This wholesale relief of some of the best officers in the German Army underscored for the Finns the magnitude of the German failure on the eastern front. Hitler’s decision to assume personal command of the German Army was anything but reassuring for the Finnish military leaders who had known many of those who were sacked.
Friction between Finns and Germans had begun in 1941 with General Siilasvuo, commander of III Finnish Corps attached to the Army of Norway, declining to continue offensive operations in his sector. Further friction that year developed between Mannerheim and Falkenhorst—see Chapter 7. The triple errors by the Germans before the war—failure to harmonize war aims with the Finns, failure to insist on a joint campaign plan, and failure to set up an effective command structure—were clearly demonstrated in 1942. Even General Erfurth wrote in 1952 that the failure to solve these issues before the onset of hostilities was “incomprehensible.”5
Army Group North’s drive towards Leningrad resumed on August 10, 1941, after a short pause, and it was rapidly approaching Leningrad. The question about what to do with Leningrad was now raised in OKW and this impacted on what they wanted the Finns to do. It had been decided that the population in the north of the Soviet Union—including Leningrad with several million inhabitants—were consumers of raw materials and food products that were needed by the Germans and the “productive” people in the industrial and agricultural part of the Soviet Union.
In line with his warped ideology Hitler decided that Leningrad should not be occupied. Its population would be reduced through a process of starvation and bombardment. In the end, it was expected that the city would be leveled to the ground. The Finns had allegedly expressed a desire to have the Neva River as their southern border and Hitler agreed that the territory north of the river should be given to them.6
The OKH took an unfavorable view of the OKW decisions on Leningrad but its own recommendations were certainly not based on any high moral principles. The main worry at OKH had to do with the adverse morale effects that a wholesale slaughter of civilians would have on German troops. Their “solution” to the dilemma was to let starvation and shelling do the work and then let the survivors evacuate through German lines.
Pending a final decision of the issue, Army Group North was ordered to encircle Leningrad but not to enter the city or accept surrender. To carry out its order to isolate Leningrad, Army Group North planned to cross the Neva River near Schlusselburg. It would then establish contact with the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus. It also intended to drive north to Volkhov and Tikhvin and link up with the Army of Karelia near the Svir River.
To assist in the accomplishment of its mission, Army Group North wanted the Finns to advance south on both the Karelian Isthmus and from the Svir River to meet the Germans moving north. These proposals were contained in a letter from Field Marshal Keitel to Mannerheim on August 22, 1941.
It seems doubtful that Mannerheim or other Finnish leaders had any knowledge of the ongoing conversations at OKW and OKH about the fate of Leningrad and its population. Mannerheim denies any knowledge in his memoirs.7 Ryti, as related earlier, did advocate that the Leningrad area be depopulated and turned into a German “trading post.” In any case, Keitel’s proposals resulted in a refusal by Mannerheim based on some gloomy observations:
1. The Finns had 16% of its population in the military and this was beginning to have serious repercussions on the country’s economy.
2. The Finnish casualty rate had been considerably higher in this war than during the Winter War.
3. Mannerheim had been forced to reduce the number of platoons in each company from four to three in August, and he intended to disband one division in September, in order to provide replacements.
4. The Soviet defensive positions along the 1939 border on the Karelian Isthmus were very strong, and Mannerheim suggested they should be taken from behind by German forces.
5. Strong resistance was expected when the offensives in Ladoga Karelia resumed, and Mannerheim doubted that the Finns could cross the Svir.
Mannerheim writes that he showed Keitel’s letter to President Ryti. He told Ryti that he did not believe it was in Finland’s interests to cross the Svir River or launch an offensive against Leningrad. Mannerheim claims that Ryti agreed.8
Major General Hanell, Mannerheim’s acting chief of staff, elaborated on Mannerheim’s reply to Field Marshal Keitel in a conversation with General Erfurth. He told Erfurth that the Finnish constitution required a political decision by the government if Finnish forces were to advance beyond the country’s borders. Permission had been granted for the area east of Lake Ladoga and Hanell stated that he was confident that a similar permission would be granted, if requested by Mannerheim, for the Karelian Isthmus. He suggested that such permission would be requested when “the German Army rapped loudly and clearly on the door of Leningrad.”9
With respect to the crossing of the Svir River, the ball was also thrown back to the Germans by Hanell stating that Mannerheim’s outlook would become more positive after the Germans demonstrated that they did not intend to stop along the Volkhov River. Erfurth concluded that pessimism had taken control of Mannerheim’s views and he recommended that an award of a German decoration would help restore his morale.10
The letter from Mannerheim to Keitel and Erfurth’s gloomy report about Mannerheim’s wavering confidence in Germany caused mild consternation at OKW and OKH. It resulted in an immediate message to Army Group North from OKH ordering it to link up with the Finns as quickly as possible, even at the cost of delaying the encirclement of Leningrad.
Mannerheim informed Erfurth on September 1, 1941, that he had secured permission from President Ryti to cross the Karelian Isthmus border as far as a line between Sestroretsk and Agalatovo. When Erfurth writes that Mannerheim’s decision to move his defensive line into Soviet territory “went along with the German point of view” he is being less than candid.11 The move was very short, and the Germans did not want the Finns to revert to a defense and had so indicated on numerous occasions.
The Soviets quickly realized that the Finnish offensive on the Karelian Isthmus had ended. They had remnants of six divisions and several separate battalions and regiments defending Leningrad from the north. They quickly withdrew two of these divisions on September 5 and committed them against the Germans.
When Keitel informed Field Marshal Leeb about the Finns moving their front south on the Karelian Isthmus on September 3, 1941, it elicited a rather cool response. Leeb observed that a mile or two of territory was of no importance and what was essential was to have the Finns undertake operations to tie down the maximum number of Soviet troops on their fronts. If they did not do that the Soviets could create serious problems for the Germans by withdrawing substantial forces from the Finnish front for use against his Army Group.12
OKW decided to send a senior German officer to Helsinki to have a discussion with Mannerheim. The choice fell on General Jodl, the Chief of Operations at OKW. He arrived in Mikkeli on September 4, and, in accordance with the earlier suggestion by Erfurth, carried all three classes of the Iron Cross for Mannerheim. While Erfurth describes the long meeting between Jodl and Mannerheim as very cordial and productive, it is difficult to see what was productive about it.13
The most important announcement that came out of the meeting was that the Finns would resume their offensive towards the Svir River that very day. Erfurth must have known that this was not a move by the Finns to accommodate the Germans. The operations in Karelia had been previously planned and the fact that its start date coincided with Jodl’s visit was simply a coincidence. For the Finns, the most important result was a promise by Germany to fulfill an emergency request for grain.