So what does this leave? First and foremost a game of cat and mouse with the authorities in the legal sphere. Even in the harshest totalitarian systems, the regime has to leave a few gaps for the legal activity of society. The regime will, of course, try to control this completely from within, but externally it’s supposed to appear as the activity of working “social institutions”. A classic example of this in Soviet times were the pseudo-social organisations known as the arts’ unions (of writers, artists, cinematographers, journalists and so on). Later, during the years of perestroika, some of them did play an active role in pushing forward changes in society. In the broad “game of chess” that the opposition is having to play with this regime – a regime that has finally put a halt to the legacy of Gorbachev and Yeltsin – every such union, every such “cell” that has been created and maintained by the authorities for its own purposes should be regarded as a tiny piece of society that must be taken over. If the opposition doesn’t do this, society will remain in the hands of the authorities.
The regime is also constantly looking at the alignment of forces. It could simply ban everything; but the more it bans, the harder it becomes to control the situation. It has to find a balance. So it leaves a few gaps where it considers that the plusses outweigh the minuses. It’s those places that the opposition should concentrate on, dashing from one to another. Because all the time some windows will be closing while others will be opening.
Working in conditions of limited legality will impose certain barriers. Clearly, we’ll have to learn again the language of Aesop’s Fables and choose our words very carefully. Anyone who suggests they are seeking power will be wiped out by the regime, but some possibilities will remain open for those who are “not aiming for power”. Therefore it will be essential to limit one’s ambitions.
One of the opposition’s main tasks will be to entice back those who have been recruited by the state. Those who are extremely intolerant towards those they consider as “loyalists” have to think about this. Today, it is only from abroad that the radical opposition is able to speak out. Yet the oppositionists lump together anyone who doesn’t share a radical opinion; anyone who’s adapted to the regime or who partially accepts it; or especially anyone who is a part of the regime, albeit not one of the worst. And all of these people are harshly criticised as collaborators. meaning that the only voices that will be heard will be those that are in the grey area. If the opposition wants to continue to be heard it has to learn to speak to those in the grey area.
When it comes to influencing public opinion, no kind of underground work can take the place of what can be done legally. The long struggle of dealing with totalitarianism bears this out. Therefore, striking alliances with those who are undecided is one of the most important conditions for success, as these are the very people who can open up the legal approach, even in the most adverse conditions. What might be meant by “alliances”? Firstly, attracting onto our side those whom the regime still allows to write and to speak. Secondly, laying the foundations for working inside those organisations that the regime has created to give the impression of the existence of a civil society, and forming within them groups of sympathisers. And thirdly, in developing independent work in those areas that the regime finds it difficult to wipe out immediately: the defence of people’s rights, social help, charity, educational work, economic initiatives and so on.
What else can the underground do? Undoubtedly, prepare public acts of protest. Not so as to “seize power”, but to show the flag and other symbols that will keep the movement alive. Of course, this also includes maintaining in readiness communication and organisational links so that if there is any change in the political situation they can emerge swiftly from underground and become a normal political organisation. Finally, there is assistance for those who have been arrested and for their families. In this instance we must bear in mind that in present circumstances financing any illegal work from external sources will, in effect, be impossible, fraught as it is with instant disclosure and sanctions. So all local activists and organisations that have managed to survive will have to be self-financing. But this in itself will reduce the number of such organisations.
Nevertheless, if the Russian state continues to develop as we’ve seen in recent years, sooner or later the opposition will have to acknowledge that the focal point of its political work will have to take place abroad. They have to look at this soberly and start to prepare for it psychologically. Recent experience, including what happened in Belarus, illustrates that the only place that at least the coordinating hub of opposition activity can be based is outside the country. Any attempt to create it internally will be smashed by the regime. It's only abroad that the work of the independent opposition media can be fully rolled out, although the spreading of its content within Russia will be a separate challenge. (But in order to put out reliable information, you also have to create reliable ways of producing it.) It’s abroad, too, that projects to teach activists how to prepare for the future Russia will have to be formed. And it’s only outside Russia that the necessary financial resources can be organised and that Western public opinion can be influenced.
Trying to operate from abroad, of course, is always a compromise. But the problem is that those who are going to try to live on inside the country will have to make even more of a compromise. I believe that we’re going to have to change our usual attitude to political emigration and see flight from the country as something essential, and thus stop dividing the opposition into the categories of “those on the ground” and “those abroad”. In this way, emigration can simply be considered as a second front in the struggle against the regime; and if the situation becomes too dreadful, it may even become the main front. There must be clear mutual cooperation between those who are fighting inside the country and those carrying on the struggle from abroad. It’s only with such cooperation that the opposition’s two fronts can survive and operate.
But those who are operating abroad will have extra problems. The regime will inevitably describe these political emigrants as spies and saboteurs who are in the pay of foreign secret services. And that’s only part of it. They certainly won’t have an easy relationship with the governments and secret services of those countries where they try to establish their bases. History has shown that European governments are not exactly thrilled about having opponents of the Russian regime operating on their territories, because it’s a headache they could do without. It also creates extra problems in their relations with the Kremlin.
It seems clear that there’s going to have to be a division of labour. From a certain point, any open discussion about the model for the new Russia will be possible only somewhere where the dictatorship is not operating. But the spread of free ideas from outside will be difficult. It will be done by those who are courageous enough to carry on the struggle inside the country. We have to be prepared for a significant period of time when the protest will have to be kept on hold before it can be released into the political sphere. It’s essential, therefore, that we ensure that during this period our work is well prepared. The more we’re able to do now, the less will need to be done later.