurement industry during the war, claims that aid played a prominent role.
It may have been in the areas of logistics, transportation, food, communications, raw materials, and the more sophisticated equipment that the aid had its greatest importance. Bellamy points out that the Soviet armed forces had 665,000 motor vehicles at the end of the war but their own production between 1942 and 1944 was only 128,000. It is therefore obvious that most of them came from American factories and that they provided the Soviets with the capability to motorize their forces. The 436,087 vehicles, received mainly from the United States, enabled the Soviets to motorize their troops, their logistical support, and their command and control.