The second part of Heinrichs’ mission was to get assurances from OKW that the Finnish III Corps would be replaced by German forces in order to deploy it to the Medvezhyegorsk area. This amounted to an end-run around the German command in Finland—which operated directly under OKW—after the conference between Mannerheim and Falkenhorst had reached an impasse on December 14. This may in fact have been the main purpose of Heinrichs’ visit. The OKW, without giving adequate consideration to the situation on the ground, agreed to the Finnish position on the exchange of forces. The Germans apparently received nothing in return as it pertained to the Belomorsk operation.
The dose of cold water that Ryti threw on the prospects for the operation was soon followed by confirmatory reports from General Erfurth. On January 20, 1942 he reported that the Belomorsk operation was completely up in the air. Erfurth noted that Mannerheim would not make a decision unless the situation on the German front in the Leningrad area improved and he recommended that everything necessary be undertaken by the Germans to persuade the recalcitrant Finns to act. He noted that other Finnish officers were less pessimistic than the marshal but that they had little or no influence.
Based on this alarming assessment, Field Marshal Keitel wrote a letter to Mannerheim on January 28, 1942, where he again raised the question of the joint Finnish–German operation against Belomorsk that Mannerheim had proposed on September 25, 1941, and again on December 14, 1941. He tried to minimize what was happening on the eastern front by writing that the Soviets were wearing themselves out in their attacks and would likely exhaust their reserves before spring.
The new commander of German forces in Finland, General Dietl, paid a courtesy visit to Marshal Mannerheim at Mikkeli on February 2, 1942. The Belomorsk operation was the main topic discussed. The politically astute Finn avoided refusing to undertake the operation but repeatedly made it clear that such an operation would be difficult, if not impossible, until the Germans had taken Leningrad. He also stated that any winter offensive under the existing circumstances was out of the question.
Dietl pointed out to Mannerheim that the delay in the arrival of the 7th Mountain Division and the uncertain arrival schedule of the 5th Mountain Division made it impossible for him to relieve the Finnish III Corps in the Kestenga sector since he lacked forces to do so. The lack of forces would also prevent the Germans from supporting the Belomorsk operation by attacking in their own sectors. Dietl told Mannerheim candidly that he did not believe that sufficient forces would be available to him until late spring or early summer.19
Mannerheim’s description of the meeting is short. He writes that Dietl was “full of enthusiasm for bringing about a united operation in which the Finnish Army was to capture the town of Sorokka [Belomorsk] on the White Sea—hopes which I had to dash.”20
Erfurth, who participated in the meeting between the two commanders, reported his impressions to the OKW. He concluded that Mannerheim was influenced by internal politics in Finland as well as by his own negative assessment of the military situation. Mannerheim and the government had repeatedly assured the Finns that the end of the war was in sight. An operation against Belomorsk would throw doubts on this optimism. Should the Soviet winter offensive in Russia continue, even a temporary setback could prove fatal to the required Finnish popular support. Further complications, which should have been foreseen, arose. The Baltic froze at the end of January and brought the flow of reinforcements for the Germans and supplies and arms for both the Germans and Finns to an end.
These were the conditions when Mannerheim finally answered Keitel’s letter on February 3, 1942. The letter, couched in very polite terms and not ruling out anything, sounded very pessimistic to the Germans. Mannerheim stressed that unless there was a favorable turn in the general situation, he doubted that he would have sufficient forces for a winter offensive, but would not rule it out.
Erfurth interpreted Mannerheim’s reference to “favorable turn” as the German capture of Leningrad. Until Leningrad was captured he would not move sufficient forces from the Karelian Isthmus and from the Svir front to undertake offensive operations against Belomorsk. Erfurth believed that Mannerheim, by not ruling out an operation against Belomorsk, was resorting to a diplomatic gesture designed to appear polite and cooperative.
OKW agreed that Mannerheim had ruled out an operation against Belomorsk—although not specifically stated in his letter—since the situation on the front around Leningrad had not changed. The operations against the Murmansk Railroad were therefore postponed indefinitely.
This would have been the appropriate time for the German High Command to be brutally frank with their recalcitrant coalition partner. They should have pointed out to the Finns that the quickest way to clear up the situation around Leningrad and thereby make forces available for use against the Murmansk Railroad would be for the Finns to close the ring around that city from the north. The Germans could also have pointed out to the Finns that German operations from central Finland were a waste of precious resources if the Finns refused to cooperate in operations against the Murmansk Railroad. In such a situation the Germans would be compelled to reevaluate the commitment of forces in central Finland. The Finns were well aware that they would be hard-pressed to hold on to their conquests in the south if they also had to hold central Finland. Such an approach at this time might have galvanized them into action.
Mannerheim writes in his memoirs that he turned down the German proposal “based on military as well as political considerations.”21 While he considered the operation feasible, he feared that the Soviet reaction would be so strong that it was doubtful that the railroad could be held. He also viewed the political repercussions as detrimental to Finnish interests because “the enterprise would have been likely to draw us into world politics, providing difficult problems for our government.” He goes on: “My attitude to the German suggestion of participation in operations against the Murmansk railway therefore continued negative, as I repeated to President Ryti on a visit to Helsinki.” Mannerheim was willing to make a limited change to the front in the northeast but rejected a proposal from his own staff to move north to Paradova, about 50 kilometers from Belomorsk since such an advance would give the Soviets the impression that the Finns were moving against the railway. Mannerheim also writes that he informed President Ryti about his decision.
Mannerheim had originally proposed the Belomorsk operation to Field Marshal Keitel on September 25, 1941, and to General Falkenhorst on December 14, 1941. But in his memoirs he makes it sound as if it were a German initiative that he had never favored. As far as becoming embroiled in world politics, that became a fact when Finland entered the war. His account also does not square with a letter that President Ryti wrote him on March 24, 1942, and Ryti’s testimony at the War Guilt Trials where the letter was introduced as evidence. It reads, in part:
On March 24, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief visited me in Helsinki and produced a plan for an operation which, however, was in the beginning only to be directed towards Paradova. He further mentioned that the greater part of the troops were already in readiness.22
The Finnish publication about the trial contains, according to Lundin, the following extract from Ryti’s diary on March 24, 1942: