On the other hand, the dodos and the Steller sea cows could have used exactly the same argument to prove their own superiority, a thousand years ago: if we’re so unfit, why haven’t we gone extinct? Why? Because natural selection takes time, and luck plays a role. The biggest boys on the block at any given time aren’t necessarily the fittest, or the most efficient, and the game isn’t over. The game is never over; there’s no finish line this side of heat death. And so, neither can there be any winners. There are only those who haven’t yet lost.
Cunningham’s stats about self-recognition in primates: those too are real. Chimpanzees have a higher brain-to-body ratio than orangutans,[130] yet orangs consistently recognise themselves in mirrors while chimps do so only half the time.[131] Similarly, those nonhuman species with the most sophisticated language skills are a variety of birds and monkeys—not the presumably “more sentient” great apes who are our closest relatives.[132], [133] If you squint, facts like these suggest that sentience might almost be a phase, something that orangutans haven’t yet grown out of but which their more-advanced chimpanzee cousins are beginning to. (Gorillas don’t self-recognise in mirrors. Perhaps they’ve already grown out of sentience, or perhaps they never grew into it.)
Of course, Humans don’t fit this pattern. If it even is a pattern. We’re outliers: that’s one of the points I’m making.
I bet vampires would fit it, though. That’s the other one.
Finally, some very timely experimental support for this unpleasant premise came out just as Blindsight was being copy edited: it turns out that the unconscious mind is better at making complex decisions than is the conscious mind.[134] The conscious mind just can’t handle as many variables, apparently. Quoth one of the researchers: “At some point in our evolution, we started to make decisions consciously, and we’re not very good at it.”[135]
The child Siri Keeton was not unique: we’ve been treating certain severe epilepsies by radical hemispherectomy for over fifty years now.[136] Surprisingly, the removal of half a brain doesn’t seem to impact IQ or motor skills all that much (although most of hemispherectomy patients, unlike Keeton, have low IQs to begin with).[137] I’m still not entirely sure why they remove the hemisphere; why not just split the corpus callosum, if all you’re trying to do is prevent a feedback loop between halves? Do they scoop out one half to prevent alien hand syndrome—and if so, doesn’t that imply that they’re knowingly destroying a sentient personality?
The maternal-response opioids that Helen Keeton used to kickstart mother-love in her damaged son was inspired by recent work on attachment-deficit disorders in mice.[138] The iron-scavenging clouds that appear in the wake of the Firefall are based on those reported by Plane et al.[139] I trawled The Gang of Four’s linguistic jargon from a variety of sources.[140], [141], [142], [143] The multilingual speech patterns of Theseus’ crew (described but never quoted, thank God) were inspired by the musings of Graddol,[144] who suggests that science must remain conversant in multiple grammars because language leads thought, and a single “universal” scientific language would constrain the ways in which we view the world.
The antecedent of Szpindel’s and Cunningham’s extended phenotypes exists today, in the form of one Matthew Nagel.[145] The spliced prosthetics that allow them to synesthetically perceive output from their lab equipment hails from the remarkable plasticity of the brain’s sensory cortices: you can turn an auditory cortex into a visual one by simply splicing the optic nerve into the auditory pathways (if you do it early enough).[146], [147] Bates’ carboplatinum augments have their roots in the recent development of metal musculature.[148], [149] Sascha’s ironic denigration of TwenCen psychiatry hails not only from (limited) personal experience, but from a pair of papers [150], [151] that strip away the mystique from cases of so-called multiple personality disorder. (Not that there’s anything wrong with the concept; merely with its diagnosis.) The fibrodysplasia variant that kills Chelsea was based on symptoms described by Kaplan et al.[152]
And believe it or not, those screaming faces Sarasti used near the end of the book represent a very real form of statistical analysis: Chernoff Faces,[153] which are more effective than the usual graphs and statistical tables at conveying the essential characteristics of a data set.[154]
ECHOPRAXIA
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It’s been a while. Three editors, three family deaths, one near-fatal brush with flesh-eating disease. A felony conviction. A marriage.
Now this.
I’m not quite sure what “this” is, exactly—but for good or ill, I couldn’t have pulled it off without help. In fact, I wouldn’t even be alive now without help. So first and foremost, let me acknowledge the contribution of one Caitlin Sweet. Echopraxia would not exist without her, because I would not exist without her; I would have died of necrotizing fasciitis on February 12, 2011. (Darwin Day. Seriously. Look it up.) As a perverse reward for saving my life, Caitlin got to endure endless hours in the shower, or in bed, or at restaurants, listening to me whinge endlessly about how this scene was too talky and that climax too contrived; she would then suggest some elegant solution that might have occurred to me eventually, but probably not before deadline. Her insights are golden. If their implementation sucks it’s my fault, not hers.
The first couple of chapters also had the benefit of being workshopped by two different groups of writers: those at Gibraltar Point (Michael Carr, Laurie Channer, John McDaid, Becky Maines, Elisabeth Mitchell, Dave Nickle, Janis O’Connor, and Rob Stauffer); and those at Cecil Street (Madeline Ashby, Jill Lum, Dave Nickle—again—Helen Rykens, Karl Schroeder, Sara Simmons, Michael Skeet, Doug Smith, Hugh Spencer, Dale Sproule, and Dr. Allan Weiss).
I’ve kept lists over the years, tried to document the various insights, references, and crazy-ass hallucinatory what-ifs that informed the writing of this book. I’ve tried to keep track of those who sent me papers and those who actually wrote the damn things, those who made offhand remarks in blog posts or jabbed a finger at my chest while making some drunken point during a barroom debate. I wanted to list everyone by the nature of their contribution: beta reader; scientific authority; infopipe; devil’s advocate.
130
Aiello, L., and C. Dean. 1990. An introduction to human evolutionary anatomy. Academic Press, London.
131
Gallup, G.G. (Jr.). 1997. On the rise and fall of self-conception in primates. In The Self Across Psychology—self-recognition, self-awareness, and the Self Concept.
132
Hauser, M.D., N. Chomsky, and W.T. Fitch. 2002. The faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?
133
Carstairs-McCarthy, A. 2004. Many perspectives, no concensus—a review of
135
Vince, G 2006. “’Sleeping on it’ best for complex decisions.” Newscientist.com, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn8732-sleeping-on-it-best-for-complex-decisions.html.
136
Devlin, A.M.,
137
Pulsifer, M,B.,
138
Moles, A., Keiffer, B.L., and F.R. D’Amato. 2004. Deficit in attachment behavior in mice lacking the μ-Opioid receptor gene.
139
Plane, J.M.C.,
140
Hauser, M.D., N. Chomsky, and W.T. Fitch. 2002. The faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?
141
Fitch, W.T., and M.D. Hauser. 2004. Computational Constraints on Syntactic Processing in a Nonhuman Primate.
145
BBC News. 2005. Brain chip reads man’s thoughts. March 31. Story online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/health/4396387.stm.
146
146. Weng, J.
147
Von Melchner, L,
149
Weissmüller, J.,
150
Piper, A., and Merskey, H. 2004. The Persistence of Folly: A Critical Examination of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Part I. The Excesses of an Improbable Concept.
151
Piper, A., and Merskey, H. 2004. The Persistence of Folly: A Critical Examination of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Part II. The Defence and Decline of Multiple Personality or Dissociative Identity Disorder.
152
Kaplan, F.S.,
153
Chernoff, H. 1973. Using faces to represent points in k-dimensional space graphically.
154
Wilkinson, L. 1982. An experimental evaluation of multivariate graphical point representations.