Hitler visited Finland in June 4, 1942 to pay honor to Mannerheim (who was promoted to Marshal of Finland) on his 75th birthday. Hitler also met with General Dietl (promoted to full general) who told him that his army did not have the troop strength to seize the Rybachiy Peninsula, or to hold it since it would lengthen his front. Hitler, still preoccupied with the perceived British/US threat, was reluctant to abandon the Rybachiy operation and ordered Dietl to proceed with his plans and preparations.
As summer began, it looked as though the troop strength situation was solved. The Finns were taking over the Ukhta sector and this would free the 5th Mountain Division for a move to the Mountain Corps Norway sector. That promising situation did not last long. In early July OKW informed the Army of Lapland (now the 20th Mountain Army) that the 5th Mountain Division would not be moved to the Pechenga area because it could not be supported logistically—sufficient stores for another full-strength division could not be brought forward from either Norway or central Finland. Instead, the OKW intended to send sufficient static troops—without transport—to relieve the 6th Division on the Litsa line. This would make both the 2nd and 6th Mountain Divisions available to undertake Wiesengrund. The OKW was obviously out of touch with the conditions on the arctic front. Dietl quickly intervened; pointing out that the Litsa front was no place for poorly trained and equipped third-rate troops. The OKW backed off and Wiesengrund was postponed.
The strengthening of other defensive forces in north Norway and north Finland also continued. The 20th Mountain Army moved five fortress battalions to the coastal areas for which it was responsible. The work on emplacing 21 coastal artillery batteries between Tanafjord in Norway and Pechenga Bay in Finland was completed in August and the headquarters of the 210th Infantry Division was brought in to command the coastal defense forces.
Another British commando raid on the Norwegian coast at Vågsø in December 1941 had, like the Lofoten raid in March 1941, refueled Hitler’s concern for Norway. This time the raid was better organized and included elements of all three services. Concern about Norway was the reason for ordering the battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen to make the famous Channel dash in February 1942 and for subsequently stationing most of the German fleet in Norway.29 Hitler even wanted to move all submarines to Norway and relented only when it was pointed out to him that the ones operating in the western Atlantic were achieving excellent results along the eastern US seaboard.
While Hitler’s worry about a British landing in north Norway in March 1941 had been completely unreasonable considering the state of the British armed forces, the situation had changed by the winter and spring of 1942 as a result of the US entry into the war. Both the OKW and General Falkenhorst in Norway now shared Hitler’s worries about Norway. They considered it very likely that Norway would become the scene of major and decisive operations after winter had passed.30 The repercussions of a successful Allied landing in north Norway or along the narrow coast south of Narvik could be devastating. The supply route for the German forces in north Norway and north Finland would be severed and the units isolated. Finland might re-evaluate its participation in the war and Sweden would come under Allied influence and could be induced to become a participant on their side. Every convoy destined for Soviet ports had to be viewed as a possible amphibious invasion force.
Churchill, whose interest in Norway almost rivaled that of Hitler, had in fact proposed a plan—Operation Jupiter—that called for landing troops at Pechenga and Banak to operate in cooperation with the Soviets. The overriding objective was probably to eliminate the German air bases that threatened the Murmansk convoys. The intention was to land a division at Pechenga and to use one additional brigade against the airfield at Banak.
Again, as in the case of Norway in 1940, Churchill underestimated the difficulties of such an operation. The Germans had moved most of their navy to Norway by the summer of 1942 and had significantly increased their air forces, not only to support ground operations in Finland, but to interdict the convoys sailing through the Arctic Ocean. The Allies would have encountered strong defenses along the coast at Pechenga, and would have confronted a division-size force in the Banak area. Churchill’s plan withered because it did not have the support of his own military advisers or of the US.
Summer also brought organizational and deployment changes in the Murmansk sector. Some have been mentioned already.
Mountain Corps Norway (renamed XIX Mountain Corps in November 1942) had two mountain divisions assigned—the 2nd and 6th. The major corps troops consisted of a signal battalion, an engineer battalion, and two construction battalions. In addition, the following units assigned to 20th Mountain Army were located in, or earmarked for, the far north:
1. 388th Infantry Regiment.
2. 93rd Infantry Regiment.
3. 4th Machinegun Battalion.
4. 13th Machinegun Battalion.
5. 67th Bicycle Battalion.
6. 12 Army coastal batteries and some naval units.
7. Five Finnish frontier guard (light infantry) battalions.
Additional forces were added in the far north between the fall of 1942 and the spring of 1943. These included:
1. 210th Infantry Division with five fortress infantry battalions.
2. Division Group Petsamo under the 503rd Luftwaffe Field Regiment staff.
3. 139th Mountain Infantry Regiment.
4. Naval Command Kirkenes with eight coastal batteries.
The two mountain divisions were stationed along the Litsa line with the 2nd Mountain Division in the south and the 6th Mountain Division in the north. The other two divisions were stationed along the coast with Division Group Petsamo in the east and the 210th Division on the left where it tied into the 230th Division from Army Group Norway.
The mission of Mountain Corps Norway remained the protection of the nickel mines at Kolosjoki (including hydroelectric plants and transmission lines), security of the Arctic Ocean Highway, and protection of the arctic coast. For supplies the corps relied entirely on the stocks that had been built up in north Norway.
The 20th Mountain Army was responsible for an enormous front. It extended from just north of Loukhi to Pechenga, a distance of over 650 kilometers. Then it ran along the coast from Pechenga to Gamvik in Norway, another 600 kilometers. This very long front could not be occupied in strength. Between XXXVI Corps in central Finland and Mountain Corps Norway there was a 300-kilometer gap in the front. Even on the Litsa front there were gaps as the Germans organized a chain of strong points with considerable distances between positions. Stores for extensive combat were located in these strongpoints with all-around defenses. South of the Litsa the gaps in what was referred to as the security line were much greater. For example, the Finnish Petsamo Battalion was responsible for the southernmost part of the security line and they held a front of about 110 kilometers. To supply the southern portion of the security line—in a virgin forest wilderness—the Finns built a 120-kilometer road running east from the town of Ivalo.
The coastal front ran from Titovka Bay on the Motovskiy Bay side of the Rybachiy Peninsula to Gamvik in Norway. This front was responsible for protecting German shipping from Kirkenes to Liinahamari, the air bases used to attack the arctic convoys, and the Litsa front against amphibious assaults.
The Germans had gone to great length to insure adequate supply of the Murmansk front. Depots to support 100,000 troops for 12 months had been ordered by Hitler. Giant depots and cold-storage plants were established in the area and cold-storage ships were located in Kirkenes.