Major General Buschenhagen, Falkenhorst’s chief of staff, traveled to Helsinki on October 15 to try to sort out various aspects relating to the Army of Norway and to visit Major General Warlimont from OKW. It probably came as no surprise to Buschenhagen that OKW was upset with the activities by the Army of Norway in view of earlier directives not to engage in offensive operations. Warlimont repeated General Erfurth’s earlier arguments that Mannerheim wanted control of his troops in order to carry out his reorganization plans. Warlimont told Buschenhagen that the Germans had to start removing their troops from III Corps no later than December 1, 1941. He also told Buschenhagen that Heinrich Himmler wanted the SS Division Nord sent back to Germany with a rather vague promise that he would provide replacement units.
Although the Finns maintained that the reason for halting offensive operations was to facilitate Mannerheim’s plans for reorganizing the Finnish Army, it is more likely that the primary reason was political. Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Finland were broken on July 31, 1941. A note from the British government to the Finnish government sent via the Norwegian Embassy in Helsinki on September 22 demanded that Finland end hostilities and pull its troops back to the 1939 borders. If the Finns continued their advance into Soviet territory the British would treat Finland as a hostile nation. After lengthy discussions within the Finnish government, in which Mannerheim participated, the Finns politely rejected the British note.21
What may have had a more decisive impact on Finnish behavior as far as III Corps operations were concerned was an intervention by the US (although not a belligerent at this time). The US ambassador to Finland presented a memorandum from the US government to President Ryti on October 27, 1941. The note included the following demands:
Insofar as the Finnish government is anxious to preserve the friendship of the United States now and in the future, the United States government must be given satisfactory assurances that the intention of the Finnish government is immediately to cease operations against Russian territory, and that Finnish forces will immediately be withdrawn (in principle) from Russian territory to a line corresponding to the 1939 boundary between Finland and the Soviet Union.
In the event that attacks are made against shipments of military supplies from the United States en route to Russia via the Arctic Ocean, and such attack is presumably made or may be claimed to be made from Finnish-controlled territory, it must be assumed that in view of the public opinion now prevailing in the United States such an incident must be assumed to lead to an immediate crisis in Finnish–American relations.22
The US warning was elaborated on in another memorandum on October 30 and at a press conference by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on November 3, 1941. The October 30 memorandum stated that Finnish military operations (presumably against the Murmansk Railroad) “constituted a definite threat to the security of the United States.”23
While the Finnish government rejected the US demands, we may assume that Finland did not want a Finnish unit (III Corps) under German command posing the only serious danger to the route by which American military equipment and supplies were delivered to the Soviet Union. It was therefore important to stop the offensive operations of III Corps, return the German units under its control to the Army of Norway, and bring III Corps back under Finnish control. This is also what Falkenhorst suspected as the reason for the unusual attitude of Major General Siilasvuo who was probably briefed by Mannerheim.24 Mannerheim, in his memoirs, is silent on this subject.
Mannerheim was not the only one contemplating organizational changes. Führer Directive Number 37, issued on October 10, ordered the Army of Norway to go over to defensive operations. It is not surprising that Falkenhorst fell by the wayside in the wake of this directive. It was the inevitable price for the failure of the Army of Norway to achieve its main objectives—the capture of Murmansk or its isolation. Falkenhorst was also a demanding officer with rough edges who frequently ruffled feathers of fellow Germans as well as his Finnish “brothers-in-arms.”
Falkenhorst did not leave in disgrace—he remained as commander in chief in Norway until December 18, 1944—and he may have been pleased by the change. Up to now he had been saddled with enormous responsibilities, and had to operate two army headquarters more than 1,600 kilometers apart. In Norway he commanded a single army with a very specific defensive mission.
The selection of General der Gebirgstruppe General Eduard Dietl as a replacement for Falkenhorst was also almost pre-ordained. He was an early supporter of Hitler. He and his company stood ready to support Hitler and his followers during the Beer Hall Putsch on November 9, 1923. His stubborn defense of Narvik for two months in 1940 when many, including Hitler, were ready to give up the game gave him an almost legendary status. Dietl was one of the few generals that Hitler had grown to like and trust over the years. He was loved by his troops and had a personality and charm well suited for dealing with the Finns who also admired him.
The instructions issued on November 7, 1941, by the OKW directed an early transfer of command. Falkenhorst and the Headquarters, Army of Norway, would return to Norway. Dietl would assume command of all German forces in Finland and northern Norway and establish a new headquarters, designated the Army of Lapland.
Everyone appears to have been pleased by the new command arrangement—except Dietl. He was basically a troop commander, not a manager, and was happiest when he was at the front with his troops. A briefing at the Army of Norway headquarters brought home to him the enormity of the job he was about to assume and he may well have sincerely doubted his own abilities to deal with this managerial task. Dietl wrote a letter to General Jodl on November 24 asking that his assignment as commander, Army of Lapland be withdrawn. This unusual action by an officer who was being promoted resulted in an order for him to report to Hitler’s headquarters. In the end, Hitler and Jodl prevailed on him not to give up the command to which he had been appointed.
The OKW and the Army of Norway made a number of serious strategic and tactical mistakes in 1941 that are complex in nature and difficult to understand. Most have their inception in the planning and preparations for operations out of Finland. Ziemke attempts to explain the problems in a different way. He writes:
In the first place, the objective of the Army of Norway [with respect to Murmansk and the Murmansk Railroad] was political and psychological rather than strategic…. There is some reason for believing that the operation was directed more against Great Britain, to demonstrate its isolation and helplessness, then against the Soviet Union. Under those circumstances it became worthwhile to disregard sound tactics and attempt to stage a quick march along the arctic coast to Murmansk.25
Hitler’s obsession with the defense of Norway—where no real threat existed in 1941—played a large part in his decisions regarding Finland. Hitler’s views regarding Murmansk were heavily influenced by his concerns for the security of the nickel mines near Pechenga—and the iron mines in north Sweden—shown by the arguments he used in his meeting with Dietl in April 1941. He viewed Russian troops in Murmansk as a threat to those mines and to northern Norway. Therefore, it is unlikely that a demonstration of Great Britain’s helplessness was foremost in Hitler’s mind when it came to Murmansk.