Wedged between the Russian and Chinese empires, unable to break through the stagnant but solid Ottoman and Ṣafavid barriers, the Turkish nomads of the steppe lying east of the Volga and the Caspian Sea and south of Russian-occupied Siberia found themselves caught in a trap from which there was no escape. If there is cause for surprise, it lies in the lateness rather than in the fact of the ultimate Russian conquest. Denis Sinor Gavin R.G. Hambly
West of the Uzbek khanates, between the Aral and Caspian seas, were the nomad Turkmen, notorious robbers who roamed the inhospitable land. The Kazakhs, who during the 17th century divided into three “hordes,” roamed between the Volga and the Irtysh. During the 16th and 17th centuries they fought Oirat and Dzungars but succeeded in holding their own, and in 1771 Ablai, ruler of the “Middle Horde,” located west of Lake Balkhash, was confirmed as ruler by both China and Russia. Yet Russian expansion, motivated by the urge to get closer to the Indian Ocean, forced the Kazakhs to yield. Although some Kazakh leaders, such as the sultan Kinesary, put up spirited resistance (1837–47), the line of the Syr Darya was reached by the Russians toward the middle of the 19th century.
The Uzbek khanate of Kokand was annexed in 1876; those of Khiva and Bukhara became Russian protectorates in 1873 and 1868, respectively. The conquest of the Turkmen in the last quarter of the 19th century defined Russia’s (now Turkmenistan’s) southern frontier with Iran and Afghanistan. Under Russian rule
The Russian conquests in Central Asia had given the tsars control of a vast area of striking geographic and human diversity, acquired at relatively little effort in terms of men and money. The motives for the conquest had not been primarily economic; peasant colonization of the virgin steppes and the systematic cultivation of cotton were later developments. The factors that determined the Russian advance into the area were complex and interrelated. They included the historic pull of the frontier, the thirst for military glory on the part of the officer corps, and the fear of further British penetration into Central Asia from across the Indus River, as well as the infectious rhetoric of imperialism common to the age.
Russian penetration of western Central Asia in the 19th and 20th centuries.Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.
From the outset, Russia’s objectives as a colonial power were strictly limited: to maintain “law and order” at minimum cost and to disturb as little as possible the traditional way of life of its new subjects. Such an approach was favoured by the remoteness of the area and its isolation even from the rest of the Muslim world. It was improbable that an almost wholly illiterate population, its prejudices formed by a venal and obscurantist ʿulamāʾ (class of Muslim theologians and scholars), could offer any concerted resistance to the Russian presence; and such, indeed, proved to be the case. The Russians, like other colonial powers, did experience an occasional uprising, generally of a very localized character, but the overwhelming military superiority displayed by the Russians at the time of the initial conquest, the inability of the inhabitants of the khanates to offer effective resistance, and the heavy-handedness with which subsequent insurrection or insubordination was dealt ensured minimal opposition. Finally, by preserving the titular sovereignty of the emir of Bukhara and the khan of Khiva, they left a substantial part of the population, especially the urban classes, most deeply devoted to the Islamic way of life, under traditionally minded Muslim rulers. Tsarist rule
Yet the Russians, whether intentionally or not, became agents of change throughout the area in much the same way as any other colonial power. The regional economy was gradually realigned to meet the Russian need for raw materials and new markets. This required the construction of railroads: by 1888 the Trans-Caspian Railroad had reached Samarkand; between 1899 and 1905 the Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad was completed; the Turkistan-Siberian Railroad came later, begun just before World War I and not completed until 1930. In Tashkent and Samarkand new European suburbs were laid out at a distance from the walled native cities, but, as in the case of the newly established garrison towns, such islands of European life required local services and supplies. Nor did the Russians wholly ignore the welfare of their new subjects. An effort was made, halfheartedly at first, to put down the indigenous slave trade, irrigation projects were initiated, and bilingual elementary education was cautiously introduced. As elsewhere in colonial Asia, the work of Russian scholars studying the literature, history, and antiquities of the Central Asian peoples aroused on the part of a numerically small but influential Russian-educated elite, especially among the Kazakhs, nostalgic awareness of a colourful past and a sense of national, or cultural, identity.
Of the major ethnic groups in Central Asia—Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz—the Kazakhs were the first to respond to the impact of Russian culture. Their early contacts with their new masters had in the main been carried out through intermediaries—Kazan Tatars, who, paradoxically, had contributed to strengthening the Kazakhs’ awareness of being part of a greater Muslim world community and their sense of being a “nation” rather than a welter of tribes and clans. Moreover, through the Tatars they were exposed to current Pan-Turkish and Pan-Islamic propaganda. In the 1870s the Russians countered Tatar influence by establishing bilingual Russian-Kazakh schools, from which emerged a Westernized elite of considerable distinction. Kazakh unrest
This “dialogue” between the Russians and Kazakhs was, however, doomed by the government’s policy of settling peasants from European Russia and Ukraine on the Kazakh steppe, where agricultural settlement on an extensive scale could be undertaken only by curtailing the area available for grazing by the nomads’ livestock and by restricting their seasonal migrations. As early as 1867–68 the northwestern fringes of the Kazakh steppe had been the scene of violent protests at the presence of colonists, but it was not until the last decade of the century that the movement got fully under way with the arrival of upward of one million peasants, resulting in the inevitable expropriation of Kazakh grazing grounds and in savage conflict between the Kazakhs and the intruders. Finally in 1916, during World War I, the Kazakhs, driven to desperation by the loss of their lands and by the ruthlessness of the wartime administration, rose up in protest against a decree conscripting the non-Russian subjects of the empire for forced labour. The rebellion assumed the character of a popular uprising, in which many colonists and many more Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were massacred. The revolt was put down with the utmost savagery, and more than 300,000 Kazakhs are said to have sought refuge across the Chinese frontier.
With the collapse of tsarist rule, the Westernized Kazakh elite formed a party, the Alash Orda, as a vehicle through which they could express their aspirations for regional autonomy. Having found during the Russian Civil War that the anticommunist “Whites” were implacably opposed to their aspirations, the Kazakhs cast in their lot with the “Reds.” After the war the Kazakhs were granted their own republic, in which, for the first few years, the leaders of the Alash Orda maintained a fairly dominant position and were active in protecting Kazakh interests. After 1924, however, direct confrontation with the Communist Party became more intense, and in 1927–28 the Alash Orda leaders were liquidated as “bourgeois nationalists.” The history of the Kazakhs in the first half of the 20th century was bleak indeed—expropriation of their grazing lands under the tsars, the bloody uprising and reprisals of 1916, the losses in the civil war and in the famine in 1921, the purges of the intelligentsia in 1927–28, collectivization during the 1930s, and further peasant colonization after World War II.