Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs and Steeclass="underline" A short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years . 1997 my own book scans preserved
In this Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Jared Diamond argues that both geography and the environment played major roles in determining the shape of the modern world. This argument runs counter to the usual theories that cite biology as the crucial factor. Diamond claims that the cultures that were first able to domesticate plants and animals were then able to develop writing skills, as well as make advances in the creation of government, technology, weaponry, and immunity to disease
PRIVATE Prologue: Yali's Question: The regionally differing courses of history 13
Ch. 1 Up to the Starting Line: What happened on all the continents before 11,000 B.C.? 35
Ch. 2 A Natural Experiment of History: How geography molded societies on Polynesian islands 53
Ch. 3 Collision at Cajamarca: Why the Inca emperor Atahuallpa did not capture King Charles I of Spain 67
Ch. 4 Farmer Power: The roots of guns, germs, and steel 85
Ch. 5 History's Haves and Have-Nots: Geographic differences in the onset of food production 93
Ch. 6 To Farm or Not to Farm: Causes of the spread of food production 104
Ch. 7 How to Make an Almond: The unconscious development of ancient crops 114
Ch. 8 Apples or Indians: Why did peoples of some regions fail to domesticate plants? 131
Ch. 9 Zebras, Unhappy Marriages, and the Anna Karenina Principle: Why were most big wild mammal species never domesticated? 157
Ch. 10 Spacious Skies and Tilted Axes: Why did food production spread at different rates on different continents? 176
Ch. 11 Lethal Gift of Livestock: The evolution of germs 195
Ch. 12 Blueprints and Borrowed Letters: The evolution of writing 215
Ch. 13 Necessity's Mother: The evolution of technology 239
Ch. 14 From Egalitarianism to Kleptocracy: The evolution of government and religion 265
Ch. 15 Yali's People: The histories of Australia and New Guinea 295
Ch. 16 How China became Chinese: The history of East Asia 322
Ch. 17 Speedboat to Polynesia: The history of the Austronesian expansion 334
Ch. 18 Hemispheres Colliding: The histories of Eurasia and the Americas compared 354
Ch. 19 How Africa became Black: The history of Africa 376
Epilogue: The Future of Human History as a Science 403
Acknowledgments 427
Further Readings 429
Credits 459
Index 461
PREFACE
why Is world history like an onion?
THIS BOOK ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE A SHORT HISTORY OF EVERYbody for the last 13,000 years. The question motivating the book is: Why did history unfold differently on different continents? In case this question immediately makes you shudder at the thought that you are about to read a racist treatise, you aren't; as you will see, the answers to the question don't involve human racial differences at all. The book's emphasis is on the search for ultimate explanations, and on pushing back the chain of historical causation as far as possible.
Most books that set out to recount world history concentrate on histories of literate Eurasia and North African societies. Native societies of other parts of the world—sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, Island Southeast Asia, Australia, New Guinea, the Pacific Islands—receive only brief treatment, mainly as concerns what happened to them very late in their history, after they were discovered and subjugated by western Europeans. Even within Eurasia, much more space gets devoted to the history of western Eurasia than of China, India, Japan, tropical Southeast Asia, and other eastern Eurasian societies. History before the emergence of writing around 3,000 b.c. also receives brief treatment, although it constitutes 99.9% of the five-million-year history of the human species.
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Such narrowly focused accounts of world history suffer from three disadvantages. First, increasing numbers of people today are, quite understandably, interested in other societies besides those of western Eurasia. After all, those "other" societies encompass most of the world's population and the vast majority of the world's ethnic, cultural, and liguistic groups. Some of them already are, and others are becoming, among the world's most powerful economies and political forces.
Second, even for people specifically interested in the shaping of the modern world, a history limited to developments since the emergence of writing cannot provide deep understanding. It is not the case that societies on the different continents were comparable to each other until 3,000 b.c., whereupon western Eurasian societies suddenly developed writing and began for the first time to pull ahead in other respects as well. Instead, already by 3,000 b.c., there were Eurasian and North African societies not only with incipient writing but also with centralized state governments, cities, widespread use of metal tools and weapons, use of domesticated animals for transport and traction and mechanical power, and reliance on agriculture and domestic animals for food. Throughout most or all parts of other continents, none of those things existed at that time; some but not all of them emerged later in parts of the Native Americas and sub-Saharan Africa, but only over the course of the next five millenia; and none of them emerged in Aboriginal Australia. That should already warn us that the roots of western Eurasian dominance in the modern world lie in the preliterate past before 3,000 b.c. (By western Eurasian dominance, I mean the dominance of western Eurasian societies themselves and of the societies that they spawned on other continents.)
Third, a history focused on western Eurasian societies completely bypasses the obvious big question. Why were those societies the ones that became disproportionately powerful and innovative? The usual answers to that question invoke proximate forces, such as the rise of capitalism, mercantilism, scientific inquiry, technology, and nasty germs that killed peoples of other continents when they came into contact with western Eurasians. But why did those ingredients of conquest arise in western Eurasia, and arise elsewhere only to a lesser degree or not at all?
All those ingredients are just proximate factors, not ultimate explanations. Why didn't capitalism flourish in Native Mexico, mercantil-
WHY ISWORLDHISTORY LIKE AN ONION? • I I
ism in sub-Saharan Africa, scientific inquiry in China, advanced technology in Native North America, and nasty germs in Aboriginal Australia? If one responds by invoking idiosyncratic cultural factors—e.g., scientific inquiry supposedly stifled in China by Confucianism but stimulated in western Eurasia by Greek of Judaeo-Christian traditions—then one is continuing to ignore the need for ultimate explanations: why didn't traditions like Confucianism and the Judaeo-Christian ethic instead develop in western Eurasia and China respectively? In addition, one is ignoring the fact that Confucian China was technologically more advanced that western Eurasia until about a.d. 1400.
It is impossible to understand even just western Eurasian societies themselves, if one focuses on them. The interesting questions concern the distinctions between them and other societies. Answering those questions requires us to understand all those other societies as well, so that western Eurasian societies can be fitted into the broader context.
Some readers may feel that I am going to the opposite extreme from conventional histories, by devoting too little space to western Eurasia at the expense of other parts of the world. I would answer that some other parts of the world are very instructive, because they encompass so many societies and such diverese societies within a small geographical area. Other readers may find themselves agreeing with one reviewer of this book. With mildly critical tongue in cheek, the reviewer wrote that I seem to view world history as an onion, of which the modern world constitutes only the surface, and whose layers are to be peeled back in the search for historical understanding. Yes, world history is indeed such an onion! But that peeling back of the onion's layers is fascinating, challenging—and of overwhelming importance to us today, as we seek to grasp our past's lessons for our future.
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