The Soviet forces soon succeeded in virtually encircling the Germans and Field Marshal Leeb found it necessary to commit two additional divisions to the operation to hold the flanks of the Tikhvin salient. Any plans of linking up with the Finns in the Lodeynoye Pole area or for a continued advance to Volkhov were out of the question.
On December 3, 1941 General von Arnim reported that he would not be able to hold Tikhvin. Field Marshal Leeb gave him a “be prepared” order to withdraw on December 7 but not to execute it until Hitler had given his permission. Both OKW and OKH warned against a withdrawal and Keitel even claimed that the Finns were going to establish contact from the north.21 This must have been wishful thinking unless he had received erroneous information from General Erfurth or the Finnish liaison officer at his own headquarters.
Hitler issued an order on December 8, 1941 to stop all offensive operations on the eastern front. The same order directed Army Group North to hold Tikhvin. With respect to Army Group North, Directive 39 reads:
Army Group North will shorten its eastern and southeastern front north of Lake Ilmen, while still denying the road and railway from Tikhvin to Volkovstroi and Kolehanavo. This will make it possible, after the arrival of reinforcements, to clean up the area south of Lake Ladoga. Only thus can Leningrad be finally enclosed and a link with the Finnish Karelian Army established.22
The order was amended, as far as Army Group North was concerned, on December 11. All offensive operations by the group were to be delayed until 1942.
Events on the ground made Hitler’s orders obsolete in the Leningrad sector. The XXXIX was fighting desperately to hold on to Tikhvin in the middle of a blizzard with temperatures below zero. Field Marshal Leeb notified OKW that he intended to withdraw the XXXIX Corps and Hitler grudgingly agreed, provided the railroad between Volkhov and Leningrad was held.
Tikhvin was evacuated on December 9 and Leeb decided to withdraw behind the Volkhov River, despite Hitler’s insistence that he should establish his new front closer to the town of Volkhov. Hitler relented on December 15 after Leeb told him that a failure to withdraw behind the Volkhov River would lead to the destruction of XXXIX Corps. The XXXIX Corps was behind the river on Christmas Eve. They had sustained heavy losses in the fighting for Tikhvin and in the withdrawal.
The situation in the Army of Lapland area was precarious in early 1942. Mannerheim had refused, in December 1941, to assume responsibility for the sector of the III Finnish Corps (see Chapter 7). He also demanded that those Finnish units attached to the Army of Norway in 1941 be returned to Finnish control. To replace these forces the Germans had decided to bring in two mountain divisions—the 5th and 7th. However, transportation problems slowed their arrival to a trickle. While the 7th Mountain Division began arriving at Hanko on January 14, 1942, only the lead elements had arrived by January 27 when ice closed all Finnish ports. The rest of this division and the 5th Mountain Division could therefore not be transported until spring.
Not only did the ice situation in the Baltic interrupt the flow of reinforcements but it seriously interfered with the flow of supplies to the German troops in Finland, brought the armament shipments for the Finnish armed forces to a standstill, and stopped the grain shipments for the Finnish civilian population.
The deployment plans for the two mountain divisions changed numerous times. Initially, they were to replace the Finnish forces and SS Division Nord that were to be withdrawn from the Lapland Army. After Mannerheim proposed an operation against Belomorsk in mid-December 1941, the OKW quickly decided to move the 7th Mountain Division to East Karelia upon its arrival in Finland to support the proposed Finnish attack toward Belomorsk. This was soon changed to employing it on the Karelian Isthmus to relieve Finnish units that could then be sent to East Karelia. The change in thinking allegedly had to do with bringing supplies to the German division, a task that would be much simplified if it were located near the coast instead of the interior.
There were probably other unstated reasons. The German troops had not proven themselves well qualified to operate in the terrain they would face in East Karelia. Probably more important was the fact the Mannerheim did not want German participation—despite his earlier polite acceptance of the German offer—since it would give them more control of events than he wished if the operation were to be actually launched.
Mountain Corps Norway had a change of command when General Dietl was moved up to take over the Army of Lapland (formerly Army of Norway) on January 14, 1942. The commander of the 6th Mountain Division, Lieutenant General Ferdinand Schörner, assumed command of Mountain Corps Norway. His previous position as 6th Mountain Division commander was filled by Lieutenant General Philipp Christian.
General Schörner is described as a “hard core” officer, particularly in adverse situations. Probably because of this quality, he rose rapidly in rank and was promoted to Field Marshal in April 1945, in command of one of the army groups defending Berlin and the rest of Germany against the advancing Soviet armies. Ziemke writes that “His [Schörner’s] ruthless generalship, especially in the later stages of the war, earned him the enmity of his own troops, and he became the most unpopular general in the German Army.”23
In the southern sector of the Army of Lapland area there had also been a reorganization of forces. The XXXVI Corps was renamed the XXXVI Mountain Corps. Its commander, General Feige, was replaced in November 1941 by General der Infanterie Karl F. Weisenberger.
The OKW sent a directive to the Army of Lapland on January 8 directing it to release the 6th Finnish Division to the Army of Karelia. The OKW directive made it clear that Mannerheim wanted the forces released to his command as quickly as possible. A quick execution was made difficult by the situation at the Kestenga front. The Soviets had brought up reinforcements and although the Finnish 6th Division—minus one regiment—began leaving the Army of Lapland area on February 15, 1942, the move of the last units was considerably delayed.
The Finnish III Corps Headquarters was still present in the Army of Lapland sector. With the departure of the 6th Finnish Division it was left only with the 3rd Finnish division and Finnish Division J. This former Group J had been reinforced to divisional status by the addition of two regiments—the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment and the one regiment left behind by the 6th Division. Division J and SS Division Nord held the Kestenga area. SS Division Nord, which had only three infantry battalions in the Kestenga area, was reinforced with two motorized machinegun battalions. The 9th SS Infantry Regiment had been sent back to Germany. The Finnish 3rd Division held the Ukhta sector.
When it became apparent that the Belomorsk operation was delayed indefinitely (see Chapter 7), the reason for moving the 7th Mountain Division to the Karelian Isthmus no longer existed. It was now decided to have this division and the 5th Mountain Division, which followed it, gradually take over the sector of the Finnish III Corps. The Army of Lapland developed a plan to be implemented when the Baltic was reopened for navigation, and this plan was approved by Mannerheim on June 9, 1942. Planning for the use of the two mountain divisions had now come full circle. The XVIII Corps Headquarters was brought from Germany to replace the Finnish III Corps Headquarters.
The reorganization of the Finnish Army did not proceed as planned and produced few of the military benefits that Mannerheim had hoped.24 The Army of Karelia Headquarters was disbanded in January 1942. General Heinrichs returned to his former job as Army chief of staff. The Army was divided into three fronts and the redesignations and regrouping of forces became effective on March 4, 1942: