Group F was also making good progress in its advance to Ukhta. After having eliminated the encircled Soviet forces in the Voynitsa area the group continued along the road to Ukhta via Korpijärvi, which was reached on July 23.
The group again split into two major columns. One approached Ukhta on both sides of the Korpijärvi–Ukhta road while the second column advanced southeast and then east along the north shore of Verkhneye Kuyto Lake. This column reached Enonsuu across Stredneye Kuyto Lake from Ukhta on August 2. The northern columns reached the Yeldanka Lake area on July 28. This put them about 19 kilometers northwest of Ukhta. By August 2, at the same time as the southern group reached Enonsuu, the northern group drew up to the Kis-Kis River line, about 10 kilometers from Ukhta.
Group J began its assault on the Sofyanga River line on July 30. While the main force attacked the river line near the village of Sof-Porog, one battalion crossed the western tip of Top Lake by boat to attack the Soviets in the rear. Group J penetrated the Sofyanga River line after three days of hard fighting. The town of Kestenga fell on August 7. The Finns and Germans believed that the Soviets had thrown their last reserves into the defense of Kestenga.11
On August 11, a Finnish regiment of Group J reached a point about 32 kilometers southwest of Loukhi, in the narrows between Lakes Yelovoye and Lebedevo. The Soviets had rushed the 88th Rifle Division to the Loukhi front from Archangel in order to keep the Murmansk Railroad from being cut. The Finns met heavy resistance in the lake narrows and the resistance became even more determined in the next few days as the 88th Division reached the front.
Group F had become stalled on the Kis-Kis River line. Attempts at envelopments from the north failed against heavy resistance. The front stagnated and the actions boiled down to patrolling and probing attacks. The Army of Norway cancelled the offensive operations of Group F on August 19. An infantry battalion from Group F was ordered to join Group J in order to increase the weight of the attack against Loukhi.
One reason for further increasing the strength of Group J was that there were indications that enemy resistance in that area was weakening. However, the Finnish and German troops were also exhausted after nearly two months of offensive operations. Their losses were also significant. Group J managed to encircle and trap a Soviet regiment south of the Kestenga-Loukhi road but because of exhaustion and lack of strength they were unable to eliminate the trapped troops. General Siilasvuo informed General Falkenhorst on August 25, 1941 that he did not believe it possible for his troops to complete their drive to Loukhi without significant reinforcements. He asked to be assigned another Finnish division used to forest fighting.
General Siilasvuo’s assessment of the situation led to a hurried meeting between Generals Falkenhorst, Buschenhagen, and Siilasvuo at Kuusamo on August 29. Siilasvuo told his guests that both Group F and J were stalled. The six Finnish and three SS battalions in Group J faced 13 Soviet battalions in prepared defensive positions. Two of his SS battalions together had an effective strength of only 280 men. It now appeared possible that the Soviets would be able to strike southward from the Loukhi area to Kestenga. If successful, this could bring about the collapse of Group J. General Siilasvuo stated that it was an error to have stopped Group F before it reached Ukhta since it now found itself in poor defensive positions.12
General Siilasvuo’s pessimistic assessment of the situation in the III Corps area led Falkenhorst to make yet another change in the operational plans. His decision was basically to start up again the attack on Ukhta while Group J held its positions. To bolster the strength of Group J, the last two infantry battalions of the SS were assigned to that group. A motorized machinegun battalion was added in the mix. A regiment from the 6th Finnish Division would be released to increase the striking power in the attack on Ukhta. The exact date for the transfer of this infantry regiment was left undecided. It would be done as soon as conditions in the XXXVI sector permitted its detachment. Until that time, Group F was expected to remain on the defensive.
The attack on the Kayrala–Mikkola line by the XXXVI Corps had met initial failure by July 28 and the Germans limited themselves to minor offensive actions to keep the Soviets from switching their forces against III Finnish Corps.
The sharp differences between Generals Falkenhorst and Feige noted earlier continued. At times they became acrimonious. Feige, in accordance with earlier instructions from the Army of Norway (and also in accordance with Hitler’s directive of July 30), ordered his two divisions on August 3 to tie down the opposing enemy forces and await a favorable opportunity for resuming the offensive after reinforcements had arrived.
The Army of Norway immediately countermanded Feige’s order. It directed XXXVI Corps to prepare to resume its offensive with the weight of the attack in the sector of the Finnish 6th Division in the south—without waiting for reinforcements that could not be counted on for some time.
There is no doubt that Falkenhorst ignored the July 30 directive as far as the XXXVI Corps is concerned. In his defense it must be pointed out that OKW did not issue an implementing order for that directive and until they did Falkenhorst may have felt free to set XXXVI Corps in motion.
The Soviets withdrew the 1st Tank Division (minus one regiment) from the Salla front on August 1 and transferred it to the Leningrad front. This led the Army of Norway to order the XXXVI Corps to execute a deep envelopment to the road-railroad line just west of the town of Alakurtti. The XXXVI Corps viewed this as impossible because of lack of sufficient forces in terrain that did not lend itself to wide and deep envelopments. It insisted that the envelopment should not aim at a point further to the east than Nurmi Lake, halfway to Alakurtti.
The XXXVI Corps intended to send the 6th Finnish Division on a thrust to Nurmi Mountains as the southern prong of the envelopment. The Finns—the main effort—would advance with one regiment forward and two in reserve against the Nurmi Mountains and take up blocking positions. One regiment of the division would advance eastward along the Alakurtti road at Vuoriyarvi (Vuorijärvi). A German task force of two infantry battalions and six companies of mixed SS and engineer troops would cross the Nurmi River behind the left wing of the 169th Division and drive towards Nurmi Lake as the northern arm of the envelopment. Other units from the 169th Division would take over the 6th Division’s defensive positions to make the Finnish drive possible. Two regiments (one German and one Finnish) constituted the corps reserve.
The regrouping of forces for the offensive was a major task. It required the construction of a road from Lampela to the southern point of Apa Lake in order to bring artillery into the Finnish sector. This road was completed on August 14. Units of the 169th Division, which were to take over the Finnish defensive positions, were pulled back through Salla and sent south to where the Finnish 6th Division had crossed the border. From here they moved northeast along the route the Finns had followed in early July. While this maneuver may have confused the Soviets, it was a trying experience for the troops in the 169th Division. The straight-line distance from their start point to their new area of operations was only 28 kilometers. Now—because of the lack of lateral roads near the front—they had to make a strenuous move of 175 kilometers to arrive at the same destination.