Germany lies wedged between these States, with completely open borders. What is especially threatening thereby is that the western border of the Reich runs through Germany’s greatest industrial region. This western border, however, in consequence of its length and of the lack of all real natural barriers, offers only a few possibilities for defence by a State whose military means seem most extremely limited. Even the Rhine cannot be viewed as a fully effective line of military resistance. Not only because the possibility of finding the necessary technical preparations for this has been taken away from Germany by the peace treaties, but because the river itself offers even fewer obstacles to the passage of armies with modern equipment than the slight means of German defence which must be dispersed over too long a front. Moreover, this river runs through Germany’s greatest industrial area, and consequently a struggle over it from the outset would mean the destruction of the industrial areas and factories technically most important for national defence. But if in consequence of a French German conflict Czechoslovakia should come under consideration as a further opponent of Germany, a second great industrial region, Saxony, which could be useful industrially for the conduct of the war, would be exposed to the greatest danger of war. Here too the border, without natural defence, runs down to Bavaria, so broadly and openly that the prospect of a resistance promising success can hardly be considered. If Poland also were to take part in such a war, the entire eastern border in addition, apart from a few inadequate fortifications, would be defenceless against attack.
Whereas on the one hand the German borders are militarily indefensible and are surrounded openly in long lines by enemies, our North Sea coast is especially small and confined. The naval power for its defence is laughable, and completely worthless as such. The Fleet which we claim today, beginning with our so called battleships, is at best the finest target material for enemy firing practice. The two newly built ships, light cruisers, modern in themselves, have no decisive value, indeed not even an apparent one. The Fleet we are allowed is inadequate even for the Baltic Sea. All in all, the only value of our Fleet is at most that of a floating gunnery school.
Thus, in case of a conflict with any naval power, not only would German trade be ended in a moment, but there would also be the danger of landings.
The entire unpropitiousness of our military situation stems from this other consideration: Berlin, the Reich’s capital, is barely 175 kilometres from the Polish border. It lies scarcely 190 kilometres from the nearest Czech border, just as far as the distance between Wismar and the Stettin Lagoon as the crow flies.
Thus this means that Berlin can be reached by modern aircraft in less than one hour from these borders. If we draw a line stretching 60 kilometres east of the Rhine River, within it will lie almost the entire western German industrial region. From Frankfurt to Dortmund there is hardly one major German industrial locality which does not lie within this zone. As long as France occupies a part of the left bank of the Rhine, she is in a position to push forward by aircraft into the heart of our western German industrial region in hardly 30 minutes. München is just as far from the Czech borders as Berlin is from the Polish and Czech borders. Czech military aircraft would need approximately 60 minutes to reach München, 40 minutes to Nuremberg, 30 minutes to reach Regensburg; even Augsburg lies only 200 kilometres from the Czech border, and consequently could also be easily reached in scarcely an hour by presentday aeroplanes. As the crow flies, however, Augsburg is almost as distant from the Czech border as it is from the French border. From Augsburg to Straßburg the line of flight is 230 kilometres, but it is only 210 kilometres to the nearest French border. Hence Augsburg also lies within a zone which can be reached by hostile aircraft in an hour. Indeed, if we examine the German border from this point of view, it turns out that within an hour’s flight time the following can be reached: the entire industrial region in western Germany, including Osnabrück, Bielefeld, Kassel, Würzburg, Stuttgart, Ulm, Augsburg. In the east: München, Augsburg, Würzburg, Magdeburg, Berlin, Stettin. In other words, with the present situation of the German borders, there is only a very small area embracing a few square kilometres which could not be visited by hostile aircraft within the first hour.
Hence France must be considered as the most dangerous enemy because she alone, thanks to her alliances, is in a position to be able to threaten almost the whole of Germany with aircraft, even an hour after the outbreak of a conflict.
At the present time, the military counteractions Germany could take against the application of this weapon, all in all, are quite nil.
This single observation already shows the hopeless situation into which a German resistance against France, based only on itself, must land at once. Whoever has himself been often subjected in the field to the effects of an enemy air attack best knows how to appraise especially the moral effects resulting therefrom.
But Hamburg and Bremen, too, in general all our coastal cities, would today no longer escape this fate since the large navies have the possibility of bringing floating landing places very close to the coast by means of aircraft carriers.
But Germany today not only has no technically effective weapons in a sufficient amount to oppose to air attacks. Even otherwise the purely technical equipment of our small Reich Defence is hopelessly inferior to that of our enemy. The lack of heavy artillery might be put up with more easily than the lack of a really promising possibility of defence against armoured tanks. If Germany today were thrust into a war against France and her allies without beforehand being in a position to be able to find at least the most necessary preparations for defence, the issue would be decided in a few days on the basis of the purely technical superiority of our adversaries. Measures required for defence against such a hostile attack could no longer be taken during the struggle itself.
Likewise false is the opinion that we will be able to put up a resistance, at least for a certain time, by improvised means, since these very improvisations already require a certain amount of time which is no longer available in case of a conflict. For events would roll more quickly and thereby produce more facts than there would be time left for us to organise countermeasures against these events.
Hence, from whatever side we consider the possibilities of foreign policy, for Germany one case must in principle be excluded: we will never be able to proceed against the forces now mobilised in Europe by relying only on our military means. Thus any combination which brings Germany into conflict with France, England, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and so on, without beforehand giving her the possibility of a thorough preparation, is therefore void.
This fundamental perception is important because there are still among us in Germany, even today, well meaning, national minded men who in all earnestness believe that we must enter into an association with Russia.
Even if considered only from a purely military point of view, such an idea is unviable or catastrophic for Germany
Just as before the year 1914, today also we can assume as unconditionally established for always that in any conflict involving Germany, regardless on what grounds, regardless for what reasons, France will always be our adversary. Whatever European combinations may emerge in the future, France will always take part in them in a manner hostile to Germany. This lies in the traditionally anchored intention of French foreign policy. It is false to believe that the outcome of the War has changed anything on this score. On the contrary, the World War did not bring about for France the complete fulfilment of the war aim she had in mind. For this aim was by no means only the regaining of Alsace-Lorraine, but, on the contrary, Alsace-Lorraine itself represents only a small step in the direction of the goal of French foreign policy. That the possession of Alsace-Lorraine in no way abolished the tendencies of French policy, aggressively directed against Germany, is most strikingly proved by the fact that at the very time France possessed Alsace-Lorraine, the tendency of French foreign policy directed against Germany was, nevertheless, already in existence. The year 1870 showed more clearly than the year 1914 what France ultimately intended. At that time no need was felt to veil the aggressive character of French foreign policy. In the year 1914, perhaps made wise by experiences, perhaps also influenced by England, the French considered it more correct to profess general ideals of humanity on the one hand, and to limit their aim to Alsace-Lorraine on the other. These tactical considerations, however, did not in the least signify an inner deflection from the former goals of French policy, but only a concealment of the same. Afterward, as before, the leading idea of French foreign policy was the conquest of the Rhine River borders, whereby the mutilation of Germany into individual States, linked as loosely as possible to each other, was viewed as the best defence of this border. That this safeguarding of France in Europe, achieved thereby, was to serve the fulfilment of greater world political aims, does not alter the fact that for Germany these French continental political intentions are a question of life and death.