On September 12 the Army of Norway pulled the SS Reconnaissance Battalion out of the XXXVI Corps sector in order to provide the Finnish III Corps with a reserve. The transfer of the regimental headquarters and one battalion of the 14th Finnish Regiment from Pechenga to the III Corps area were also ordered. This reshuffling of forces to the III Corps area took place while the main effort was still assigned to the XXXVI Corps and while that commander was virtually begging for reinforcements. It underscores the lack of an overall strategy and may well have contributed to a Finnish refusal of a second request from Falkenhorst for a fresh regiment. Mannerheim did promise to provide 2,800 troops as replacements for losses in III Corps.
Relations had soured between Falkenhorst and subordinate Finnish commanders. The transfer of the SS Reconnaissance Battalion to the Finnish III Corps brought virtually all SS Division Nord units into that corps. General Siilasvuo, the III Corps commander, had split the SS Division and assigned its units to his two groups—primarily Group J. This left General Demelhuber, the commander of SS Division Nord, and his staff as mere onlookers. The SS Division had improved since its debacle at Salla but the Finns still considered it an unreliable unit if left on its own. Demelhuber had obviously complained about this state of affairs to Falkenhorst who now insisted to General Siilasvuo that all SS units be placed under the command of General Demelhuber with their own sector of operations. While General Siilasvuo resisted, Falkenhorst was not about to have a German division commanded by a Finnish colonel. Siilasvuo appealed the decision later in the month but Falkenhorst refused to reconsider.
A trip by Falkenhorst to Hitler’s headquarters on September 14 resulted in yet another change of plans for the Army of Norway. Falkenhorst was ordered to stop the attack by Group F against Ukhta and have Group J and SS Division Nord take up defensive positions. These orders were later confirmed in Führer Directive 36.
Intelligence from prisoner interrogations convinced III Corps at the end of September that Soviet morale was poor among the forces in the area between Kestenga and Loukhi. III Corps planned to resume its advance against Loukhi and asked the Army of Norway for reinforcements. Falkenhorst agreed with the request despite Hitler’s orders on September 14 to halt all offensive operations in the III Corps sector and he offered Siilasvuo the following units:
1. One regiment from the 6th Finnish Division.
2. The two infantry battalions that constituted Schützenverband Oslo.
3. The 9th SS Infantry Regiment from Mountain Corps Norway.
4. One regiment of artillery.
5. The last battalion of the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment, also from the Mountain Corps Norway sector.
The Army of Norway issued orders for the III Corps attack on October 6 but had to cancel the order on October 8 since OKW, in accordance with Hitler’s earlier instructions, ordered that all offensive operations cease. The cancellation order came as the troop deployments were underway. The 9th SS Infantry Regiment and the lone battalion from the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment were allowed to move into the III Corps sector but remained under Army of Norway control.
Generals Falkenhorst and Siilasvuo had a meeting on October 11, 1941. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss developments in the left sector of III Corps. It had been learned that one of the major units facing Group J and SS Division Nord—Independent Brigade Grivnin—had been dissolved. One of its regiments was moved south to join the 54th Rifle Division while another regiment had been identified in the XXXVI Corps sector. Both generals agreed that the prospects for an attack were good but, in view of Hitler’s orders, it was decided to characterize their planned attack as an attempt to improve the defensive positions of Group J and SS Division Nord.
Major General Siilasvuo reported to Falkenhorst on October 23 that he believed the attack discussed on October 11 would prove to be a complete success. Falkenhorst asked if Siilasvuo believed that a drive directly to Loukhi was possible. The Finn gave an affirmative answer. Falkenhorst’s question to Siilasvuo is a clear revelation of his intention. He saw a chance to accomplish the Army of Norway’s mission of cutting the Murmansk Railroad and grabbed it despite Hitler’s instructions on September 14 and the OKW order on October 8. The redeployment of forces that the Army of Norway had ordered on October 6 gave Siilasvuo and Falkenhorst the extra forces they believed necessary for the new offensive.
Major General Siilasvuo set the objectives for the attack. It involved a close encirclement of the Soviet forces along the front and then a quick drive to Loukhi. The SS Division Nord was given the mission of tying down the Soviet forces on their front while three Finnish regiments and the 9th SS Infantry Regiment broke through the Soviet positions along the railroad. The breakthrough forces would then turn north and encircle the Soviet troops tied down by the SS Division Nord. A task force of two Finnish battalions would bypass the southern Soviet flank and advance to Verkhneye Lake south of Lebedevo Lake.
The attack began on October 30 and by November 1, III Corps had encircled the Soviet regiment holding the front in the SS Division Nord sector. It had been General Siilasvuo’s intention to destroy the encirclement as quickly as possible while the bulk of his forces pushed on to seize the narrows between Lakes Lebedevo and Yelovoye on their way to Loukhi. However, there was a sharp change in his intention soon after the encirclement was completed. He insisted to the Army of Norway that he needed time to eliminate the Soviet pocket before he could resume his advance.
A message from OKW on October 9 requested information about Falkenhorst’s intentions and reminded him pointedly about Führer Directive Number 37, which had prohibited offensive operations in the III Corps area. In its reply, the Army of Norway pointed to the successes already achieved: the destruction of two regiments of the 88th Soviet Rifle Division and the seizure of the narrows between Yelovoye Lake and Lebedevo Lake. This area provided an excellent starting point for operations against Loukhi.
The Army of Norway also received a message from General Erfurth. The message requested that III Corps cease offensive operations as soon as possible because Mannerheim wanted to proceed with the reorganization of the Finnish Army (to be discussed in Chapter 6). This message elicited the logical question from the Army of Norway—what was meant by as soon as possible? Erfurth replied that the timing was left up to the Army of Norway but Mannerheim wanted to proceed with his reorganization plans quickly.
The cleaning out of pockets of Soviet soldiers was completed by November 13. Over 3,000 dead were reported as well as 2,600 prisoners. While the Soviets had moved reinforcements into the area in form of the 186th Rifle Division, it was not viewed as a serious obstacle since it was less than 3,000 men strong. It was in fact the Polyarnyy Division, which had made an appearance in the Mountain Corps Norway sector in September. It had been renamed and moved south when operations on the Litsa front came to an end.
Despite the successes achieved, General Siilasvuo made no move to exploit them. In fact, he grew downright gloomy in his assessment. On November 16 he reported that his troops were facing 17 enemy battalions and his conclusion was that further attacks by his corps would produce no results. This was followed by a report on November 18 that his corps was not capable of continuing the operation and that he would instead adopt a defensive posture. His immediate subordinates, the commanders of Group J and SS Division Nord, disagreed openly with Siilasvuo’s assessment and felt that the prospects for a continued offensive were good. The German liaison officer at III Corps reported that the commander of Group J, as late as November 18, considered his unit fully capable of continuing the offensive and his regimental commanders concurred. The drawbacks of coalition warfare were beginning to haunt Falkenhorst’s efforts.