Ziemke is definitely right in his observation that the operations in Finland were begun with inadequate forces and that OKH was correct in not providing substantial reinforcements that would detract from the main effort in Russia. Substantial forces could, however, have been provided from those seven divisions that sat idle in Norway but here again we are confronted with Hitler’s obsession with the defense of Norway.
When it comes to German operations in Finland in 1941 we are again faced with a complex and confusing picture. One is forced to conclude that there was a great amount of uncertainty in the Army of Norway and at the highest level in Germany, caused by a lack of a coherent strategy. This resulted in constant changes. Some of these changes originated with the Army of Norway but others were caused by OKW meddling in the operations of that army.
Seven divisions (five German and two Finnish) were employed at four different points and the effective main effort kept shifting throughout 1941. Two German divisions and one Finnish regiment were used in the far north. Two German divisions and one Finnish division were used initially on the Salla front. SS Division Nord was subsequently fragmented and eventually sent to the III Corps area. The III Finnish Corps, with one division initially, was employed 140 kilometers to the south of Salla. It was subsequently reinforced in driblets by units from the SS Division Nord. Finally, the badly split 163rd German Infantry Division was used in the far south, in Mannerheim’s main offensive.
Although a main effort was designated initially, the force levels in each of the three areas reveal that no main effort existed. In failing to come up with a strategy supported organizationally within the German armed forces, the Germans let a golden opportunity for decisive results slip away in 1941. The Finns, seeing shifting plans and the lack of progress, became increasingly difficult to deal with, a situation aggravated by outside influences on the Finnish government.
The blame for the lack of a coherent strategy cannot be laid at the feet of Falkenhorst alone as Erfurth and Feige appear to do. Much of the fault can be traced back to inadequate planning and preparation and OKW meddling. The shifting of forces from one area to another to exploit opportunities rather than to create opportunities was not wise in view of the enormous transportation and supply difficulties in northern and central Finland.
Falkenhorst had a thankless job. He did not have the complete control of operations that you would expect of an army commander. He did not control air operations in his area of responsibility—the 5th Air Fleet in Norway answered to Göring and if he did not want to cooperate he had the ear of Hitler. Similarly, the SS Division he had assigned had a direct channel to Himmler. The commander of the Finnish III Corps had a direct line to Mannerheim who kept a close eye on the happenings in the Army of Norway area since Finnish troops were heavily involved.
Falkenhorst’s force requests were submitted to OKH. That headquarters, completely absorbed with operations in the Soviet Union proper and North Africa, increasingly viewed the operations by the Army of Norway as a drain of valuable resources that were sorely needed elsewhere.
Finally, there was a surprising disregard for the chain of command within the army. Dietl was subordinate to Falkenhorst but in Chapter 3 we saw that he frequently dealt directly with OKW on operational matters. He even took positions opposing those held by the Army of Norway (for example, the use of the 6th Mountain Division).
It has already been noted that Generals Feige and Dietl felt that the real main effort should be in the Kandalaksha sector. Dietl had felt this way since April 1941 and never changed his views. Falkenhorst, on the other hand, was a proponent for cutting the Murmansk Railroad further south at Loukhi, from the III Corps sector. Feige and Dietl were correct from a tactical standpoint and also on strategic grounds. The place to cut the Murmansk Railroad for the most decisive results was at Kandalaksha. Cutting it further south—between Kandalaksha and Belomorsk—would not be as effective since the Soviets could bring supplies and equipment by rail to Kandalaksha and from there across the White Sea to Archangel or Onega by ship. Cutting the line south of Belomorsk would serve no purpose because a recently completed rail line from Belomorsk connected with the line from Archangel, thus avoiding the use of the southern part of the Murmansk Railroad from Belomorsk to Volkhov.26 The Kandalaksha sector was also the only one of the three that had a relative good road and rail network that could logistically support the large forces required to interdict the Murmansk Railroad.
General Erfurth was a strong proponent of achieving relative superiority. In his book, Die Überraschung im Krieg, published in 1938 he writes “To achieve relative superiority somewhere is the main objective of almost all military movements and the essential purpose of generalship.”27 It is therefore surprising that he supported the movement of the 163rd Infantry Division to Karelia—where it accomplished virtually nothing—and was very critical of the decision to give one of its regiments to Falkenhorst. Giving the whole division to Falkenhorst might have given him the necessary forces to carry out his mission.
Erfurth argued later that General Siilasvuo would probably have reached Loukhi if he had been given an additional division in a timely manner and that Marshal Mannerheim had expressed the same opinion on several occasions.28 By an additional division they are undoubtedly referring to the 6th Finnish Division attached to XXXVI Corps, and they are probably right. However, Falkenhorst had already given Siilasvuo SS Division Nord and, in view of the condition of the 169th Division, he had no further forces to spare based on security requirements in XXXVI Corps’ sector. The presence of the whole 163rd Division would have allowed him to release the 6th Finnish Division.
In an article published in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau in 1952 and cited by Ziemke, General Erfurth suggested that the Army of Norway failed to follow OKW orders on several occasions. Falkenhorst did deviate from plans and orders several times to seize opportunities. The prerogative and expectation that a commander would do so had been part of German military doctrine since the late 1600s. The concept was referred to as Selbständigkeit der Unterführer (Independence of Subordinates).
Erfurth also claims in the same article that the orders violated were intended to create a main effort. The orders to which he must be referring are the ones issued on July 7 and 30. It is somewhat misleading to characterize those as establishing a main effort. If anything, they were disruptive.
The July 7 OKW order dealt with the transfer of forces to Mountain Corps Norway after the capture of Salla. Dietl needed reinforcements—he had asked for one regiment. There is no indication that this represented a change in the main effort. The other order to which Erfurth is referring must be the Führer Directive of July 30. It stopped the XXXVI Corps offensive and directed increased efforts in the Mountain Corps Norway and III Corps sectors. By this time Falkenhorst had unfortunately already switched his efforts to the Mountain Corps Norway and Finnish III Corps sectors. If the July 30 directive did anything, it appears to have blessed actions already taken by Falkenhorst. The effort in the far north was stopped by atrocious terrain and lack of lines of communication. The effort in the III Corps sector also had poor lines of communication but here the effort collapsed through Finnish refusal—probably on political grounds—to carry it out.
The frequent movement of regiments and battalions from one sector to another during the summer and fall point to uncertainty in German headquarters caused by a lack of cohesive strategy. However, Ziemke’s explanation for the shifting of forces should be kept in mind as it was obviously a contributing factor: