1. The Karelian Isthmus front under Major General Oesch. Before the change was instituted Oesch was given the Svir front and Major General Harald Öhquist took over on the Karelian Isthmus.
2. The Svir front with Major General Öhquist the designated commander. The commander was later changed to Major General Osech. Öhquist had been the Finnish liaison officer at OKW and he was replaced by General Talvela.
3. The Maaselkä front with Major General Laatikainen as its commander.
The lull in the fighting after the middle of January 1942 was used by the Finns to begin their planned reorganization of divisions into brigades. The reorganization resulted in a reduction in the strength of the Finnish forces. Older men were released. Some were sent home but others were organized into new units behind the fronts and given a not too glorious name in the popular vernacular of the day—the “senile battalions.” The number of troops dismissed came to 111,500 according to Erfurth but Mannerheim places the number at 180,000.25
The planned conversion of divisions into brigades proceeded very slowly, and other than the release of older age groups, did not produce the hoped-for advantages. The plan was finally abandoned by Mannerheim on May 16, 1942, after two divisions had been converted.26 These units retained their brigade status even after Mannerheim’s decision to discontinue the reorganization.
Over the late fall of 1941 and winter of 1942, the Soviets had slowly increased their forces opposite the Germans and Finns in northern and central Finland as well as opposite the Finns in East Karelia. The Soviets had created the Karelian Front just before the onset of winter. This new army group was responsible for the area from Murmansk to Lake Onega and directed the operations against the Germans in Lapland and against the Finns in the Maaselkä and Rukajärvi sectors. The 14th Soviet Army was given responsibility for a shortened part of the new army group front from Murmansk to Kandalaksha, while the 26th Soviet Army was given responsibility in April for the old southern part of the 14th Army sector opposite the Finnish III Corps.
The magnitude of the Soviet winter buildup is demonstrated by the fact that, by the middle of April 1942, they had the following forces arrayed against the Germans and Finns in the Murmansk and Lapland sectors:
1. Against the Mountain Corps Norway they had two divisions, two infantry brigades, two brigades of ski troops, three border regiments, and two machinegun battalions.
2. Against the XXXVI Mountain Corps and Finnish III Corps they had six divisions, two infantry brigades, two border regiments, and five brigades of ski troops.
The Soviets were able to do this despite the loss of about three million men on the eastern front in 1941, and the enormous resources of men and matériel they were pouring into their operations in central and southern parts of the Soviet Union. This realization must have had a sobering effect on both Finns and Germans.
The Germans recognized that their lateral transportation problems in Lapland could only be rectified by building railroads or roads linking the east and west within the various sectors, as well as by building a railroad between Rovaniemi and Pechenga. The Finns agreed to an OKW proposal in September 1941 for the building of the north–south railroad provided the Germans supplied the materials and labor. The project met with so many difficulties that it was finally abandoned. As an alternative, the Germans undertook to improve the road between Rovaniemi and Pechenga. This project became an important factor in late 1944 as the Germans began a fighting withdrawal from Finland.
The Finnish front was mostly quiet during the winter except in the Maaselkä area where the Soviets made several limited attacks in January. The Finns had three divisions (1st, 4th, and 8th) and one brigade (the 3rd) in this sector. The 3rd Brigade constituted the reorganized 12th Division and had been stationed on the Karelian Isthmus. It was moved into the Maaselkä area after the Finns detected a Soviet buildup in progress.
The Soviet offensive began in the Maaselkä area between Povents and Lake Seg on New Year’s Day. Bitter fighting took place until January 11, 1942. The Soviet attacks took place mainly across the frozen lakes and rivers and the fighting was particularly heavy on the peninsula near Povents. Although the Soviet attacks were repulsed, they succeeded in pushing back the Finnish front in the area closest to the Murmansk Railroad. Their advance formed a salient, which the Finns attacked—resulting in the restoration of their original front as well as the destruction of a Soviet division.
In the third week of January a very strong ski combat patrol from the 14th Finnish Division, led by Colonel Joose Olavi Hannula, penetrated Soviet territory. Reaching the Murmansk Railroad south of Kochkoma, the Finns disrupted rail traffic for some time. The Russian supply base at Segesha was destroyed, but because they had insufficient forces to hold their position, the Finns withdrew to their own lines.
With the approach of spring and the melting of the snow and ice, the Soviets launched an offensive against the Finnish front on the Svir River. The main thrust was in the area between Lake Onega and Lodeynoye Pole. The Finnish defenders were able to repel the attacks while inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. The Soviets managed to make a 10-kilometer penetration in a heavily forested area where the Finnish line was thinly held. The Finns counterattacked and in ten days of heavy fighting succeeded in virtually annihilating the Soviet troops in that salient. The Svir front was again stabilized by April 21 as the rains ushered in the spring thaw.
Army of Lapland plans to undertake offensive operations in late winter were nullified by three events:
1. The unexpected Soviet spring offensive.
2. The failure to reach an agreement with the Finns for joint operations (see below).
3. The failure of promised reinforcements to arrive as scheduled—the 7th and 5th Mountain Divisions.
One regiment of the 7th Mountain Division was diverted “temporarily” to Army Group North on March 2, 1942, before it sailed from Germany. The same happened to a regiment from the 5th Mountain Division a week later. The German lack of reserves for the eastern front was impacting operations in Finland.
The Army of Lapland was slow in noticing Soviet preparations for a spring offensive. Part of this failure is attributable to the preconceived notion that the Soviets would not undertake offensive operations in the period of the spring thaw, when the rains and the melting snow made roads that were not hard-surfaced impassable and the ground too soft for vehicles of any kind. Aerial reconnaissance discovered that there were 700–800 railcars in the Loukhi rail yards on 13 April and this caused III Corps to cancel its own plans for offensive operations. However, nothing happened over the next ten days and this brought a false sense of security.
Contrary to German expectations, the Soviets timed their attacks to take advantage of the looming thaw. By attacking as late as possible before the onset of the spring thaw they hoped to achieve their initial objectives before its effects reached a point where offensive operations were no longer possible. Having seized their initial objectives they hoped that the thaw, then underway, would prevent or seriously complicate German and Finnish counterattacks for several weeks. The Soviets calculated that the thaw would make the long Finnish and German supply lines impassable while they themselves would have the luxury of a rail line directly to the front.