In this sense, an ontology, however clumsy and ingenuous it may be, is the local representation of a portion of encyclopedic knowledge relevant for the purposes of a given universe of discourse.
1.8. Ontologies and Semiosic Creativity
It appears that, if we are to understand a text or the meaning of a word, we need an underlying ontology, as is shown in the example illustrated in Figure 1.18. In the same way, it seems obvious that if the encyclopedia, as Leibniz already opined, is a body subject to a constant process of renewal and expansion, many expressions produced in the context of a given culture can contribute toward changing the current encyclopedia. The contentions of Copernicus, for instance, and later those of Galileo and Kepler noticeably modified the encyclopedia of the modern world (which from that moment on did not stop citing the theories of Ptolemy but placed an asterisk in front of them to show they were mistaken).
But, alongside these cases of scientific innovation, or transformation of common sense, there are cases of artistic creativity in which a new text requires—if it is to be understood in all its innovative aspects—that our encyclopedia be modified.
1.8.1. Metaphor as a Tool for Producing New Ontologies
In this historical rereading of the adventures of the encyclopedia we must once again return to Aristotle, to consider an aspect of his thought that has apparently nothing to do with the history of definitions, either dictionary or encyclopedic. We are talking about his theory of metaphor.
What makes Aristotle’s theory of metaphor interesting for us today is not simply the fact that it is the first rigorous discussion of this trope, but above all the fact that this first theorization of metaphor does not consider it as a mere ornament of discourse but assigns it a cognitive function.34
The key suggestion in the Poetics is to be found in 1459a 8, where the author declares that metaphor is the best of all the tropes because understanding metaphor means “knowing how to recognize similarity” or “the related concept.” The verb he uses is theorein, which means to perceive, to investigate, to compare, to judge. It is then clearly a verbum cognoscendi. Aristotle gives examples of banal metaphors, such as those from genus to species (there lies my ship) or from species to genus (Verily ten thousand noble deeds hath Odysseus wrought), but he already lists metaphors that are more interesting poetically when he speaks of the metaphor from species to species (with blade of bronze drew away the life). As for the metaphor by analogy he appears to be listing expressions that are already quite solidly codified such as the shield of Dionysus (god of wine) for the cup and the cup of Mars (god of war) for the shield or the evening as the old age of the day. But he identifies an effective and original poetic expression in sowing the god-created light, said of the sun, perhaps by Pindar, and he likewise appreciates a quasi-riddle like a man I saw who on another man had glued the bronze by aid of fire, said of the suction cup or cupping glass. These are cases in which the poetic invention leads us to investigate the similarity, suggested, but not immediately evident.
The relevant passages in the third book of the Rhetoric are far more in number. What arouses wonder (to thaumaston) is pleasing; metaphor manifests itself (phainesthai) when we examine (skopein) a possible correspondence or analogy. The talent for metaphor is not something that can be learned from others, and therefore it is not a matter of mere imitation but of invention. The examples he gives of analogy are not in the least banal, as in the famous example (1405a) in which pirates refer to themselves as “purveyors.” The rhetorical move is persuasive because it insinuates that the plunderer and the merchant share a characteristic in common, since both of them facilitate the transfer of goods from a source to the consumer. The identification of the characteristic they share (in addition to being brazen) is daring, because other discordant characteristics, such as the opposition between a peaceful means and a violent one, are narcotized, but it is undeniably ingenious and provokes surprise, encouraging us to reconsider the role of the pirate in the economy of the Mediterranean.
Aristotle declares that metaphors should be drawn from things that are not evident, just as in philosophy the sagacious mind recognizes, discovers, perceives (theorein) similarities between distant things (1412a 12). On the other hand, in 1405b he says that metaphors imply enigmas. When, apropos of the asteia (1410b 6 et seq.), he says that the poet calls old age kalámen or “a withered stalk,” he specifies that such a metaphor is productive of a knowledge (gnosis) through their common genus, inasmuch as both belong to the genus of things that have lost their bloom. Elegant enthymemes are those which help us learn in a new and rapid way and, in this as in other cases, the verbum cognoscendi used is manthanein, to learn. Those enthymemes are efficacious that are understood little by little as they are spoken and were previously unknown, or those we understand only at the end. In such cases we say that gnosis gínetai (“knowledge comes to be”). Moreover, the obvious metaphor, which is not at all striking, is rejected. When the metaphor makes us see things the opposite from the way we thought they were, it becomes evident that we have learned something, and our mind seems to say: “That’s the way it was, and I was mistaken about it.”
Metaphors, then, “put the thing before our eyes” (to poiein to pragma pro ommaton). This notion of “putting something before our eyes” is repeated several other times in the text, and Aristotle appears to insist on it with conviction: a metaphor is not a mere transfer but a transfer that is immediate in its evidence—but clearly unfamiliar, unexpected, thanks to which things are seen in action (1410b 34), or better, signified in action.
As for the many examples provided by the text, especially those that concern similes (1406b 20 et seq.), it is certainly difficult to say whether they may have sounded bold to the ears of Aristotle’s contemporaries, but all of them appear to be examples of original witticisms. The same can be said of the passage on the asteia (1411b 22). All the examples are provocative and so little used previously that they are attributed to a specific author. To call triremes painted millstones and taverns the mess-rooms of Attica is a fine way to show something in a new light.
But what is it that metaphor as a cognitive mechanism makes us see in a fresh light? Things themselves, or the way we were accustomed to seeing (and representing) things?
It appears that it is only in contemporary culture that we have realized that, in order to be understood, metaphors often require us to reorganize our categories. As Black (1979: 39–40) remarks, “some metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor production helps to constitute. But that is no longer surprising if one believes that the world is necessarily a world under a certain description—or a world seen from a certain perspective. Certain metaphors can create such a perspective.”35
Still, when Aristotle said that the invention of an effective metaphor “puts before our eyes” for the first time an unfamiliar relationship between two things, he meant that metaphor compels us to reorganize our knowledge and our opinions. Let us return to the Rhetoric (1405a) and the metaphor by which pirates are said to be purveyors or suppliers. Now, before the appearance of this metaphor there was nothing to associate an honest merchant who acquires, transports by ship, and resells his merchandise with a pirate who steals someone else’s merchandise. The astuteness of the metaphor consists in compelling us to identify a hierarchical organization of property that, on a lower level, distinguishes a violent action from a pacific one, but, on the higher level, lumps together genera and species of those who transport merchandise upon the sea. In this way the metaphor unexpectedly suggests a socially useful role for the pirate, at the same time leading us to suspect that there may be something not altogether above board about the transactions of the merchant. In this way, the categorical field becomes reorganized no longer on the basis of moral or legal considerations but on the basis of economic activity.