As the XXXVI Corps drew up to the Verman Lake line the Army of Norway made another change in its strategy that brought relations between Generals Feige and Falkenhorst to breaking point. With the failure of the last attack across the Litsa River in the Mountain Corps Norway’s area of operations, the Army of Norway switched the effective main effort in Finland back to the XXXVI Corps—just a few days after two battalions of the 7th SS Infantry Regiment were transferred to the Finnish III Corps, and one battalion from the 9th SS Infantry Regiment was sent north to Mountain Corps Norway.
The XXXVI Corps had suffered 9,463 German casualties since the campaign was initiated and was hardly in a position to become the main effort. The 169th Division was so worn out and depleted that it was hardly capable of performing defensive missions, much less offensive operations. The Army of Norway proposal elicited some very unusual harsh comments from General Feige. The XXXVI Corps characterized the proposal as “grotesque” and “hardly calculated to arouse confidence in the higher leadership.”15
General Feige did not limit himself to pointing out the futility of switching the main effort to the XXXVI Corps. He leveled—in an appreciation of the situation on September 16—some harsh criticism against the Army of Norway for having missed excellent opportunities in the past. He pointed out that, by the earlier emphasis on the operations of Mountain Corps Norway to the detriment of reinforcing the XXXVI Corps, two good opportunities had been missed within a month—one after the Kayrala encirclement and another as the corps drew up to the Verman line. He concluded his assessment with the statement that the corps could advance no further with the forces it had assigned. While there was still a possibility of reaching Kandalaksha before winter, Feige stated that to do so he needed another Finnish division and a German mountain division. However, time was of the essence since the Soviets were improving their defenses with each passing day.
General Feige must surely have been aware of the efforts made by the Army of Norway to obtain additional forces, although those efforts were late. Falkenhorst had requested the two remaining regiments of the 163rd Division on August 25, 1941 and on September 4 General Buschenhagen had requested the use of the 6th Mountain Division. On September 14 Falkenhorst had again requested the remainder of the 163rd Division and the 6th Mountain Division. There was no reply to the August 25 request for the 163rd Division and, as we saw earlier, both Hitler and Dietl were determined to use the 6th Mountain Division in the far north. With respect to the second request for the 163rd Division on September 14, OKW promised a reply as soon as the operations around Leningrad were sorted out.
The request for the 163rd Division on August 25, even if OKW had acted on it, came too late to add much punch to the pursuit after the Kayrala encirclement. It would take some time to withdraw the 163rd Division from East Karelia and move it and its support base several hundred miles. The request for the 6th Mountain Division on September 4 was likewise too late. The division was still on its way from Greece by way of Norway and was not expected to reach the Mountain Corps Norway’s area of operations until sometime in October.
The Army of Norway instructed XXXVI Corps on September 17 to rest its troops for the time being on the Verman River line. Feige was promised two battalions from an organization referred to as Schützenverband Oslo. This was a regimental-size unit of two battalions organized in Norway. The unit was not yet available; it was on the way to Finland from Norway and the quality of this makeshift organization was open to question. General Feige predicted that the operations of his corps had come to an end since winter was fast approaching.
Hitler’s War Operational Directive Number 36, issued on September 22, still called for the XXXVI to continue its offensive against Kandalaksha in October.16 The Army of Norway was told that Mannerheim would be asked to release the 163rd Division in time to take part in the offensive. The directive also called for the release of all German troops from the Finnish III Corps and for them to be reattached to XXXVI Corps. Finnish III Corps was to halt all its offensive operations. This was yet another change to German strategy in Finland and the promised additional forces were too little and too late. It was soon learned, for example, that the 163rd Division was not expected to join the XXXVI Corps for four to five weeks, after the full fury of winter had set in on the central front in Finland.
This realization led to yet another shift in strategy by the Army of Norway. Falkenhorst disregarded Directive 36 since the premise on which it was based—the timely arrival of the 163rd Division—was no longer realizable. Instead of terminating operations by III Finnish Corps, Falkenhorst began withdrawing troops from the XXXVI Corps for use in the Finnish III Corps area. Offensive operations in the XXXVI area were delayed until winter.
This was not the end of the back-and-forth about strategy in Finland between the Army of Norway and the OKW. On October 8 the OKW ordered a stop to all operations in the Army of Norway sector. This resulted in a call from the Army of Norway to OKW for an explanation. This was at a time when the great encirclement battles by Army Group Center at Bryansk and Vyazma had been concluded with Soviet losses estimated at 300,000 killed and 700,000 captured.17 With Army Group Center beginning its final drive against Moscow a sense of unwarranted optimism prevailed in Berlin. OKW believed that the military collapse of the Soviet Union was imminent. In view of this, it was felt that it was not necessary to push things in central Finland. This is essentially the explanation given to General Buschenhagen by General Jodl. It was confirmed by Führer Directive Number 37 on October 10, 1941.18
Offensive operations by the Army of Norway were to cease and its mission reverted to protecting the nickel mines and making preparations for seizing the Rybachiy Peninsula and Murmansk. It was planned to give Mannerheim control of the Finnish III Corps as part of his planned reorganization of the Finnish Army and the XXXVI Corps was instructed to detach its Finnish units and have them revert to III Corps control and at the same time transfer the SS Division Nord to the control of the XXXVI Corps.
The operations in the Finnish III Corps area had also turned decisively against the Army of Norway. The Soviets had increased their forces confronting both Groups J and F. The 88th Soviet Rifle Division was moved into the Group J area along with an ad hoc unit referred to as Independent Brigade Grivnin. This unit was made up of one regiment from the 54th Rifle Division and a unit referred to as Special Regiment Murmansk. Group F, west of Ukhta, confronted the 54th Rifle Division (short one regiment). Under constant pressure, Group J had to abandon its forward positions and fall back. It ended up in new defensive positions about 13 kilometers east of Kestenga. Group F attempted to resume its offensive but was stopped dead in its tracks by the 54th Rifle Division.
As the situation in the Group J area looked very threatening, possibly necessitating a further withdrawal, the Army of Norway asked for an additional Finnish regiment for this sector on September 9. Ziemke writes that General Erfurth, the chief German liaison officer at Mannerheim’s headquarters, refused to relay the request to the Marshal.19 Erfurth does not mention this in his book. He only observes that the difficulties in the Army of Norway area caused Falkenhorst to ask the Finns for help. He also observes that the frequent changes in German plans decreased Finnish willingness to heed the German requests.20