At the heart of this selectivity was Al-Wahhab’s interpretation of jihad. Following Ibn Taymiyya’s lead, he dismissed as inauthentic the Prophet’s declaration of an end to the lesser jihad and the beginning of the greater. This proclamation finds no place either in the Book of Unity or in Al-Wahhab’s other key publication, Kitab al-Jihad, the Book of Struggle. Its author recognised the purpose of jihad to be the defence of Islam and the Islamic community – but for him, as for Ibn Taymiyya, that defence took only one form: violence against all who stood in Islam’s way. Polytheists and pagans were to be given one opportunity to convert, and became fair game thereafter. If they refused to submit or resisted they were to be killed, and if they were made prisoner and still refused to submit they should still be killed, although certain categories such as women, children, the elderly and slaves (and mullahs) might be spared. As for those who called themselves Muslims but were deviants and apostates who failed to acknowledge their falsehoods, they were to be shown no mercy. On the other hand, those who heeded and followed Imam Al-Wahhab’s teachings became sanctified warriors or, in his own words, ‘the army of God’. It became their duty to make jihad at least once a year as ordered by their Imam. This jihad could only take place by his specific order, and on his terms.
It has been argued recently on the basis of a study of Al-Wahhab’s writings preserved in Riyadh that the violence which characterised Wahhabism was the work of his successors and not promoted by the man himself. His writings do indeed show that Al-Wahhab always gave his neighbours an opportunity to convert before the Wahhabi ghazu were unleashed on them, and that when it suited him or when his neighbours were too powerful he made non-aggression pacts with them. Hitler applied much the same philosophy. What these writings also demonstrate is that the Wahhabi interpretation of jihad followed the selective trail first marked by Ibn Taymiyya. Nowhere in either the Book of Unity or the Book of Struggle is there to be found a single example of the many verses in the Quran that refer to non-violent means of defending Islam or propagating the faith, or which place specific restrictions on fighting (e.g., chapters and verses 2,109; 2,190; 2,194; 5,13; 6,106; 15, 94; 16,125; 22, 39-40; 29, 46; 42,15; 50,39; etc.). In the Book of Struggle Al-Wahhab turns for authority to just four verses from the Quran, precisely those verses most frequently cited by past militants such as Ibn Taymiyya and by present Islamist extremists whenever the call to jihad goes out. These include the much-quoted and much-abused ‘Verse of the Sword’ (chapter 9, verse 5), usually only quoted in part. The full verse reads: ‘Then, when the sacred months are over, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, take them [as captives], besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every point of observation. If they repent afterwards, perform the prayer and pay the alms, then release them. God is truly All-Forgiving, Merciful.’ In none of these four instances is reference made to the specific circumstances in which the Prophet originally dictated his statements. In the case of the Verse of the Sword, scholars of the Quran will point out that the whole chapter relates to the ending of a truce with non-believers that the Prophet Muhammad and his followers had entered into, and that the verse should not be read in isolation. But then, literal and selective reading lies at the heart of fundamentalism, whether Muslim, Christian, Jewish or Hindu.
In 1766 Muhammad ibn Saud was assassinated while at prayer and was succeeded as emir by his son Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud. The new emir built on and added to his father’s military successes – with his father-in-law at his elbow as both spiritual and tactical godfather. Even those biographies which extol his saintly virtues make it plain that Imam Al-Wahhab saw his duties as extending into the battlefield. He introduced firearms where the Bedouin had previously relied on the spear and the scimitar and he personally taught recruits how to handle this new weaponry. He also issued every holy warrior a firman or written order addressed to the gate-keeper of heaven, requiring him to be admitted forthwith as a martyr should he die in battle. The cult of martyrdom in Islam is traditionally associated with the Shias, arising from Imam Hussein’s seeking of martyrdom at Karbala. Now under the Wahhabis the prospect of dying in battle as a shahid or martyr became a powerful motivating factor, a consummation devoutly to be wished. Thus Emir Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud’s jihadis found themselves in a win-win situation: if they triumphed in battle they gained material benefits; if they were vanquished they went directly to Paradise.
Like the Pathans in their mountains, the Bedouin had always turned their hostile environment to their advantage. ‘Hunger, thirst and fatigue are the Wahabis’ natural allies,’ noted Louis de Corancez:
They have no discipline in combat, and are wary of engaging the enemy before he is weak enough to have lost the will to defend himself. Thus they pillage rather than wage war. They waver at the first sign of resistance, and are as speedy in fleeing from the enemy’s range as in pursuing him from beyond it. They cling to this course of action tenaciously, fleeing the enemy when he faces them and following in his steps when he in turn takes flight. Thus they spy on him for days on end, awaiting the opportunity to surprise and slaughter him without great danger, convinced that the finest victory lies in destroying everything without incurring any loses themselves.
The young emir and his older imam together improved upon this hit-and-run mode of warfare by inculcating a new sense of discipline among their soldiers, teaching them to make better use of the skills they already possessed: ‘Ibn Saud ordered that each dromedary should be mounted by two soldiers. He rationed not only the soldiers’ food, but also that of the camels, so that each was able to carry rations for a twenty-day journey… The two riders carry nothing except two goatskins, the one filled with water, the other with barley flour. When they become hungry they mix the flour in a little water. This is their only sustenance for weeks… Henceforth many armies were able to scour the desert and take their defenceless enemies by surprise.’ All these warriors were tribal levies, but three hundred of the best were selected to form a permanent force under the emir’s personal command. They were given fast horses, weapons and armour as well as other special privileges, and they became the vanguard of the Wahhabi ghazu or war party.
As his spiritual mentor grew older Emir Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud assumed greater authority, enforcing his father-in-law’s hard-line teaching with ever-increasing ruthlessness. According to Burckhardt, every non-Wahhabi tribe was first given the option to convert, and if its people refused they were condemned as meshrekin or heretics: ‘The Wahaby (as Ibn Saud, the chief, is emphatically styled) propagates his religion with the sword. Whenever he purposes to attack a district of heretics, he cautions them three times, and invites them to adopt his religion; after the third summons, he proclaims that the time for pardon has elapsed, and he then allows his troops to pillage and kill at their pleasure. All who are taken with arms are unmercifully put to death. This savage custom has inspired the Wahabys with a ferocious fanaticism that makes them dreadful to their adversaries.’ De Corancez confirms this ruthless approach to conversion: