Was he fit to replace him? If he had been asked by anyone other than Justinian, Flavius would have replied in the affirmative. He had much to boast of: had he not been promoted to the rank of decanus in Vitalian’s rebel army, given command of men twice his age and more, when no more than a callow youth and after only serving for a short period?
With every action he had engaged in since, the pacification of insurrection, the question of the effectiveness of his personal leadership had never arisen and if he had been forced into an ignominious retreat in Armenia then that had been under the command of Sittas, who had never once sought the opinion of his junior commanders.
Justinian obvious sensed the unspoken concerns. ‘I trust you, Flavius, that is all you need.’
‘Highness.’
‘I do think it would be fitting,’ Justinian said in a slightly wounded tone, ‘to thank me.’
The arrangements made for the eastern border seemed to be a mix of pragmatic moves and political expediency. Hypatius was named as magister militum per Orientem, giving him overall authority for the borders of Asia Minor, no doubt necessary to quiet what might prove a troublesome faction within a senate testing out the will of a new emperor.
The sons of the murdered Vitalian, who had on the accession sent immediate pledges of loyalty without reference to the fate of their father, would be not only kept in the offices but would be afforded a chance to distinguish themselves under the leadership of the new dux Mesopotamiae.
The overall strategy was offensive. Since Dara had proved advantageous in holding the central part of the border, it seemed to Justinian sensible to seek to construct more forts, albeit funds did not exist for the construction of places of the same size and strength. Flavius was given orders to begin construction at Minduous to the north of Dara, the first of a planned string of fortified and garrisoned places by which the empire could hold its territory without the need for the constant raising of armies.
But first the Lakhmids had to be dealt with; allies of Kavadh, they had been raiding to the south of Dara, issuing from their own tribal lands to burn and plunder, and they required to be stopped, which had the added advantage of distraction. With an army entering Kavadh’s domains, threatening to chastise a confederate tribe, the Sassanids would be obliged to face that threat.
CHAPTER TWELVE
On taking over at Dara the new man discovered how different it was to command an army than to control a smaller military group. This was obvious from the first day and one that deteriorated as the men he was set to lead began to arrive, for Justinian had sent him to the frontier with no staff. Flavius had assumed the need would be met by those people who had served his dead predecessor but he had controlled only a static garrison that engaged in occasional patrols, not a force that aimed to blunt a Sassanid incursion and that was a very different beast.
Feeding and seeing to their supply requirements while within the confines of the fortress was burden enough, given their numbers: what wore him down was the need to plan for the forthcoming march, which being partly across desert meant ensuring a good supply of water, for the men certainly, but even more so for the horses. They required water by the barrel load and if it was lacking they would soon become useless.
Added to that there was feed for several thousand mouths, equine and human, which if it would be provided inside imperial territory, still had to be purchased and stockpiled. Once over the frontier the same supplies required to be transported and that meant hundreds of mules — wheeled transport on soft sand was never going to work — which only added to the nightmare.
Being so busy afforded him little time to assess the men he would lead, and in the short time he could spare in evaluation, what he observed did not excite him for it seemed far from being a cohesive force. The contingents arrived in piecemeal fashion from all over the southern provinces of the empire and as was normal with such bodies their leadership was personal. Each unit of men looked to their own commanders for instruction and he was too occupied to devote enough time to altering that.
His duties granted him even less of a chance to explain to these leaders his objectives and preferred tactics but with the time of departure approaching, and most of the needs of his army met, he finally called on them to confer. Flavius was very much the man in charge but, fresh to command, he was wary of treating them with too lofty a tone, so much so that it was not orders he issued but a set of guidelines that sought to achieve consensus on what manoeuvres to adopt that afforded the best chance of success.
The most important point was that this was no invasion; the object was to check the Lakhmid raiders and force them back over the frontier. That changed when information came in that they had been reinforced by a proper army; clearly news of the Roman response had forced Kavadh to act to protect his allies. Now the task became to eject that force from Roman territory, which might occasion a proper battle.
Flavius suggested, given the altered circumstances, they take up a position in the hope of drawing the enemy onto them, in short to choose the battlefield, not least because they had no idea of Sassanid numbers and it was definitely folly to attack an enemy of unknown strength. The feeling that those listening were merely paying lip service was one he could not put aside. He was sure he saw in their smiling agreement a hint of indulgence; they were as aware as he of his inexperience and probably saw in what he said the fear of defeat rather than a hope of victory and he decided that had to be addressed.
‘I doubt any host has marched without a certainty of impending success and too many have paid in blood for being overzealous. I would want it to be no different with us but we must acknowledge realities.’
The response came from Coutzes, who led the largest contingent of cavalry. ‘It is possible to be too cautious, Flavius Belisarius, and that is not a feeling it is wise to allow to pervade an army. Our men look to us to display confidence. We must ever appear certain of victory otherwise the spirit will not be there when we need it.’
A son of Vitalian and the dux of Phoenicia Libanensis, Coutzes ruled his satrapy from Palmyra. He came across as a man full of confidence and one who saw no need for excessive respect to his titular superior, both obvious in the cast of his look and the tone of his voice, though he was never openly impolite.
That there was an undertone in his attitude was only to be expected; Coutzes knew Flavius was close to Justinian, just as he must be aware that the Emperor had been behind his father’s murder. That fact alone made Flavius wonder how he could continue to serve the Emperor and placed a mark on his character. Yet to show any disrespect would not serve, so the response had to be one that took account of his obvious self-esteem.
‘I know what you mean, Coutzes, and I accept it as valid. But men who cannot see further than the end of their lance rely on the likes of us to do so for them, to make sure we do not waste their blood. We are about to traverse a desert, which imposes supply problems not least with water and that tells our enemies the direction we must take to have access to the wells.’
Atafar the Saracen spoke up this time. ‘Where they will wait for us.’
Of all the junior commanders he seemed the most receptive to what was being imparted and it was easy to understand why, for his men were entirely infantry. He was an experienced leader and came showered with honours from previous battles in which he had acted with bravery and distinction, so he knew what he wanted. Fluid battle and rushed movement was not the forte of the kind of levies he led. They were more suited to stout defence on suitable ground followed by a mass attack once the conditions for victory had been attained, namely the enemy been rendered disordered when they were still in proper formations.