Neither Wolff nor Langbehn was actually present at the interview, of which two accounts survive. The first is that given in the subsequent indictment of Langbehn and Popitz, and is therefore strictly slanted to conceal Himmler’s part in the matter; only Popitz’s very vague statements are given and no word is included of what Himmler may have said. Popitz, according to the terms of the indictment, expressed his anxiety at the corruption in high places, the inefficiency of the administration, and the impossibility of winning the war so long as Hitler, though admittedly a genius, remained in absolute power. The chances of promoting a negotiated peace should be explored, but this was not possible unless the Führer was ‘surrounded by men with whom negotiations could be undertaken’. Such conditions would definitely exclude Ribbentrop. Popitz then mentioned the kind of persons he had in mind for the leadership of the Army and the Foreign Office. It was left that another conversation should be arranged at a later date. Meanwhile, in the ante-room, Langbehn expressed his fears to Wolff that Popitz would not be sufficiently outspoken to Himmler, and said that on the next occasion he wanted to be present himself. The other account of this meeting was that given by Popitz himself to a friend called Zahler a few days later. Himmler had said little, he told Zahler, but had not opposed the suggestion of negotiations being conducted without Hitler’s knowledge.25
Langbehn then left for Switzerland to pass on the good news to his contacts in neutral territory. It was then, at this moment of cautious optimism, that the sword of Damocles overhanging every conspirator against Hitler, fell on the neck of Langbehn. As Schellenberg put it: ‘A radio message about Dr Langbehn’s negotiations with Allied representatives in Switzerland was intercepted, and the fact that Dr Langbehn had my blessing in this completely unofficial undertaking was mentioned, as well as Kersten’s part in furthering these negotiations. Kaltenbrunner and Mueller immediately arranged for a secret investigation, but Kersten’s influence with Himmler saved me from disaster.’
The interception of this radio message (which, according to Dulles, was neither British nor American in origin) meant that Himmler and Schellenberg were forced to sacrifice Langbehn, though Popitz, strangely enough, remained free until after the attempt on Hitler’s life the following year. However, it seems that Langbehn was able to secure a meeting with Himmler before his arrest by the Gestapo following his return from Switzerland. Evidence for this meeting, which must have taken place before Schellenberg and Himmler had learned about the interception of the message, rests solely on Langbehn himself, who told his friend the sculptress Puppi Sarre ‘that he had touched on the elimination of Hitler only in passing, that Himmler had been quite serious, had asked factual questions, but had not tried to find out any names’. But Himmler could do nothing now but protect himself and Schellenberg, whom Kaltenbrunner and Mueller were now only too ready to denounce as a British agent. Langbehn was arrested, along with his wife and Puppi Sarre.
Himmler, however, won a victory elsewhere. This was the final collapse early in 1944 of Canaris’s department for military Intelligence in foreign countries, the Abwehr. It came as a direct result of the arrest of another anti-Nazi group centred round the widow of Dr Wilhelm Solf, a former German ambassador in Japan and a man of liberal, as distinct from right-wing, outlook. Solf, who hated the Nazis and did not fear to say so, had died in 1936 and his wife, Frau Hanna Solf, and her daughter, the Countess Ballestrem, maintained this independent outlook and were active helpers of those persecuted by the regime. They formed an intellectual circle of distinguished people, but on 10 September a Gestapo spy called Dr Reckse, who they believed to be a Swiss medical student prepared to take messages to Switzerland, was introduced at a tea-party given by Frau Solf for members of this group. Three months were allowed to elapse before the mass arrest of over seventy anti-Nazis belonging to the liberal wing of the resistance, including Otto Kiep, formerly of the German Foreign Office, and Helmuth von Moltke, who belonged to the legal section of the Abwehr. Attempts were also made to inveigle two other Abwehr agents, Erich and Elizabeth Vermehren, who were close friends of Kiep in Berlin, to return from their base in Istanbul for interrogation. Knowing of Otto Kiep’s arrest, they sought asylum with the British, and were flown to Cairo.26
Hitler was now strongly advised by Himmler to dispense with the Abwehr, since it seemed so persistently to be staffed by intellectuals who were opposed to the regime. On 18 February 1944 Hitler broke up the organization and announced that the German Intelligence Service was to be unified. Later in the year the various sections of the Abwehr came finally under the authority of the Gestapo and the S.D., and in May Himmler gave one of his standardized speeches at Salzburg to the principals of Canaris’s former department. He derided the very term Abwehr as defensive, whereas a truly German Intelligence service, he said, should obviously be aggressive. The inspiration of the Führer made defeatism impossible; Himmler even went so far as to welcome the idea of invasion because it would enable Hitler’s armies to drown the invaders ‘in the seas of their own blood’. D-Day came two weeks later.
Canaris was not immediately disgraced by the collapse of the Abwehr. He was transferred and made chief of the Office for Commercial and Economic Warfare, a suitably remote position for a man who was too involved in well-meaning personal intrigue to be an efficient master either of spies for the Nazis or agents for the resistance. The Abwehr had been a failure, staffed by amateurs and used as a convenient cover by a number of members of the resistance, such as the Pastors Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Bethge, Hans Bernd Gisevius, Otto John and Josef Müller. ‘His subordinates were able to twist him round their little finger’, wrote Schellenberg of Canaris, whose company he always enjoyed in spite of their dubious official relationship. A vast dossier against Canaris had been built up over the years against the time when Himmler should decide on the destruction of this man he professed to admire. The long delay in taking action led Schellenberg, the expert in suspicion, to sense that Canaris had some secret hold over Himmler. He was allowed to continue unassailed until after the attempt on Hitler’s life in July, when Schellenberg was sent to arrest him.
Langbehn remained imprisoned without trial until after the attempt on Hitler’s life the following year; he was the subject of speculation alike by the Nazis and the members of the resistance. Popitz’s attempt to enquire after his fate from Himmler met with no success, and Popitz himself was regarded with suspicion by many members of the resistance who knew in any case that he was dangerous because he was being closely watched. Interrogation recurred month after month, duly noted by Hassell, but it was in Himmler’s interest to keep the enquiries as obscure as possible. At least at this stage Langbehn was not tortured, and this could only have been the result of orders from Himmler.
Early in November 1943, Himmler had a long conversation with Goebbels in which they agreed that Ribbentrop’s inflexible foreign policy was deplorable, and they joined in the usual diatribe against the High Command. Then Himmler began to whitewash his own position with regard to the resistance; he told Goebbels all about the existence of a group of enemies of the State, among whom were Halder and possibly also Popitz. This circle, he said, would like to contact England, by-passing the Führer. Himmler must have aquitted himself welclass="underline" ‘Himmler will see to it that these gentlemen do no major damage with their cowardly defeatism’, wrote Goebbels. ‘I certainly have the impression that the domestic security of the country is in good hands with Himmler.’