The military chiefs also focused on the advantages of shifting the war to Scandinavia, where they reasoned that the Germans would need at least 20 divisions while the Allies, with the help of the Swedes and Norwegians, could make do with a much smaller force. It was believed that the German army had only limited reserves of iron ore on hand, and the chiefs concluded that this fact would force the Germans to attack in the west in the near future or to invade Sweden to secure the Swedish ore. Such an action would also require the Germans to invade Norway, and these combined operations would demand resources on a scale that would force them to postpone indefinitely an attack in the west.
The chiefs gave their blessings to the proposed operations in northern Norway and Sweden, and recommended that the first part of the force be dispatched no later than March 1940 in order to secure the mining districts and the port of Luleå before the northern Baltic became navigable. No direct military action was contemplated against the iron ore mines in central Sweden. They were to be made inoperable by sabotage.
The military chiefs’ acquiescence in the operation against northern Scandinavia carried with it several assumptions. It was imperative to obtain the cooperation of the Norwegian and Swedish governments, although such cooperation would place both those nations at odds with Germany and very possibly the Soviet Union as well.
The chiefs expected that an operation against Narvik would cause German counter-action in southern Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian nations would be promised help and this help would come primarily through Trondheim in central Norway. The forces landed there would proceed to Sweden, and in cooperation with that nation’s military, establish a defensive line south of Stockholm. Since a German occupation of southern Norway would place Trondheim within the reach of their air force, it was deemed necessary to also occupy Bergen and Stavanger. It was considered essential to carry out these operations almost simultaneously, and this required much shipping and very large naval forces.
Churchill kept pressing for his more limited option of mining the territorial waters. He presented a five-point plan to the War Cabinet on December 29 calling for quick action, pending execution of Ironside’s more ambitious plan:
1. Send a note to Norway and Sweden promising Allied help in certain circumstances.
2. Notify Norway on January 1 that the British intended to retaliate for the sinking of ships in Norwegian territorial waters.
3. Send a British flotilla to Norway.
4. Begin seizing German ships in Norwegian territorial waters.
5. Take measures against the iron ore facilities in Oxelösund by end of January 1940.
As already stated, Churchill was well aware that the elimination of the iron ore shipments through Norwegian waters would not alone have a severe effect on German war industry. His plans in the fall of 1939 and spring of 1940 were simple. He hoped for a German reaction to interference with their ore shipments. This would provide the Allies with the requisite excuse needed to move into Scandinavia and eliminate the source of iron ore and other valuable supplies for Germany. The northern blockade would be much more effective with British bases on the Norwegian coast. While Churchill hoped that the Scandinavian countries would resist a direct German attack and become part of the Allied camp, he was not overly concerned if, instead, there was a hostile reaction by these countries to British actions and a request from them for German assistance. While the cabinet members were impressed with Churchill’s arguments, they made no decision.
The military Chiefs of Staff, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall as spokesman, advised against Churchill’s proposal on January 2 when they presented the plan they had developed. They reasoned that Churchill’s plan could lead to German countermeasures that would jeopardize the larger project—the seizure of Narvik and the Swedish iron ore districts. This was in accordance with views expressed by Ironside at the War Cabinet meeting on December 22. Furthermore, the army was not prepared to counter a German move against southern Norway. While expressing favor for Churchill’s project, Chamberlain used the Chiefs of Staff’s objections to delay any actions except for the dispatch of a note to Norway.
The minutes of the meeting on January 2 clearly indicate that there was no realistic understanding of possible Swedish, Norwegian, and German reaction to an Allied entry into northern Scandinavia. They also demonstrate lack of under standing for the complexities of operations in a rugged, road less arctic wilder ness. Churchill maintained that Allied forces were sufficient to seize the iron ore districts regardless of Norwegian and Swedish reactions. The Dominions Secretary, Anthony Eden, suggested that 5,000–7,000 Canadians could be available for the operation in March. When it was pointed out that the Canadians were not trained on skis, General Ironside noted that they had snowshoes, and felt that was sufficient. The lack of reality of these and other assumptions by Allied leaders was quickly demonstrated when they sent forces to Norway in April.
Lord Halifax delivered the British diplomatic note to the Norwegian Ambassador in London, Erik Colban, on the evening of January 6. The note used the sinking of one Greek and two British merchant ships in 1939—Thomas Walton on December 8, Garoufalia on December 11, and Deptford on December 13—as examples of Norwegian failures to prevent the misuse of its territorial waters.12 The note, a copy of which was provided to Sweden, stated it would be necessary in the future to permit British warships to operate in Norwegian waters because the Germans had turned them into an operational area.
The Norwegian reaction was stronger than the British had anticipated. The Norwegians viewed the note as the most serious threat yet against their neutrality. They were probably aware that some British officials, Churchill among them, were hoping for a German reaction. In Churchill’s view, the Scandinavian countries were afraid of Germany and they would react favorably to Allied demands only if they were more afraid of them than the Germans. Foreign Minister Koht probably selected his words deliberately when he voiced the suspicion “that the British Government’s goal was to bring Norway into the war.”13 To the Norwegians, the note sounded suspiciously like the unreasonable accusations that sometimes preceded action by major powers. In addition, they felt particularly offended that this note was directed at a nation that had lost many lives and much property bringing supplies and foodstuffs to Great Britain through the German blockade.
The Norwegian government viewed the British threat so seriously that they prevailed on King Håkon VII to send a telegram on January 7 to his nephew, King George VI, asking for his personal intervention. George VI answered that it was necessary in this period for his country to defend its interests. The official Norwegian protest pointed out that British actions of the type threatened would lead to German counter-measures, and that the Norwegian Navy had orders to repel any violations of Norwegian neutrality by all means, regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality.