Marshal at Helsinki with Lieutenant Colonel Viljanen presenting a plan for an attack in the direction of Sorokka, towards which he must in the immediate future start the troops which are already for the most part in a state of readiness for it. He requested my view of the matter. I promised to think about the matter overnight and write my opinion the next day and send it by courier to Headquarters. My answer negative.23
In his memoirs, Mannerheim writes that he was astonished to receive a letter from President Ryti in which the President claims his views as his own. Mannerheim explains the incident “as due either to misunderstanding or lapse of memory.”24
Ambassador Schnurre came to Finland in February 1942 to extend the Finnish–German commercial treaty. He visited Mannerheim at Mikkeli on February 15. They discussed the Belomorsk operation and he reported that Mannerheim had stated flatly: “I shall not attack any more.” Schnurre was not sure whether Mannerheim was only referring to the present situation or whether his statement should be given a broader interpretation.25 In any case, the OKW was alarmed by the news.
Mannerheim paid a visit to Dietl in Rovaniemi on April 2, 1942 and again reiterated that he would not undertake the operation against Belomorsk until Leningrad had fallen to the Germans. To soften his rejection he observed that he did not consider the operation against Belomorsk feasible, because of the terrain, until winter.
Erfurth observes that in early March 1942, the US began to exert diplomatic pressure on the Finns to have them reach an agreement with the Soviets or at least refrain from attacking the Murmansk Railroad. Erfurth is right but the pressure from the US had begun much earlier, in late October and early November 1941, when they passed on a peace feeler from the Soviet Union accompanied by a warning of the dire consequences for US–Finnish relations if the Murmansk Railroad was attacked from territories under Finnish control. That happened at least six weeks before Mannerheim met with Falkenhorst at Rovaniemi.
The US pressure on Finland in March 1942 came at a time when the Finns and Germans were deeply involved in discussions about the offensive against the Soviets in Kandalaksha and Belomorsk and undoubtedly influenced the outcome of these negotiations. Erfurth believes that the timing was not accidental and that a leak of the discussions may have been picked up by the Swedes who in turn informed the US.26
Erfurth wrote about Mannerheim’s vacillations in the 1950 German version of his book. This part is missing from the English version, published in 1979 under the auspices of the US armed forces:
It is extraordinary that the plan for an offensive against Soroka [Sorokka/Belomorsk], to which Mannerheim had grown skeptical as early as the beginning of the year because of the deteriorating situation on the German eastern front, was no longer considered viable beginning in March for reasons of foreign policy. In discussions with the OKW at the time, Mannerheim very skillfully placed priority on military considerations, by not rejecting continual German demands to attack the Murmansk Railway, by making them conditioned on the prior capture of Leningrad by the Germans.27
The Army of Lapland made another proposal for a German–Finnish operation against the Murmansk Railroad on April 8, 1942. Dietl requested the participation of III Finnish Corps as well as the 14th Finnish Division. The Finns turned down the proposal based on political considerations. This was undoubtedly a reference to Finland’s relations with the US.
The proposed operation against Belomorsk was discussed during Hitler’s visit to Finland on June 4, 1942. Keitel related later that the Finns had stated that Belomorsk was of special importance to them not only militarily, but because of the establishment of postwar frontiers. They expressed their regrets at not having been able to undertake it during the past winter but did not think it feasible during the summer. They were considering it for the winter of 1942–43.28
The discussions over an operation against Belomorsk were not totally dead but they became hopelessly entangled in two other operations—Operation Lachsfang (Salmon Catch) and Operation Nordlicht (Northern Light).
Dietl, having finally received reinforcements and eager to carry out offensive operations, began to argue again for a double drive against the Murmansk Railroad. One part of the drive would be undertaken by the XXXVI Mountain Corps against Kandalaksha, and the other by the Finns against Belomorsk.
A conference between Generals Dietl and Erfurth took place in Rovaniemi on July 9, 1942. The conference was designed to discuss the situation in 20th Mountain Army but developed into an impulse for new operational planning based upon General Dietl’s concept. It appeared very illogical to the two generals that the German and Finnish forces between Leningrad and the Arctic Ocean—amounting to about 600,000 men—remained inactive while the German forces on the eastern front were engaged in a life and death struggle to bring about a final decision in the campaign.29 The German summer offensive of 1942 had begun in the last days of June with the main effort in southern Russia. No mission of any consequence had been assigned to the Finnish-German forces by the OKW.
General Jodl visited General Dietl’s headquarters on July 13, 1942 and he was brought in on the discussions. Jodl expressed agreement and carried Dietl’s proposal back to Hitler who gave his approval on July 21, 1942 in Führer Directive No. 44. The directive reads in part:
We must now cut the northern supply route which links Soviet Russia with the Anglo-Saxon powers. This is principally the Murmansk railway, along which by far the largest proportion of supplies from America and England were delivered during the winter months. The importance of this supply route will increase further when the season and weather conditions prevent successful operations against the northern convoys.
20th Mountain Army therefore proposes, in cooperation with the 5th Air Fleet, to prepare an offensive this autumn to seize the Murmansk railway near Kandalaksha.30
The directive also states that it was desirable that the attack by the 20th Mountain Army should be coordinated with a Finnish advance on Belomorsk. It goes on to list the two assumptions, which were that Leningrad would be captured in September 1942 at the latest, thereby releasing Finnish forces and that the 5th Mountain Division would arrive in Finland by the end of September.
Directive 44 puts brakes on Dietl’s planned operation by stressing that the “most important task” of the 20th Mountain Army remained the protection of the Finnish nickel mines. On this issue, it reads:
It must once again be stressed, with the greatest emphasis, that without deliveries of Finnish nickel Germany could probably no longer manufacture the high-grade steel necessary above all for aircraft and submarine engines. This could have decisive effects upon the outcome of the war.31
The 20th Mountain Army was directed to be ready at all times to send reinforcements to Mountain Corps Norway to fulfill the task of protecting the mine production. The 5th Air Fleet was likewise ordered to be prepared to subordinate all other missions to the protection of the mines if they were attacked.
The directive also postponed the operation against the Rybachiy Peninsula (Wiesengrund) by stating that the operation would not take place in 1942, but that Mountain Corps Norway would continue to be reinforced so that it could be launched on an eight-week notice in the spring of 1943. Hitler directed that particular attention should be given to the development and strengthening of air and supply bases, essential not only for the successful execution of Wiesengrund but also for meeting an enemy offensive in the north.