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In September 1998, several months after X11R6.4 was released with nonfree distribution terms, the Open Group reversed its decision and rereleased it under the same noncopyleft free software license that was used for X11R6.3. Thus, the Open Group therefore eventually did what was right, but that does not alter the general issue.

Even if the X Consortium and the Open Group had never planned to restrict X, someone else could have done it. Noncopylefted software is vulnerable from all directions; it lets anyone make a nonfree version dominant, if he will invest sufficient resources to add significantly important features using proprietary code. Users who choose software based on technical characteristics, rather than on freedom, could easily be lured to the nonfree version for short-term convenience.

The X Consortium and Open Group can no longer exert moral suasion by saying that it is wrong to say no. This will make it easier to decide to copyleft your X-related software.

When you work on the core of X, on programs such as the X server, Xlib, and Xt, there is a practical reason not to use copyleft. The X.org group does an important job for the community in maintaining these programs, and the benefit of copylefting our changes would be less than the harm done by a fork in development. So it is better to work with them, and not copyleft our changes on these programs. Likewise for utilities such as xset and xrdb, which are close to the core of X and do not need major improvements. At least we know that the X.org group has a firm commitment to developing these programs as free software.

The issue is different for programs outside the core of X: applications, window managers, and additional libraries and widgets. There is no reason not to copyleft them, and we should copyleft them.

In case anyone feels the pressure exerted by the criteria for inclusion in the X distributions, the GNU Project will undertake to publicize copylefted packages that work with X. If you would like to copyleft something, and you worry that its omission from the X distribution will impede its popularity, please ask us to help.

At the same time, it is better if we do not feel too much need for popularity. When a businessman tempts you with “more popularity,” he may try to convince you that his use of your program is crucial to its success. Don’t believe it! If your program is good, it will find many users anyway; you don’t need to feel desperate for any particular users, and you will be stronger if you do not. You can get an indescribable sense of joy and freedom by responding, “Take it or leave it—that’s no skin off my back.” Often the businessman will turn around and accept the program with copyleft, once you call the bluff.

Friends, free software developers, don’t repeat old mistakes! If we do not copyleft our software, we put its future at the mercy of anyone equipped with more resources than scruples. With copyleft, we can defend freedom, not just for ourselves, but for our whole community.

Copyright c 1998, 1999, 2009 Richard Stallman

This essay was originally published on http://gnu.org, in 1998. This version is part of Free Software, Free Society: Selected Essays of Richard M. Stallman, 2nd ed. (Boston: GNU Press, 2010).

Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire chapter are permitted worldwide, without royalty, in any medium, provided this notice is preserved.

Chapter 37.

The Problem Is Software Controlled by Its Developer

I fully agree with Jonathan Zittrain’s conclusion that we should not abandon general-purpose computers. Alas, I disagree completely with the path that led him to it. He presents serious security problems as an intolerable crisis, but I’m not convinced. Then he forecasts that users will panic in response and stampede toward restricted computers (which he calls “appliances”), but there is no sign of this happening.

Zombie machines are a problem, but not a catastrophe. Moreover, far from panicking, most users ignore the issue. Today, people are indeed concerned about the danger of phishing (mail and web pages that solicit personal information for fraud), but using a browsing-only device instead of a general computer won’t protect you from that.

Meanwhile, Apple has reported that 25 percent of iPhones have been unlocked. Surely at least as many users would have preferred an unlocked iPhone but were afraid to try a forbidden recipe to obtain it. This refutes the idea that users generally prefer that their devices be locked.

It is true that a general computer lets you run programs designed to spy on you, restrict you, or even let the developer attack you. Such programs include KaZaA, RealPlayer, Adobe Flash, Windows Media Player, Microsoft Windows, and MacOS. Windows Vista does all three of those things; it also lets Microsoft change the software without asking, or command it to permanently cease normal functioning.

But restricted computers are no help, because they present the same problem for the same reason.

The iPhone is designed for remote attack by Apple. When Apple remotely destroys iPhones that users have unlocked to enable other uses, that is no better than when Microsoft remotely sabotages Vista. The TiVo is designed to enforce restrictions on access to the recordings you make, and reports what you watch. E-book readers such as the Amazon “Swindle” are designed to stop you from sharing and lending your books. Features that artificially obstruct use of your data are known as Digital Restrictions Management (DRM); our protest campaign against DRM is hosted at http://defectivebydesign.org. (Our adversaries call DRM “Digital Rights Management” based on their idea that restricting you is their right. When you choose a term, you choose your side.)

The nastiest of the common restricted devices are cell phones. They transmit signals for tracking your whereabouts even when switched “off”; the only way to stop this is to take out all the batteries. Many can also be turned on remotely, for listening, unbeknownst to you. (The FBI is already taking advantage of this feature, and the US Commerce Department lists this danger in its Security Guide.) Cellular phone network companies regularly install software in users phones, without asking, to impose new usage restrictions.

With a general computer you can escape by rejecting such programs. You don’t have to have KaZaA, RealPlayer, Adobe Flash, Windows Media Player, Microsoft Windows or MacOS on your computer (I don’t). By contrast, a restricted computer gives you no escape from the software built into it.

The root of this problem, both in general PCs and restricted computers, is software controlled by its developer. The developer (typically a corporation) controls what the program does, and prevents everyone else from changing it. If the developer decides to put in malicious features, even a master programmer cannot easily remove them.

The remedy is to give the users more control, not less. We must insist on free/libre software, software that the users are free to change and redistribute. Free/libre software develops under the control of its users: if they don’t like its features, for whatever reason, they can change them. If you’re not a programmer, you still get the benefit of control by the users. A programmer can make the improvements you would like, and publish the changed version. Then you can use it too.