He’d also learned to do his homework; he wasn’t walking into this meeting unprepared. He’d spent most of the last hour reading through National Intelligence Estimates and briefing books and even some raw intel on the crisis du jour.
Intelligence intercepts had determined days ago that North Korea was fueling a long-range rocket, a version of its most advanced ICBM, and moving it to its launch pad. They were clearly prepping to launch, likely for a test because their earlier launches of the device had all been unsuccessful. This new test had, quite understandably, caused concern at the White House, and Ryan had been boning up on the North Koreans’ technology before the meeting.
As soon as Ryan sat down he said, “I got word the agenda for today’s meeting has been changed, so I guess that means the DPRK launched.”
SecDef Bob Burgess nodded. “Yes, sir.”
Ryan sighed. “Give me the details.”
“Colonel Richard Ward from DIA will brief us, Mr. President.”
A tall, thin Army colonel in his forties stood up at the far end of the table. In his hand he held a laser pointer and in front of him was a folio with the seal of his organization, the Defense Intelligence Agency. Sitting next to Ward, a female DIA major controlled with her tablet computer the map and graphics on a large plasma screen on the far wall. The screen showed the entire Korean Peninsula at first, but quickly it zoomed in on the DPRK.
Ward said, “Good afternoon, Mr. President. At twenty-two hundred hours yesterday North Korean time, some six hours ago here in Washington, the DPRK launched an Unha-3, or Galaxy-3 rocket from their Dongchang-dong Launch Station in the northwestern part of the country. This facility is also known as Sohae Satellite Launching Station.”
The screen next showed the hundred-foot-long rocket. “As you are aware, sir, the DPRK claims the Unha-3 is a space launch vehicle, and while this is technically accurate, it is merely an expendable carrier rocket and therefore virtually identical to the DPRK’s most advanced but as yet unproven ICBM, the Taepodong-2.”
Ryan did know all of this. The colonel seemed a little eager and earnest, not intentionally patronizing his President but perhaps unaware of the fact Ryan made a point to know as much of this material as possible as part of his job.
Ryan waved a hand. “Right. Any sat launch over there is just cover to test an ICBM. The Unha-3 is more than big enough to carry a nuke, and the range estimates say it could deliver a payload as far as Northern California.”
“That’s correct, Mr. President. If the North Koreans have successfully managed to miniaturize a nuclear device. We haven’t been able to confirm they have perfected the technology yet, but we suspect they have. The Unha-3 carries a hundred-kilo payload, and you can pack a lot of power into a hundred-kilo device if you have mastered the technology to miniaturize it.”
“Or if you have stolen the technology,” Ryan said.
The colonel nodded, though he looked a bit off balance by the comment, because it wasn’t part of his briefing.
“Please continue, Colonel Ward,” the President said.
The screen now showed a graphic representation of the launch, and the separation of the first stage of the rocket/missile. “We had a number of sensors in place to track the launch. Measurement and signature intelligence assets. From this we have put together what happened after the rocket cleared the launch pad. The first stage burned for approximately two minutes, burnout took place at one hundred twenty kilometers altitude over the east coastline of North Korea above the city of Tanchon, and there was good separation. The second-stage burnout occurred at three hundred fifty kilometers over the Sea of Japan. The rocket then apparently malfunctioned before third-stage separation, there was a catastrophic failure, and it crashed into the Sea of Japan, eighty miles west of Sapporo.”
Ryan was more than pleased by the failure, but he knew the diplomatic fallout from Japan would be near equal to the nuclear yield of the device if it had been armed.
Scott Adler was thinking the same thing. “I’m sure Tokyo isn’t too thrilled about the wreckage coming so close to their mainland.”
Jay Canfield replied, “I’ll bet they are pissed. As far as I’m concerned, though, that’s better than it plowing into Seattle or San Fran.”
Ryan continued to address Ward. “Any idea what went wrong?”
“MASINT, that’s measurement and signature intelligence, detected an abnormal flare after second-stage burnout but before separation. We will be running tests for some time, but it looks like it was something we call a ‘staging failure.’ It is not uncommon, especially for the DPRK. The last time they launched an Unha-3 they lost it at first-stage separation, so this time they got a little further.”
“What was the duration of the flare?” Ryan asked.
The colonel was obviously surprised by the question. He looked down to his sheet, then quickly began shuffling papers in front of him. The major sitting at her iPad scurried a bit as well, before finding what she was looking for. She pushed a page to Colonel Ward.
“Sorry for the delay, Mr. President. The flare lasted approximately two seconds.”
Ryan made a face. “That sounds a little short to be a staging failure, doesn’t it? Normally with stage fail there will be a partial flameout before the explosion. This, to me, sounds like an instantaneous detonation. Maybe the ground control center saw the rocket wasn’t going to make it into orbit for some other reason so they aborted. Just pushed a button and blew the ICBM up in flight. Does the Unha-3 have a flight termination system?”
Colonel Ward looked at some more papers. “Uh… we actually do not know the answer to that, Mr. President. Their mid-range ballistic missiles do not have flight termination systems, but this ICBM is much larger, so we think they might.”
“They might?” Ryan asked. This wasn’t the kind of intelligence briefing he liked getting. And from the look on Ward’s face, this wasn’t the type of intelligence briefing the colonel liked giving.
“I’m sorry, sir. We don’t have any hard intelligence that answers the question, one way or the other.”
“The Russians have flight term systems on their mid-range and larger ICBMs, and so do the Chinese. Right?”
“That is correct, Mr. President.”
“Well… the North Koreans are basing their systems off of Russian and Chinese technology, so it should follow they have a similar setup.”
Ward did not reply.
“Yes or no, Colonel Ward?”
“Well… yes. But…”
“But what?”
“But the North Koreans have taken significant shortcuts with other aspects of the systems they copy. It’s possible they did not put any flight termination systems on their Unha-3. We just cannot make a determination with the raw intel we have on the matter.”
Ryan was dissatisfied, but he changed gears. “Okay. For some reason the missile failed. Let’s talk about what happens next time, when it succeeds. Where are we on determining the efficiency of their nuclear weapons?”
Ward thought he was on firmer ground here. “They have a stockpile of around fifty kilos of weapons-grade plutonium, most of which is disbursed in the existing weapons. They also have uranium enrichment facilities. They have one overt facility at Yongbyon, but we are virtually certain that is just a cover location to show their interest in uranium is for peaceful purposes. They have other clandestine facilities, but the location and efficiency of these are uncertain.” He frowned. “Another function of our poor intelligence out of the country.”