SIX
COALITION PROBLEMS AND SOVIET COUNTEROFFENSIVES
Despite impressive Finnish military successes that achieved all their stated war aims, neither the Finns nor the Germans were satisfied with the events of 1941, and the Finns faced 1942 with considerable doubts and apprehensions. The Germans in Finland had accomplished none of their objectives. They had failed to interdict the Murmansk Railroad or capture Murmansk. They had failed to take Leningrad and the planned linkup with German forces on the Svir had not materialized. The Germans had not succeeded in convincing their cobelligerent to participate in the attack on Leningrad or even to take aggressive action to tie down Soviet forces north of Tikhvin and Leningrad. Finally, Finnish participation in operations to cut the Murmansk Railroad was coming into question.
While the Finns were awed and impressed by the crushing German victories in the first months of the war they must have been equally impressed by continued stiff Soviet resistance. Between July and Nov ember, the German armies in the east conducted one of the greatest sustained offensives in military history. The Soviets suffered some three million casualties, half of these being prisoners. But the German losses had also been heavy—about 800,000 men. Despite the enormous Soviet losses, their armies had not been destroyed and they successfully traded space for time and awaited the approaching winter, which proved to be especially severe.
The misfortunes of the German armies on the eastern front in December 1941 could not be shielded from the Finns and they began to fear that they could be on the losing side in this brutal war. They had assumed that the war would be short and that the Soviet Union would collapse under the German onslaught. It was the short-war illusion that had caused the Finns to mobilize the maximum force for its prosecution, a decision that was now haunting the Finnish economy. The accord and smooth relations that had existed between Finns and Germans at the outset of the war were also beginning to fade. Finally, the relations with the Western democracies worsened.
This worsening of relations began with a German demand in July 1941 that Finland break diplomatic relations with Great Britain. The Germans based their demand on the claim that the large British contingent at their embassy in Helsinki served as an intelligence-gathering apparatus for the Soviets. The British made no move to close its embassy and the repeated German urgings finally led Finland to announce on July 28 that it intended to close its embassy in London. The matter was decided on July 31 when British aircraft bombed Pechenga. Both countries broke diplomatic relations.
The United States had taken a wait-and-see attitude, watching whether Finland, despite its official statements, would carry the war beyond its 1939 borders. In mid-August the Soviet Union authorized the US to inform Finland of its willingness to make peace with territorial concessions. This offer was communicated by Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells to the Finnish ambassador in Washington on August 18, but no reply was received from Finland.1
The rebuff infuriated Stalin and he demanded that Great Britain use its influence with Finland to have the operations stopped or, failing that, to declare war on Finland. The British warned Finland through Mr. Michelet, the Norwegian Ambassador to Finland, against invading Soviet territory. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull gave a similar warning to the Finnish ambassador to Washington, Hjalmar J. Procopé, on October 3.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the US presented a note to Finland on October 25, 1941, when it became worried about the Murmansk supply route for Lend-Lease supplies. Finland delayed its answer until November 11 and in the meantime the US made public both the Soviet offer from August and its own note to Finland. The Finnish answer on November 11 rejected the US note, stating that they were waging their own separate war, and refused to suspend what they called fully justified military operations.
The US publication of the Soviet offer of peace caused some friction in German–Finnish relations. The Finns had never given their “brothers-in-arms” a complete version of the offer. The Anti-Comintern Pact was due to be renewed at the end of November 1941 and Germany now pressured Finland to become a signatory. Germany’s action was probably aimed at complicating Finnish relations with the Western democracies.
The Finns were in no position to refuse the German demand. They had recently asked Germany for help with their railroad transportation problems and had also found it necessary to request 175,000 tons of grain to help them through the winter.
Unable to avoid signing the Anti-Comintern Pact, Finland wanted to do so with as little fanfare as possible. However, this was not in Germany’s interest. The Germans insisted that Foreign Minister Witting participate in the well-publicized ceremony in Berlin on November 25, 1941 when Germany, Japan, and Italy also signed the pact. In a long post-signing audience with Hitler the Finns were promised their territorial aspirations, the Kola Peninsula, and more grain (260,000 tons) than they had actually requested.2
Foreign Minister Witting found a British ultimatum waiting for him when he returned to Helsinki on November 28. The note demanded that Finland cease active operations by December 5 and withdraw from hostilities. There was no demand for the withdrawal of troops and a private letter from Winston Churchill to Mannerheim had the added suggestion that “Surely your troops have advanced far enough for security during the war and could now halt and give leave. It is not necessary to make any public declaration, but simply leave off fighting and cease military operations, for which the severe winter affords every reason, and make a de facto exit from the war.”3
The British, having received no reply from Finland, declared war on Finland on December 6, which happened to be Finland’s Independence Day. It was also the day after Finnish forces captured Medvezhyegorsk and the same day that the Finnish parliament formally annexed the recaptured territories.
The many reports flowing into Mannerheim’s headquarters in December 1941 made it obvious that a crisis situation had developed for the Germans in the east. The German Army communiqué on December 17 allowed the Finns to infer that the Germans were retreating involuntarily. One passage read “Improvements and shortening of various sectors of the eastern front have at present become necessary owing to the transition from offensive operations to winter trench warfare.” Hitler’s order of the day on December 31, 1941 was unusually frank in stating: “The year 1941 now lies behind us. It was a year of most difficult decisions and extremely bloody fighting.”4
Hitler undertook a house cleaning as a result of the setbacks in the late fall of 1941. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group South, was relieved on December 1 for withdrawing his forces against Hitler’s orders. Army Group Center’s senior officers were hit hard for their failure to capture Moscow. The Army Group commander, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, was relieved on December 18. Over the next three weeks, about 40 high-ranking officers from Army Group Center were relieved including three of the six army commanders and four of the 22 corps commanders. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the German Army, bit the dust on December 19. His job was taken over by Hitler himself. Field Marshal Leeb asked to be relieved in January 1942.