Marshal Mannerheim’s account of the meeting is considerably cooler than that of Erfurth. He states that his previous attitude on future Finnish operations did not change as a result of the meeting—leading Jodl to exclaim “Can’t you then do anything to show yourself co-operative.”14 He goes on to explain that in order not to put undue strain on the relations with the Germans or jeopardize the negotiations for grain he “unwillingly” agreed to a limited advance (to the Mustapuro River) on the right flank of the Karelian Isthmus. This advance was never carried out. According to Ziemke, Mannerheim had agreed to more by promising to cross the whole length of the border up to the permanent Soviet fortifications and that when he informed Keitel three weeks later that the Finnish forces had crossed the border to the depth promised, he was only temporizing by avoiding the real issue.15 The limited advance fell far short of Field Marshal Leeb’s wishes.
Army Group North arrived in the Leningrad area in September 1941 at the same time as the Finns reached the Svir River and began their drive into East Karelia. This first week in September was a momentous one for the Germans and the course of the war. Despite signs of an early winter and the exhausted state of his troops, Hitler decided on September 6 that the time was right to resume the German offensive against Moscow. This decision involved removing the 4th Panzer Group from Army Group North and transferring it to Army Group Center.16 This left only one mechanized formation in Army Group North, the XXXIV Corps.
Schlusselburg fell to the Germans on September 8, 1941, and they now had a foothold on Lake Ladoga and the city of Leningrad was encircled.17 This was the moment when OKW had planned that Field Marshal Leeb should send the XXXIV Corps on an eastward drive to Volkhov and Tikhvin. Leeb protested that the operation would dissipate his strength at a time when he needed to make the ring around Leningrad secure. He prevailed for the time being. OKH ordered him to cross the Neva River and link up with the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus. The army group’s operation against Volkhov and Tikhvin was put off pending the arrival of reinforcements.
The Soviets upset the German plans by launching heavy counterattacks against Schlusselburg. Field Marshal Leeb pointed out to OKH on September 15, 1941, that the Soviets were withdrawing forces from the Finnish front and using them against the Germans. He urged that the Finns resume their offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and predicted that if they did this the battle for Leningrad could be decided within a few days. If they did not, he could not predict when he would be able to cross the Neva River in view of the exhausted and weakened condition of his army group.
There can be little doubt that Leeb was correct. The handful of mauled Soviet divisions north of Leningrad could have been brushed aside easily by the Finns, particularly if they had not transferred forces to East Karelia or if those transfers had been delayed until after the requested German operations on the Karelian Isthmus. Such operations would also have closed the one opening in the German encirclement—across the southern part of Lake Ladoga.
The OKH answered Leeb on September 18, 1941. General Halder assured him that the Finns intended to resume their attacks both on the Karelian Isthmus and south of the Svir River. However, the Finns were hedging their bets by some well-concealed conditions, indicating that they were well informed of what was going on at OKH. The offensive on the Karelian Isthmus would be undertaken as soon as the Germans had crossed the Neva River. The drive out of the Svir beachhead would be undertaken as soon as the effects of a German drive to the east became observable. These conditions doomed the hoped-for cooperation from the Finns since the drive to the east had been cancelled temporarily and Leeb had just stated that he did not have the strength to cross the Neva River in force.
The personal correspondence between Field Marshal Keitel and Field Marshal Mannerheim resumed in the second half of September. Keitel requested that Mannerheim move the 163rd German Infantry Division to the mouth of the Svir River and allow it to cross the river to link up with Army Group North at the appropriate time. This idea appears to have originated with General Erfurth who considered that the use of the 163rd Division in this manner would strengthen the resolve of the Finns and that their forces would join in the venture.18
It is difficult to see how two understrength infantry regiments could have made much difference in the situation south of the Svir River. Mannerheim, a very perceptive individual, must have realized the difficult situation in which the Germans found themselves. He agreed to the request but stipulated that the timing of the move should be left to him.19
The issue about what the Finns planned to do was not resolved. While Keitel did not mention it in his letter, Mannerheim’s long reply on September 25, 1941, did. Mannerheim informed Keitel that he intended to take Petrozavodsk and thereafter advance to Medvezhyegorsk. He also told the Germans about his plans to reorganize the Finnish Army after the capture of Medvezyegorsk. He intended to change the divisions into brigades and the surplus troops would be released from service to alleviate the acute labor shortage in the civilian economy, now dangerously close to collapse. This explanation was probably made to discourage any further requests from the Germans to reconsider his refusal to participate in their operations south of the Svir or on the Karelian Isthmus.
The German front south and east of Leningrad was stabilized by the beginning of October despite continued heavy Soviet counterattacks. Field Marshal Leeb decided that the time was right for the long-contemplated offensive against Volkhov and Tikhvin. He pulled the XXXIX Corps, commanded by General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim and consisting of two armored and two motorized infantry divisions, out of the front east of Leningrad.
OKW ordered Leeb to attack eastward on October 14, although there was no evidence that the Soviets had reduced their force levels in the Leningrad area to counter the offensive against Moscow. The plan was to drive eastward and envelop the Soviet forces south of Lake Ladoga. It was expected that the XXXIX Corps would link up with the Finns in the area between Tikhvin and Lodeynoye Pole. It appears from this that the Germans still harbored hopes that the Finns would undertake operations south of the Svir River despite Mannerheim’s flat refusal to do so in his September 25 letter.
The XXXIX Corps began its advance on October 16, 1941. The advance was slow due to strong Soviet resistance and the onset of rain that turned the roads and earth into mud. The mud and soft ground was so bad that the armored divisions were forced to leave their tanks behind after a few days. The situation appeared so bleak that Hitler wanted to cancel the operation but OKH persuaded him to continue. Field Marshal Leeb also favored continuing the operation when he visited Hitler but cautioned that his troops would probably only be able to advance as far as Tikhvin.
By the first week in November the Germans were still 10 kilometers from Tikhvin. They planned one final push on November 6. The attack succeeded and Tikhvin was captured on November 9, 1941. Thereupon, one division was turned north along the railroad towards Volkhov.
However, the situation in the Tikhvin salient turned downright dangerous for the Germans by the end of November. The Russians were not giving up the fight for the town and began a counteroffensive against Army Group North with new forces. Some of these forces, according to Erfurth, had been withdrawn from the Army of Karelia front.20