There was no unanimity of opinion on whether the prospects for an operation against the Murmansk Railroad offered better prospects in the Kandalaksha sector or in the Kestenga sector. OKW opinion was divided on this issue as were the opinions of senior officers in the 20th Mountain Army. Dietl favored the Kandalaksha sector as did the commander of the XXXVI Corps but Dietl’s chief of staff favored the Kestenga sector.32 An attack from the Kandalaksha sector was chosen.
The XXXVI Mountain Corps started planning for Lachsfang on July 22, 1942. The planners realized that success depended on a quick breakthrough of the Verman river/lake line followed by a rapid thrust to Kandalaksha before the Soviets could mount another defense. The XXXVI Corps planned to use both infantry divisions in the breakthrough, one along the road and one along the railroad. The plan also called for a sweep by a mountain division (the yet-to-arrive 5th) around the Soviet right flank to prevent them from establishing and occupying a second defensive line. The plan involved about 80,000 troops, double the number of troops involved in the 1941 summer offensive. The 5th Air Fleet agreed to provide 60 dive–bombers, 9 fighters, and 9 bombers for the operation. This was more air support than had been available in the summer of 1941.33
Timing was all-important because of the weather and terrain. The XXXVI Mountain Corps believed it would require four weeks from start to finish. To avoid a winter campaign or a campaign during the spring thaw, it was decided to launch Lachsfang so that military operations would essentially be completed by November 15, 1942.
Both Dietl and OKW considered a Finnish attack against Belomorsk an essential prerequisite for the success of Lachsfang. General Erfurth was ordered to get the Finnish reaction to Führer Directive 44. He first approached General Heinrichs, the chief of the Finnish General Staff. As expected by the Germans, Heinrichs delivered a “yes, but” answer—the “but” being that Leningrad had to be captured before the operation could be undertaken. However, the Finns brought up a new prerequisite that surprised the Germans. Heinrichs stated that it was necessary also for Army Group North to advance east to the middle Svir River south of Lake Onega.
Erfurth writes:
From whatever side one looked at the problem, one was caught in the vicious circle of a situation in which a free hand in the east could only be obtained after first getting a free hand in the south. Leningrad remained the key to all planning at the Finnish-German front.34
General Heinrichs also told Erfurth it would be preferable to have German troops be the first to cut the Murmansk Railroad in order for Finland to avoid difficulties with the US that would probably lead to a declaration of war.35
Erfurth writes that the Germans hoped that the news from the fronts in Russia would convince the Finns that things were improving. In fact, the Finns were seeing the German summer offensive in the southern part of the Soviet Union rolling from one success to another. The lower part of the Don River had been crossed on a 250-kilometer front by German troops and their allies and the spearheads of the German drive were 180 kilometers south of the Don. On August 9, 1942, German troops reached the northern slopes of the Caucasus on a 400-kilometer wide front and on August 12 the Germans announced that General Paulus’ forces had encircled and destroyed a Soviet army in the great Don bend. The operations in North Africa also looked very promising. German and Italian forces had taken Tobruk on June 21, 1942, and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s forces were pursuing the defeated British towards the Libyan–Egyptian frontier and had captured Mersa Matruh on June 30. News also arrived in Finland that Erich von Manstein’s 11th Army was on the way to the Leningrad area with its impressive siege artillery—280 batteries of 817 guns ranging in caliber from 75mm to 800mm—from the successful siege of Sevastopol. It was hoped that these events would influence the Finnish decision.
Mannerheim’s written answer to General Erfurth was delivered on August 2, 1942. In typical fashion, Mannerheim expressed agreement “in principle” with the German proposal for an attack towards Kandalaksha along with a Finnish drive on Belomorsk. In other words, he was willing to cooperate but set a very high threshold. The letter left no doubt that Finnish participation depended on Leningrad being captured first. He also repeated General Heinrichs’ prerequisite of an eastward offensive by Army Group North towards the Svir River. Added to the prerequisites was that the Belomorsk operation be supported by the Luftwaffe and that a very large amount of fuel be made available to the Finns.36
Under these stipulated conditions the Finnish commander in chief agreed to make the following forces available for an operation against Belomorsk:
1. Two divisions from the Karelian Isthmus and the 3rd and 12th Brigades in the Medvezhyegorsk area.
2. The armored division currently being formed west of Lake Seg.
3. Two more divisions from the Karelian Isthmus and the 14th Division in the Rukajärvi area.
4. The two divisions presently at the Maaselkä front (1st and 4th Divisions) were to follow as a second wave.
In other words, Mannerheim promised to make available the equivalent of 10 divisions for the operation and to do that he would have to strip away the units on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad. The redeployment of the four divisions on the Karelian Isthmus could not take place until Leningrad was in German hands and the redeployment itself would take four weeks because of poor roads. Implicit in his promise to make these forces available was that this rather immense force was needed for the operation to be successful. It was undoubtedly assumed that the Germans would not be so bold as to challenge this implicit assumption.
General Talvela, the Finnish liaison officer to OKW and OKH, delivered the German answer on August 15, 1942:
1. The occupation of Leningrad would be carried out as requested by Marshal Mannerheim.
2. The OKW granted the Finnish request for Luftwaffe support in the attack on Belomorsk.
3. The very large fuel requests were also granted.
4. However, if Mannerheim insisted on an advance by Army Group North to an area south of Lake Onega prior to the offensive, the entire Operation Lachsfang would be cancelled. The 5th Mountain Division, slated for movement to the 20th Mountain Army would under these circumstances be assigned to Army Group North.
Erfurth writes that Mannerheim, “like a skilled fencer… obliged to make a clear decision by paragraph four of the German reply, evaded a precise written answer and ordered his Chief of Staff to discuss [in Germany] the matter verbally.”37 General Heinrichs arrived in Germany on August 24, 1942 and he and General Talvela gave their explanations to the OKW. The Germans appear to have accepted them—there was not much else they could do unless they were willing to threaten to withdraw the 20th Mountain Army from central Finland. Though it is not certain whether the Finns dropped their demand for an eastward advance by Army Group North, they most probably did since Operation Lachsfang was not cancelled.
Marshal Mannerheim devotes only a few lines to these important and complicated negotiations about a Belomorsk operation in his memoirs and has nothing at all to say about his acceptance as long as specific conditions were met. He is also less than candid in describing the requested Finnish participation as limited to tying down Soviet forces in support of a German attack on Kandalaksha. He writes in his memoirs:
At the end of July, the Germans again raised the question of a Finnish attack on the Murmansk railway, which this time was to commence from the direction of Rukajärvi and the object of which would be to hold down the adversary while they themselves were to attack in the direction of Kandalaks [sic]. I informed President Ryti of the proposal, and it was declined for the same reasons as before.38