Falkenhorst maintained consistently and correctly that to relax the pressure at any one point meant giving the Russians an opportunity to exploit the superior maneuverability which the Murmansk Railroad afforded them to pull out troops and shift them to one of the other sectors. With the troops at its disposal the Army of Norway could not create a true main effort anywhere without defeating its own ends in the process and could not shut down any single sector without creating a potential threat elsewhere.29
This observation in turn reveals the fact that the Germans were overcommitted. When overcommitted, the judicious use of available forces is more important than ever. The correct place for judicious offensive action was opposite Kandalaksha. General Erfurth agrees despite his above support for an increase of forces in the III Corps sector.30
The Germans underestimated both the difficulties that the terrain posed for an attacker, and the capabilities and determination of their foe. These were surprises for the Germans and had a devastating effect on some of the poorly trained units that were sent to Finland.
Finally, when it comes to air operations—a factor that cannot be overemphasized in the spectacular string of German victories up to this point—the resources were not up to the demands placed on them. This again supports the observation of overcommitment. They had to support operations of three corps separated by great distances. If the Murmansk Railroad could not be seized, adequate air assets should have been provided so as to render the railroad and trans-shipment facilities useless for considerable periods of time.
When Dietl assumed command of the Army of Lapland, his command had been forced into a defensive posture in all sectors and the outlook for the future was bleak. After about 100 days of fighting the Germans had suffered nearly 22,000 casualties and the Finnish forces in the German areas had close to 7,000 casualties. Those who had watched the performance of the German Army in Finland with a sense of disillusionment were hoping that the Hero of Narvik could turn the situation around.
FIVE
THE FINNISH OFFENSIVES
The Finns were much better prepared for war in 1941 than in 1939. They had an officer and noncommissioned officer corps of proven leaders with solid experience from the Winter War. These men, who had proven themselves in the past, faced the prospect of another encounter with their traditional foe with confidence. Furthermore, they were not alone as they had been in 1939. They were now entering the fight at the side of Germany, the world’s leading military power.
The Finnish leaders, realizing that the imposed peace of 1940 was not the end of their troubles with the Soviet Union, had done all that could be done to prepare themselves for a new conflict. The stocks of supplies and equipment, exhausted in March 1940, had been replenished with German assistance. The increase in automatic weapons for the infantry had significantly improved their firepower. Heavy field artillery batteries, lacking in the Winter War, were now available. Air defenses had been improved and strengthened, however, although the Finnish Air Force was in better shape than during the Winter War, it was still inadequate in size for the tasks that lay ahead.
One of the most important improvements dealt with mobilization. New procedures instituted in the short period since the end of the Winter War resulted in the ability to field almost twice as many operational units. By the time the ground war began Finland had about 500,000 men under arms, an amazing feat for a country with a population of four million. When military construction and men and women auxiliaries are included, the number of individuals involved in the military or military-related activities amounted to 630,000 or over 15% of the population.1 Even with such a massive mobilization it is highly questionable whether the Finns could have conducted their offensives in the south had it not been for the fact that the Germans had relieved them of the responsibility for defending a 500+ kilometer stretch of frontier in Lapland. In addition, the northward advance of German Army Group North served as a magnet that drew Soviet forces away from the Finnish front.
Such a large military was unsustainable in a prolonged war and it strongly suggests that Mannerheim and other Finnish leaders expected the war to be short. They, like so many others, were highly impressed by the string of spectacular German victories in Scandinavia, western Europe, and the Balkans and probably expected the Soviet armed forces to quickly crumble. When this did not materialize in the first six months of the war the large Finnish military establishment became a serious economic liability that had to be rectified.
The Finns had asked for a few days’ delay in the attack by their main army until operations in the far north and around Salla had begun. As related in Chapter 2, Erfurth explains that the Finns wanted to create the impression among the people and members of parliament that Finland was being drawn into the war by events outside its control. This accorded well with the wishes of OKH. That headquarters wanted the Finns to strike from the north at the most effective time, as Army Group North approached the last natural obstacle south of Leningrad—the Dvina River, which was reached on a wide front on July 1, 1941. By July 4 the OKH had sufficient confidence in the continued progress of Army Group North to ask the Finns to launch their attacks on July 10.
The general concept of operations by the main Finnish army had been thrashed out on January 30, and again in the period June 24–28. The Finns, despite Mannerheim’s disclaimer below, appear to have initially wanted to undertake operations west of Lake Ladoga with the goal of recovering the important territory on the Karelian Isthmus, which they had lost in the Winter War. The Germans, on the other hand, wanted the Finns to attack on both sides of Lake Ladoga, with the main effort in the east. This wish was again expressed by OKH on June 24 and reflected in the Finnish plans submitted on June 28, 1941.
Mannerheim writes that, despite the wishes in some Finnish circles for the immediate reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus, he opposed this idea from the beginning. He explains that by initiating operations on the Karelian Isthmus the Soviets would believe that he was aiming at Leningrad and would marshal strong forces in opposition at a time when Army Group North was still far to the south. Mannerheim writes “It was my firm opinion that such an undertaking was against the interest of the country, and from the beginning I had informed the President of the Republic and the government that under no circumstances would I lead an offensive against the great city on the Neva.”2
Mannerheim describes the development of the concept of operations by the Finnish Army as follows:
Instead of attacking on the Karelian Isthmus, I decided to commence an offensive north of Ladoga on either side of Lake Jänisjärvi, with the beach of the Ladoga west and east of the town of Sortavala as its first objective, and the next one the frontier. A thrust north of Lake Jänisjärvi towards the Suojärvi area formed part of the main operation. The aim was to sever the way of retreat for the Russian forces concentrated west of Sortavala, and to roll up the enemy’s position north of Vuoksi, thereby creating a favourable initial situation for a later offensive against Viipuri and the Isthmus3
While—as Lundin points out—the sources are murky, imprecise, and contradictory, there is no doubt that Mannerheim’s memoirs imply that the concept of operations was his, not that of the OKH.4 German sources claim that the initial wish of the Finns was for an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and that this issue was thrashed out in the meetings between General Heinrichs, the chief of the Finnish General Staff, and General Halder, the chief of staff of OKH, on January 30 and the results were as expressed by the OKH on June 24.