Thirdly, it remains vital to control the traditional forms of mass communication: television, radio, newspapers and print. If they can’t be taken over, they must at least be neutralised.
Fourthly: it’s very important to prevent the regime from carrying out repressions and seizing the leaders from the crowd. In order to prevent this, one of the first things to do is blockade prisons and police stations, and release any comrades who’ve already been arrested.
Fifthly: the formation of an advance guard of units of well-prepared and, if possible, armed youths remains as important as ever. They should be able at least partially to prevent the security forces from acting and provide cover for the bulk of the people. Similarly, preparing and arming these units both with weapons taken from the security forces and with home-made devices, such as Molotov cocktails and so forth, is also of vital importance.
Revolution is a serious business, and should never be toyed with. If you’re not absolutely sure, don’t try to overtake history. If you’re not prepared to carry things through to the end, don’t even leave your room. Don’t start up any kind of movement. Just stay where you are. Don’t call people out on the streets if you don’t know which street to choose and where you need to go – and if you’re not prepared to lead from the front. But if you do make that call, don’t stop, even when there are casualties. Because if you do, there’ll simply be even more casualties and, worst of all, they will have died for nothing. If you feel that you’re capable of doing this, then prepare yourself. Being a revolutionary is a profession. And as with any other profession, it doesn’t tolerate amateurs. Preparing yourself means also thinking things through to their conclusion and not being afraid of the outcome, which could be far tougher than any of us might want.
Chapter 5. How to Organise the New Order:
Constitutional Democracy or Democracy by Decree?
An honest and principled person who is critical of the current regime in Russia is right to ask: what’s the problem in moving from a bad authoritarian state to a good democratic one?
Indeed, at first glance everything looks relatively simple. After the democratic forces have triumphed (however this is accomplished), the first step must be to call a Constituent (constitutional) Assembly. Next, a new Constitution must be approved; or, at the very least, the old one must have all of the non-constitutional additions removed. Then free and fair elections must be held to create the democratic authorities’ new institutions. This tends to be how everything works. But the reality is somewhat more complicated. We need to look carefully at the details of this plan to be aware of the many practical issues that will arise. And it’s much better to consider all this before we arrive at this juncture.
Common sense tells us that even in the most favourable conditions, the three most basic requirements of the new authorities – calling the Constituent Assembly, bringing the Constitution into line with democratic principles and holding free and fair elections – cannot be achieved in a day or even a month. You need at least a year, probably longer. And this is in ideal circumstances; that clearly won’t be the case for us.
We have to spend more time looking at these conditions, because they’re hugely significant. You don’t have to be a prophet to predict that when Putin goes many people will still retain the habit of living as they have under Putin. This means that genuine changes in life in Russia will take place far more slowly than we would wish.
Far too often we underestimate the power of social inertia. People intrinsically hang on to whatever it is that they’ve grown used to over a number of years. As a result of this, dilapidated organisations keep on working, even though you might have expected them to collapse under the weight of corruption and ineffectiveness. The system shows a miraculous ability to survive against all the odds. But then, when inertia finally takes its toll (and it can’t go on for ever), the system collapses drastically and in a way that’s difficult to control. The stronger the inertia is and the longer it lasts, the greater will be the risks that need to be overcome in the transitional period.
What can any temporary government expect when it attempts to drag Russia out of its past and prepare it for the future?
A sharp rise in poverty due to a worsening budget deficit and limited possibilities for financial flexibility;
Increased disintegration and the growth of a mood of separatism;
Opposition and sabotage from the old elite, especially from the military and the secret services;
Capital flight, directly or tangentially linked to the previous regime;
An increase in crime, especially with the redistribution of property;
A worsening in the international sphere, since the weakening of the situation inside the country will inevitably lead to greater pressure from outside.
In circumstances that will already be difficult, all of these factors could create “the perfect storm”. Whatever good intentions the temporary government may have, it will quickly find itself having to introduce emergency measures. It will have two concurrent agendas, one of top of the other, each interfering with the other. There will be the transformative agenda, aimed at creating the conditions in Russia for stable, constitutional government. And there will be the emergency agenda, that will try to maintain the political gains that have been won, while fighting off opposition from the old society and trying to bring stability to the overall socio-economic and political situation in the country.
Politics is a never-ending process. If this process splits apart, even if just for a few days, not even weeks or months, then chaos will inevitably reign in the gaping chasm this brings. And we’re talking here about a period of one or two years. Confusion and anarchy could produce an even worse regime for Russia than Putin’s. If we don’t think about this in advance, then someone could simply seize the power that’s being trodden underfoot. And whether they would then wish to share that power with anyone else is a serious question.
From a practical point of view, the success of the transformation will greatly depend not only on the effectiveness of the Constituent Assembly, but also on the competence of the government that takes over on day one of the revolution, and that will rule the country until a permanent government takes office following free and fair elections. This temporary government must be capable of closing the gap between the start of the democratic transformation and the point when these democratic changes come into force. Agreeing the goals and the tasks of the temporary government is more important right now than talking about future constitutional innovations. This can be discussed in the Constituent Assembly; but the temporary government won’t have time for that.
The phrase “after Putin” is a rather abstract one. “After Putin” could happen when Putin is still alive; or it could come many years after his death. We must not assume that another “Putin” – or an even worse example – would not come to power when Putin goes. And there could be many such examples. Opponents of the Bolshevik regime predicted its demise nearly every year, but it continued for almost 70 years. It’s a different matter that it won’t go on forever. There will come a time when civil society will be allowed to find its place in the political sphere. That will be the point when the transitional period begins.
To some degree it doesn’t matter who makes the first move, or how they do it. It could be someone from the ranks of the successors who, as Gorbachev did, will declare that, “we cannot go on living like this”, and will start to gradually loosen the screws on society. It might be a “traitor to their own class”, like Yeltsin, who manages to burst through to the highest echelons of power and build “a revolution from above”. It’s not impossible that it could even be a coalition of democratic forces, that carries out “a revolution from below”; although in a police state such as Russia, that, for now, seems unlikely.