The anti-Western stance did not undergo any significant development until the mid nineteenth century. Even the famous debates between Slavophiles and the Westernizers, which began in the late eighteenth century, was less harsh at the beginning of the nineteenth century than it was at the end. Vera Tolz points out that the first round of debates between Westernizers and Slavophiles ‘reflected the divide between cosmopolitans of the Enlightenment and (proto) nationalists’ (2001, p. 65). In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the rapid development of the nation had not yet begun; this would not happen until the second half of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, a search for the dangerous ‘Other’, which would help to design the country’s identity and clarify who was ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, was at a premature stage.
The watershed in the rapid development of conspiracy theories in Russia was the Crimean War (1853–6), which was triggered by the desire of Russia’s rulers to gain control over the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The alliance of European governments supporting the Ottoman Empire was devastating for Russia, and resulted in her losing territory, influence in Europe, and the right to keep a fleet on the Black Sea. Many conservative thinkers in Russia had imagined her advancing into the Middle East and the Balkans as part of a messianic mission; these illusions of grandeur were now shattered (Duncan, 2005).
A new generation of Slavophiles emerged in the wake of the Crimean disaster, with more radical views about the West. Russia’s humiliation in the Crimean War was not the only factor in the spread of anti-Western sentiment and conspiracy fears. The Slavophiles enjoyed the support of conservative groups in governing circles, especially during the reign of Aleksandr III, who promoted a counter-liberal agenda. Many elements of anti-Western conspiracy theories appeared in Russia at this time.
The proliferation of conspiracy fears in the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth century was the result of several factors. Aleksandr II introduced a series of reforms which liberalized Russia and set it on the path of rapid industrialization and modernization. The mass migration of people from villages to cities changed the social structure of Russian society, and helped spread rumours and fears (Fuller, 2006; Kolonitskii, 2010). In addition, Russians became better educated as a result of Aleksandr’s educational reforms, and this was instrumental in helping to produce and disseminate conspiratorial ideas. As Hofstadter explains, conspiracy theorists aimed to present their ideas in an academic style, and this required a basic education and the ability to formulate ideas. Ironically, conspiracy theories became a mechanism by which conservative intellectual elites understood the liberal changes that were taking place in Russian society. Aleksandr’s reforms, which allowed more freedom for both liberal and conservative groups, were perceived by the conservatives as a Western plan to corrupt and destroy Russia.
Among the first groups of intellectuals which openly endorsed conspiratorial notions to interpret domestic and foreign policies were the conservatives, that were called ‘okhraniteli’ (defenders). Their clear anti-Western views were characteristic of conspiracy theories in late Imperial Russia. The idea that Russia had a special path (teoriia osobogo puti), an historic mission to save the world, rested on an idealized vision of the country as a repository of morality and of Christian Orthodoxy (Poe, 2000). The writer Dostoevsky became a driving force in disseminating the idea of Russia’s global mission, both in the nineteenth century and for later generations of Russian conservatives. The Diary of a Writer became a manifesto for Russian conservatism, outlining the main tenets of Russia’s ‘special mission’ (Dostoevsky, 1995). The dichotomy between the corrupt Catholic Church of the West and the pure and faithful Orthodox Church of the East framed the conflict between Russia and the West. The revolutionaries who emerged in post-Crimean Russia were in Dostoevsky’s view, connected to Catholicism and hence a weapon being used by the West to destroy Russia from within.
The perceived need to extricate Russia from heretical Western influence was also an important issue for late Slavophiles. Aleksei Khomiakov, one of the early Slavophiles, had put forward the idea that Russia had become a virtual colony of the West because of Peter the Great’s reforms. To shape a new national identity, Russians needed to rid themselves of Western influence and promote a spiritual rebirth (Khomiakov, 1982). Danilevskii, a prominent thinker of the late nineteenth century, went so far as to advocate the radical separation of Russia from Europe, insisting that Russia was an autonomous cultural-historical entity which must evolve independently from Europe (Danilevskii, 2013). Danilevskii’s ideas have been widely adopted in the writings of post-Soviet conspiracy theorists and, as we will see, have often been used to explain supposed Western hatred towards Russia.
Nationalist movements reached their apotheosis in the period of Aleksandr II’s reforms. Following the Polish uprising of 1863 and the rise of Ukrainian nationalists (Miller, 2012b), the term ‘national’ began to appear more frequently in the conservative press. The Poles and the Jews, who inhabited the Western territories of the Russian empire, were often depicted as Russia’s main enemies. The Poles were considered particularly dangerous not only due to their religion but also because they had a strong and active nationalist movement which was thought to threaten the integrity of the Empire. The image of the conspiratorial Catholic Polish priest was central to these fears. The Imperial government was also suspicious about local anti-Russian Catholic activists who were thought to receive instructions from their foreign superiors on how to resist and overthrow the Tsar (Dolbilov, 2010).
Mikhail Katkov, a prominent writer and publisher in nineteenth-century Russia, was an iconic conservative conspiracy theorist of the late nineteenth century who focused on the supposed Western plot. He linked the threat to Russia by Polish revolutionaries directly to Western anti-Russian plotters. In his view, every Russian patriot had a duty to be loyal to the state in the same way that a soldier was loyal to his commander. A ‘genuine Russian’ had to be an Orthodox Christian, a committed monarchist and a loyal subject. If not, he would be considered an enemy of the nation (Katkov, 1863). Just as post-Soviet Russian conspiracy theorists claim that the opposition movement gets funding from the West, Katkov accused the Poles of funding bloodshed and revolution with money from abroad (Katkov, 1881). As is typical of conspiracy theorists, Katkov divided Russia into two groups, the national and anti-national. The nationalists rejected reforms which they considered to threaten Russia’s very existence; they thought they were aimed at changing Russia’s territorial integrity, and that this could only benefit Russia’s enemies (Katkov, 1880). They believed that anti-Russian plotters in the West manipulated revolutionaries into threatening and destabilizing the Russian monarchy; they also tried to destroy Russia’s reputation in the European press and wrote cynical lies portraying the country as backward (Katkov, 1865).