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Since the Army of Norway was about to have a change in commanders and since Dietl was considered more expert in winter warfare than Falkenhorst, Dietl was ordered to make a personal reconnaissance and report his conclusions. He agreed with Falkenhorst that transportation and supply problems ruled out the offensive and he also doubted the effectiveness of retraining the infantry divisions for winter warfare.11

In the conversation Mannerheim had with Erfurth on November 20, 1941 they also discussed the future conduct of the war in Finland. Erfurth, speaking of Mannerheim’s opinions, writes:

According to his view, Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and Soroka [Belomorsk] must be taken during the present winter—the sooner, the better. He advocated the beginning of January as the best time to launch a winter offensive to the eastward—simultaneously, be it noted well, against all three of the aforementioned objectives on the railway.12

Erfurth also reports that Mannerheim was eager to have the Germans capture the important rail junction at Vologda, north of Moscow, the junction through which the line from Archangel passed. “It is the decisive point for military operations on the whole Russian front. If we have Vologda, Soroka, Kandalaksha, and Murmansk in our hands, the Anglo-Americans can no longer get at us.”13

In a letter to Keitel on December 4, 1941, Mannerheim described the cutting of the Murmansk Railroad as a matter of the highest importance. If Vologda had not fallen to the Germans before then, the railroad north of it should be heavily attacked from the air to hamper the movement of Soviet reinforcements. His letter, which is not part of the memoirs, reads in part:

The importance of the Murmansk Railway for the Soviet Union’s ability to wage war is undoubtedly great, not only with respect to the importation of war materials and food from America and England, but also by the morale role it plays as the main communication route between Russia and its allies. A prompt severing of this connection is of paramount importance.14

Then he went on to throw the ball back into the German court by stating that his proposal on September 25, 1941 was conditioned on the fall of Leningrad and the Germans establishing contact with Finnish forces along the Svir River. Those preconditions had not been met and the conditions of the Finnish troops and the economy had in the meantime deteriorated. Mannerheim believed that the German attack on Kandalaksha should begin before March 1, 1942, so that it would be completed before the spring thaw. If the situation permitted, Finnish troops would then begin their advance on Belomorsk with two brigades. His letter makes the Finnish advance on Belomorsk not only dependent on the success by Army Group North, but also on that of the Army of Norway.

General Erfurth believed that the Finns were anxious to get control of the Murmansk Railroad because it might then cease to be a problem in their relations with Great Britain and the US. This seems a peculiar view since the result of interdicting the Murmansk Railroad is likely to have had the opposite effect.

It appears that both Mannerheim and Erfurth believed that simultaneous attacks should be made against Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and Belomorsk in order to keep the Soviets from exploiting the lateral movement capability that the Murmansk Railroad provided them.15 This is not what Mannerheim stated in a meeting with Falkenhorst less than two weeks later.

Mannerheim and Falkenhorst, with key staff officers, met at the Army of Norway Headquarters in Rovaniemi on December 14, 1941. The meeting dealt primarily with the separation of forces in the Army of Norway sector. Falkenhorst was in a dilemma. He had been directed to cooperate with Mannerheim in the exchange of forces so that the Finns could proceed with their reorganization and also undertake a winter offensive against Kandalaksha. Finally, he had been directed to prepare SS Division Nord for movement to Germany. While replacements were promised, they were not in place. Falkenhorst told Mannerheim that he was therefore in no position to release the Finnish units. Mannerheim, on his side, told Falkenhorst that he would take over the Ukhta sector only if it contained the same number and strength of units as it had earlier. In other words, he would not take over the sector until the requested separation of Finnish and German forces had been carried out. The end result was that Mannerheim refused to take responsibility for the Ukhta sector.

Mannerheim also took a dim view of undertaking operations against Kandalaksha before the beginning of March 1942. He stated that the Murmansk Railroad had increased in significance since the British declaration of war on Finland on December 6, 1941, and the state of war between Germany and the US. He concluded that the railroad had to be cut and suggested that the best way to cut it was by a converging attack on Belomorsk from the south and west by German and Finnish forces. Cutting the railroad at Belomorsk would also cut the branch line south of the White Sea to the interior of the Soviet Union via the Archangel–Vologda route. Successfully cutting the railroad hub at Belomorsk would completely isolate Murmansk.16

The OKW accepted Mannerheim’s suggestion immediately and offered him the 7th Mountain Division for the operation. This was not the end of the problems associated with cutting the Murmansk Railroad at Belomorsk.

Erfurth reports that Mannerheim was “deeply distressed” by the outcome of his meeting with Falkenhorst. While he made Erfurth understand that he was willing to move against Belomorsk with Finnish troops alone if he had to, the precondition was as before—that the situation south of the Svir River be cleared up by the Germans since the forces he needed for the operation and protection for the Finnish right flank had to come from the fronts in the south.17 He knew that the situation was critical for the Germans east of Leningrad and he learned, upon return to his headquarters, that the Germans had been driven out of Tikhvin and that the situation east of Leningrad had worsened. On December 26, 1941, the Germans requested that the Finns mount a diversionary operation on the Karelian Isthmus.

It is difficult to determine from the contradictory sources what motivated Mannerheim to make his proposal for a converging attack on Belomorsk or the reasons for his later vacillation. The first indication that the Finns had second thoughts about the proposed operation came in a conversation Ambassador Blücher had with President Ryti on January 1, 1942.18 Ryti indicated that the operation against Belomorsk posed difficulties for the Finns when it came to availability of forces and supplies. He indicated that the operation would require thorough preparations and he did not see how it could take place before March of that year. Blücher assumed that Ryti’s views were based upon those of Mannerheim.

We should keep in mind that the overall military situation on the eastern front had undergone a dramatic change in the month preceding this report. The German reverses in front of Moscow and in other parts of the front had had a sobering effect on the Finns and their outlook on the war. Mannerheim appears to have been so alarmed by these developments that he sent his chief of staff, General Heinrichs, to Germany on January 6, 1942. His mission was two-fold. First, he was to get a clearer overall picture of the situation on the eastern front. With respect to the military situation, Mannerheim wanted answers to two questions. Would the German retreat in Russia be brought to a halt and would the Germans resume and conclude their operation against Leningrad? Mannerheim may have been concerned that when the Germans eventually stopped the Soviet offensive they would direct their main efforts in the south at the expense of Leningrad. Heinrichs received reassuring promises from Keitel and Jodl at OKW, and from Halder at OKH.